


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BURKE'S THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE
OF THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS



Burke's Thoughts

on

The Cause of the Present Discontents

EDITED, WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES, BY

F. G. Selby, M.A. Oxon.

Late Scholar of Wadham College; Principal and Professor of
Logic and Moral Philosophy, Deccan College, Poona
Fellow of the University of Bombay

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INTRODUCTION.

EDMUND BURKE was born at Dublin, at the end of 1728 or the beginning of 1729. He was first elected to Parliament, as member for the borough of Wendover, at the end of 1765, the year in which George Grenville was dismissed from office. Grenville was succeeded by Lord Rockingham, the head of a party which Burke regarded as the most honest and patriotic party in the country, and which he was largely instrumental in keeping together. Rockingham remained in office for one year and twenty days. After him came the Chatham ministry. On Chatham going to the House of Lords, the Duke of Grafton led the ministry, and after him Lord North, who remained at the head of affairs for twelve years, from 1770-1782. The opening years of the reign of George III. were years of disturbance and difficulty. The elevation of Bute to the premiership, after the disgrace of Pitt and the dismissal of Newcastle, had produced a violent prejudice against the Scotch. Then came the troubles with America. There was, besides, the excitement caused by the affair of Wilkes. It seemed likely that the majority of the House of Commons would arrogate to itself the right of determining whom the constituencies might elect to sit as their

representatives. There were violent riots in London, provoked by the sympathy of the mob with Wilkes, and by general detestation of the arbitrary conduct of the House of Commons. Burke's view of the period, his explanation of the disorders, and the remedies which he proposed, are set forth in his pamphlet on *The Cause of the Present Discontents*, published in 1770.

Burke sat in the Parliament of 1774 as member for Bristol, of which city he continued to be the representative for six years. He made himself unpopular with his constituents by the support which he gave to the abolition of restrictions on Irish trade, and to the removal of unreasonable disabilities on Catholics. In this year he made his speech on American taxation, and in 1775 the speech on conciliation with America. In 1777 appeared his letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol on the affairs of America. It contains a characteristic defence of freedom. It is a plea for generosity and self-respect in national policy. Above all, it urges a preference of moral and utilitarian considerations to assertions of abstract rights. In 1780 matters were complicated at home by the anti-popery Gordon riots. Burke was endangered because he, as a Whig, had advocated a milder treatment of Catholics. It was in this year that he presented to the House his scheme of Economic Reform. His object was to abolish all the lucrative sinecures, by means of which the Court could corrupt the House of Commons, and turn it into a mere tool of despotism. This was Burke's substitute for those schemes of organic reform which he always opposed. In this year he lost his seat for Bristol, but was returned as member for the borough of Malton. When

Lord North's government came to an end in 1782, the Rockingham party again came into power. Notwithstanding the services which Burke had rendered to the party, he was not admitted into the Cabinet. Lord Rockingham died after three months of office. The ministry was split up. Some of them supported the claims of Shelburne, others those of Fox, who was now the head of the Rockingham section of the Whigs, to the vacant premiership. The king preferred Shelburne. It was unfortunate that the whole Whig party could not act together. We must regret that Burke rendered the party powerless by aiding to split it into two halves, and that he offered a violent and factious opposition to the ministry. The Shelburne administration fell in the spring of 1783, and Fox and Burke, to their disgrace, went over to their old enemy Lord North. A Coalition Ministry was formed, but was dismissed in December, 1783, on the rejection of Fox's India Bill. Pitt was made prime minister, and the power of the Whigs was at an end for half a century. Burke began by opposing a measure brought forward by Pitt, which was practically a proposal to give to Ireland complete commercial freedom, on condition that she paid a contribution from her surplus revenue to the Imperial Treasury. Mr. Morley points out that Burke's conduct can only be justified on the ground that Pitt's proposals "amounted to an attempt to extract revenue from Ireland, identical in purpose, principle, and probable effect with the ever memorable attempt to extract revenue from the American colonies." In 1787 he opposed Pitt's proposed treaty of commerce with France, "which enabled the subjects of both countries to reside and travel in either without license or passport, did away with all prohibitions

of trade on either side, and reduced every import duty.”* But, so far as Burke was concerned, the most remarkable event of the session was, of course, the impeachment of Warren Hastings. He opened the case in 1788, and the verdict was delivered in 1795. To the affairs of India, generally, Burke really devoted the labour of fourteen years, from 1781 to 1795.† Burke next opposed Pitt’s Regency Bill, the principle of which was that the Prince of Wales could not claim to act as Regent, but that it lay with the Parliament to appoint the Regent and to define the terms on which he held office. During this period, Burke appears, by his unreasonableness, to have lost his influence in the country, and the confidence of his party and his friends. But with the French Revolution all this was changed. On this subject he was at variance with Fox from the first. In 1790 he supported the bill for the increase of the English army, and he took occasion to declare that he would not remain on terms of friendship with any one who should in any way further the introduction of a democracy like that of France. Fox expressed in the House his high sense of the value of Burke’s friendship. When Sheridan dissented from the

* Green’s *Short History of the English People*, p. 772.

† “If I were to call for a reward, which I have never done, it should be for those services in which for fourteen years, without intermission, I showed the most industry, and had the least success, I mean in the affairs of India. They are those on which I value myself the most; most for the importance; most for the labour; most for the judgment; most for constancy and perseverance in the pursuit. Others may value them most for the *intention*. In that surely they are not mistaken.”—*Letter to a Noble Lord*.

views expressed in Burke's speech, Burke openly broke with him. In the same year, when Fox proposed, what Burke had before advocated, namely, a repeal of the Test and Corporation Act, Burke turned round and opposed it, declaring that Dissenters were disaffected citizens. It was in November, 1790, that he published his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. It was hailed with delight by the Crown and the Tories. In 1791 Burke openly broke with Fox on the subject of the French Revolution. In August of the same year he published his *Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs*, in which he explained and defended his views on the French Revolution, and vindicated himself against the charge of having abandoned, in his criticisms on that event, the Whig principles which he had professed through life. A few months after the publication of the *Reflections*, he had issued his *Letter to a Member of the National Assembly*, which was full of violent abuse of the Revolution and its authors. In the same letter he hinted that a European intervention in favour of the French king might become necessary. By the end of the year 1791 he had himself become convinced that it was necessary. Henceforth he devoted himself to the advocacy of war against the French, and of repressive measures at home to stop the spread of Jacobin opinions. It was the murder of the French king which roused opinion in England to sympathy with Burke. In 1794 he retired from Parliament. Arrangements were being made for creating him a peer, but, in August of that year, he was completely broken by the death of his son. The question of the peerage was dropped, and a pension was granted to him. His *Letter to a Noble Lord* is a vindication, at once spirited and

pathetic, of his right to a pension on the score of his political services. In 1795 he wrote the *Letters on a Regicide Peace*, which are, like the rest of his writings on the subject, characterized by violent hatred of all that was being done in France. The death of his son threw a profound melancholy over his closing years, and he died July 9th, 1797.

It is not necessary to repeat the oft told story of the first ten years of the reign of George III.* Burke thus diagnosed the situation: From the accession of William III. onwards various causes prevented the Crown from acting despotically. A sovereign with a new Parliamentary title was necessarily dependent on the leaders "of connexion and popularity." George I. and II., besides being foreigners by extraction, manners, and interests, were in constant dread of a successful Jacobite rising. But with George III. all this was changed, and a certain set of people thought that they could turn his security and popularity to account, and, under the specious name of loyalty, advance themselves by making the dignity and comfort of the king the avowed object of their policy. They represented the Crown as being discredited by dependence upon those whose assistance it no longer required. It was now to assert its proper independence. This could not be effected

* It is told shortly in Chapter xvi. of Book vi. of the *Epochs of English History*, and at greater length in the histories of Mahon and Massey. On the whole, I think that the student will find in the first volume of Mr. Massey's *History* his most judicious companion and guide. Macaulay's *Essays* relating to the period and Trevelyan's *History of Charles James Fox* should, of course, be read; but it must be remembered that they are not a criticism, but a repetition and a paraphrase, of Burke.

by substituting Prerogative for Parliament. But the influence of the Court, it was thought, might be substituted for that of popularity and connexion. This would be to deprive the people of all power, and so to introduce a despotism. Plausible arguments were not wanting to recommend such a change, and it was proposed to carry the scheme into practice by shifting power from the nominal Ministry to a real Ministry, composed of the self-styled *King's Friends*, behind the throne. The nominal Ministry was to be weakened and discredited in every way, and the members of it were to be made to quarrel with one another so as to prevent the possibility of their ever working together again. The Rockingham administration was a short but unsuccessful attempt to bring back the old and better state of things. It is not to be wondered at that the people were exasperated. Their control over the management of affairs, and over the spirit and the policy as well as the execution of the laws was, practically and in reality, taken away from them. Court favouritism and constitutional government are incompatible things. When the nation no longer through the Parliament controls the system and persons of Ministries, the free constitution is at an end, and only the outward form of it remains. It is impossible to admit that the King may appoint his own Ministers, and that the sole business of Parliament is to support them. The only hope of restoring peace and contentment to the country lay in the recovery by the people of the importance and power to which by the constitution they were entitled. The system of weakening and discrediting the Ministry resulted in an utter

paralysis of Government, so that it was naturally regarded as a *quantité négligéable* by foreign powers. The Colonies were alienated from a Government from which they had nothing to hope, and which was not strong enough to inspire fear. The people of England were disgusted because they saw themselves mocked with the forms, while robbed of the reality, of freedom. Under these circumstances agitators, in themselves insignificant, arose and obtained an unnatural importance. They increased the disorder to which they owed their power. Force had to be employed to keep order, and the King's friends, unwilling to proclaim to the world their dependence upon the army, were obliged to use one mob to disperse another, and then to protect from the just punishment of the law the authors of disturbances which they themselves had illegally provoked. The original justification of the scheme had been that it would make the King independent and happy. The only result of it had been to subject him to impoverishment, humiliation, and anxiety, such as had been unknown in the days of constitutional Government, and that for the sake of men whom he did not know, and who would desert him at the first appearance of danger.

To watch and control the Ministry in the interests of the people is the characteristic function of the House of Commons. At the time at which Burke wrote the Ministry knew that it could count upon the support of the House. Circumstances had increased the power of the Commons and the frequency and duration of their sittings; and it had now come to this, that they had the power of deciding, by no other rule than their


own pleasure, who might sit as a representative of the people. That House, which was intended to look after the interests of the people, was to be composed of the very men by whom the people did not wish to be represented. That which was intended for the protection of the people had allowed itself to be made the instrument of their neglect and oppression. It is obvious how much more a government can do in the direction of despotism through a complaisant House of Commons than it could do by using the Prerogative against a House of Commons faithful to its trust. Popularity and popular sympathies were to be made a positive disqualification for a seat, and the treatment of Wilkes was intended to show that nothing but subservience to the Court could make the position of a member respectable or even endurable. After securing a packed House of Commons the next necessity was to secure unlimited means of bribing it. Accordingly, the unconstitutional principle was asserted that the House of Commons, the trustee of the public purse, was bound, without requiring any accounts, to pay any debts which the Sovereign might incur, although the amount which the Crown might spend was fixed by Parliament.

The remedies proposed for the evils which existed, namely, the shortening of Parliaments and disqualification of placemen, would, in Burke's opinion, have done more harm than good. The people themselves, he argued, must interfere and keep their representatives true to their duty. They had the right to do this, and in no other way could they recover what was theirs according to the Constitution. It was hopeless to expect peace until the Constitution was restored. Until

that was done there could be no respect for Government, and consequently no respect for the law which the Government attempted to enforce. The body of King's Friends must be broken up ; support must be refused to any administration which consented to have any dealings with them ; and a recurrence of the existing troubles must be prevented by the restoration, before it was too late, of those honest party connexions, backed by popular support, which it had been the natural policy of the King's Friends to discredit.

In forming an estimate of the period to which Burke's pamphlet refers, it is well to begin by making certain admissions. It may be allowed that the Whigs had degenerated into a selfish and venal oligarchy, that they had usurped powers which properly belonged to the Crown, and had used them badly, and that George III. had a right to do his utmost to recover the powers which were constitutionally his. All this, however, has nothing to do with the actual aims and methods of George. If he had been a man of intelligence and tact, willing to respect the limitations imposed by the Constitution upon the Crown, he might have made himself at once powerful and popular. But he was obstinate and arbitrary. The real tendency of his policy was to assimilate the English monarchy to the absolute monarchies of the Continent, and he had not the sense to see that this was an impossible policy in England. Both the history and the character of the people made it impossible. In the immediate struggle with his Whig opponents the victory, perhaps, on the whole, was with George ; but his effort to stifle freedom in the only European country in which in the eighteenth century freedom existed happily failed.

It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to remind the student that Burke's pamphlet has another interest than the merely historical one. Burke is always a great teacher, and this treatise is full of information and suggestion on political and constitutional matters of eternal interest—on the basis of authority, the conditions of political freedom, the relation of the Executive to the Legislature, the power of law, the principles of finance, the character and aims of the British Constitution, the history and functions of Parliament, the theory and operation of Representative government, and the obligations of citizenship. However we may differ on the correctness of Burke's views on particular events, we must all agree in regarding his writings as a storehouse of "large and liberal ideas" upon politics.



THOUGHTS

ON THE

CAUSE OF THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS.

Hoc vero occultum, intestinum, domesticum malum, non modo non existit, verum etiam opprimit, antequam perspicere atque explorare potueris.
CIC.

1770.

It is an undertaking of some degree of delicacy to examine into the cause of public disorders. If a man happens not to succeed in such an inquiry, he will be thought weak and visionary ; if he touches the true grievance, there is a danger that he may come near to persons of weight and consequence, who will rather be exasperated at the discovery of their errors, than thankful for the occasion of correcting them. If he should be obliged to blame the favourites of the people, he will be considered as the tool of power ; if he censures those in power, he will be looked on as an instru- 10
ment of faction. But in all exertions of duty something is to be hazarded. In cases of tumult and disorder, our law has invested every man, in some sort, with the authority of a magistrate. When the affairs of the nation are distracted, private people are, by the spirit of that law, justified in stepping a little out of their ordinary sphere. They enjoy a privilege, of somewhat more dignity and effect, than that of idle

lamentation over the calamities of their country. They may look into them narrowly ; they may reason upon them liberally ; and if they should be so fortunate as to discover the true source of the mischief, and to suggest any probable method of removing it, though they may displease the rulers for the day, they are certainly of service to the cause of government. Government is deeply interested in everything which, even through the medium of some temporary uneasiness, may tend finally to compose the minds of the
10 subject, and to conciliate their affections. I have nothing to do here with the abstract value of the voice of the people. But as long as reputation, the most precious possession of every individual, and as long as opinion, the great support of the state, depend entirely upon that voice, it can never be considered as a thing of little consequence either to individuals or to governments. Nations are not primarily ruled by laws ; less by violence. Whatever original energy may be supposed either in force or regulation, the operation of both is, in truth, merely instrumental. Nations are governed
20 by the same methods, and on the same principles, by which an individual without authority is often able to govern those who are his equals or his superiors ; by a knowledge of their temper, and by a judicious management of it ; I mean, —when public affairs are steadily and quietly conducted : not when government is nothing but a continued scuffle between the magistrate and the multitude ; in which sometimes the one and sometimes the other is uppermost ; in which they alternately yield and prevail, in a series of contemptible victories and scandalous submissions. The temper
30 of the people amongst whom he presides ought therefore to be the first study of a statesman. And the knowledge of this temper it is by no means impossible for him to attain, if he has not an interest in being ignorant of what it is his duty to learn.

To complain of the age we live in, to murmur at the present possessors of power, to lament the past, to conceive

extravagant hopes of the future, are the common dispositions of the greatest part of mankind ; indeed the necessary effects of the ignorance and levity of the vulgar. Such complaints and humours have existed in all times ; yet as all times have *not* been alike, true political sagacity manifests itself in distinguishing that complaint which only characterizes the general infirmity of human nature, from those which are symptoms of the particular distemperature of our own air and season.

Nobody, I believe, will consider it merely as the language of spleen or disappointment, if I say, that there is something 10 particularly alarming in the present conjuncture. There is hardly a man, in or out of power, who holds any other language. That government is at once dreaded and contemned ; that the laws are despoiled of all their respected and salutary terrors ; that their inaction is a subject of ridicule, and their exertion of abhorrence ; that rank, and office, and title, and all the solemn plausibilities of the world, have lost their reverence and effect ; that our foreign politics are as much deranged as our domestic economy ; that our dependencies are slackened in their affection, and loosened from their 20 obedience ; that we know neither how to yield nor how to enforce ; that hardly anything above or below, abroad or at home, is sound and entire ; but that disconnexion and confusion, in offices, in parties, in families, in parliament, in the nation, prevail beyond the disorders of any former time : these are facts universally admitted and lamented.

This state of things is the more extraordinary, because the great parties which formerly divided and agitated the kingdom are known to be in a manner entirely dissolved. No great external calamity has visited the nation ; no pesti- 30 lence or famine. We do not labour at present under any scheme of taxation new or oppressive in the quantity or in the mode. Nor are we engaged in an unsuccessful war ; in which our misfortunes might easily pervert our judgment ; and our minds, sore from the loss of national glory, might feel every blow of fortune as a crime in government.

It is impossible that the cause of this strange distemper should not sometimes become a subject of discourse. It is a compliment due, and which I willingly pay, to those who administer our affairs, to take notice in the first place of their speculation. Our ministers are of opinion, that the increase of our trade and manufactures, that our growth by colonization and by conquest, have concurred to accumulate immense wealth in the hands of some individuals ; and this again being dispersed among the people, has rendered them
10 universally proud, ferocious, and ungovernable ; that the insolence of some from their enormous wealth, and the boldness of others from a guilty poverty, have rendered them capable of the most atrocious attempts ; so that they have trampled upon all subordination, and violently borne down the unarmed laws of a free government ; barriers too feeble against the fury of a populace so fierce and licentious as ours. They contend, that no adequate provocation has been given for so spreading a discontent ; our affairs having been conducted throughout with remarkable temper and consummate wisdom.
20 The wicked industry of some libellers, joined to the intrigues of a few disappointed politicians, have, in their opinion, been able to produce this unnatural ferment in the nation.

Nothing indeed can be more unnatural than the present convulsions of this country, if the above account be a true one. I confess I shall assent to it with great reluctance, and only on the compulsion of the clearest and firmest proofs ; because their account resolves itself into this short but discouraging proposition, "That we have a very good ministry, but that we are a very bad people ;" that we set ourselves to
30 bite the hand that feeds us ; that with a malignant insanity we oppose the measures, and ungratefully vilify the persons, of those whose sole object is our own peace and prosperity. If a few puny libellers, acting under a knot of factious politicians, without virtue, parts, or character, (such they are constantly represented by these gentlemen,) are sufficient to excite this disturbance, very perverse must be the disposition

of that people, amongst whom such a disturbance can be excited by such means. It is besides no small aggravation of the public misfortune, that the disease, on this hypothesis, appears to be without remedy. If the wealth of the nation be the cause of its turbulence, I imagine it is not proposed to introduce poverty, as a constable to keep the peace. If our dominions abroad are the roots which feed all this rank luxuriance of sedition, it is not intended to cut them off in order to famish the fruit. If our liberty has enfeebled the executive power, there is no design, I hope, to call in the aid 10
of despotism, to fill up the deficiencies of law. Whatever may be intended, these things are not yet professed. We seem therefore to be driven to absolute despair ; for we have no other materials to work upon, but those out of which God has been pleased to form the inhabitants of this island. If these be radically and essentially vicious, all that can be said is that those men are very unhappy, to whose fortune or duty it falls to administer the affairs of this untoward people. I hear it indeed sometimes asserted, that a steady perseverance in the present measures, and a rigorous punishment of those 20
who oppose them, will in course of time infallibly put an end to these disorders. But this, in my opinion, is said without much observation of our present disposition, and without any knowledge at all of the general nature of mankind. If the matter of which this nation is composed be so very fermentable as these gentlemen describe it, leaven never will be wanting to work it up, as long as discontent, revenge, and ambition have existence in the world. Particular punishments are the cure for accidental distempers in the state ; they inflame rather than allay those heats which arise from 30
the settled mismanagement of the government, or from a natural ill disposition in the people. It is of the utmost moment not to make mistakes in the use of strong measures ; and firmness is then only a virtue when it accompanies the most perfect wisdom. In truth, inconstancy is a sort of natural corrective of folly and ignorance.

I am not one of those who think that the people are never in the wrong. They have been so, frequently and outrageously, both in other countries and in this. But I do say, that in all disputes between them and their rulers, the presumption is at least upon a par in favour of the people. Experience may perhaps justify me in going further. When popular discontents have been very prevalent, it may well be affirmed and supported, that there has been generally something found amiss in the constitution, or in the conduct of government. The people have no interest in disorder. When they do wrong, it is their error, and not their crime. But with the governing part of the state, it is far otherwise. They certainly may act ill by design, as well as by mistake. "*Les révolutions qui arrivent dans les grands états ne sont point un effet du hazard, ni du caprice des peuples. Rien ne révolte les grands d'un royaume comme un gouvernement foible et dérangé. Pour la populace, ce n'est jamais par envie d'attaquer qu'elle se soulève, mais par impatience de souffrir.*" [*The revolutions which occur in great states are not the result of accident or of the caprice of the people. There is nothing which disgusts the grandees of a kingdom so much as a feeble and disorganized government. As for the masses, they rise because their sufferings are unendurable, not because they have any wish to attack the government.*] These are the words of a great man ; of a minister of state ; and a zealous assertor of monarchy. They are applied to the *system of favouritism* which was adopted by Henry the Third of France, and to the dreadful consequences it produced. What he says of revolutions, is equally true of all great disturbances. If this presumption in favour of the subjects against the trustees of power be not the more probable, I am sure it is the more comfortable speculation ; because it is more easy to change an administration than to reform a people.

Upon a supposition, therefore, that, in the opening of the cause, the presumptions stand equally balanced between the parties, there seems sufficient ground to entitle any person

to a fair hearing, who attempts some other scheme beside that easy one which is fashionable in some fashionable companies, to account for the present discontents. It is not to be argued that we endure no grievance, because our grievances are not of the same sort with those under which we laboured formerly ; not precisely those which we bore from the Tudors, or vindicated on the Stuarts. A great change has taken place in the affairs of this country. For in the silent lapse of events as material alterations have been insensibly brought about in the policy and character of 10 governments and nations, as those which have been marked by the tumult of public revolutions.

It is very rare indeed for men to be wrong in their feelings concerning public misconduct ; as rare to be right in their speculation upon the cause of it. I have constantly observed, that the generality of people are fifty years, at least, behind-hand in their politics. There are but very few, who are capable of comparing and digesting what passes before their eyes at different times and occasions, so as to form the whole into a distinct system. But in books every- 20 thing is settled for them, without the exertion of any considerable diligence or sagacity. For which reason men are wise with but little reflection, and good with little self-denial, in the business of all times except their own. We are very uncorrupt and tolerably enlightened judges of the transactions of past ages ; where no passions deceive, and where the whole train of circumstances, from the trifling cause to the tragical event, is set in an orderly series before us. Few are the partisans of departed tyranny ; and to be a Whig on the business of an hundred years ago, is very 30 consistent with every advantage of present servility. This retrospective wisdom, and historical patriotism, are things of wonderful convenience ; and serve admirably to reconcile the old quarrel between speculation and practice. Many a stern republican, after gorging himself with a full feast of admiration of the Grecian commonwealths and of our true

Saxon constitution, and discharging all the splendid bile of his virtuous indignation on King John and King James, sits down perfectly satisfied to the coarsest work and homeliest job of the day he lives in. I believe there was no professed admirer of Henry the Eighth among the instruments of the last King James; nor in the court of Henry the Eighth was there, I dare say, to be found a single advocate for the favourites of Richard the Second.

No complaisance to our court, or to our age, can make me believe nature to be so changed, but that public liberty will be among us, as among our ancestors, obnoxious to some person or other; and that opportunities will be furnished for attempting, at least, some alteration to the prejudice of our constitution. These attempts will naturally vary in their mode, according to times and circumstances. For ambition, though it has ever the same general views, has not at all times the same means, nor the same particular objects. A great deal of the furniture of ancient tyranny is worn to rags; the rest is entirely out of fashion. Besides, there are few statesmen so very clumsy and awkward in their business, as to fall into the identical snare which has proved fatal to their predecessors. When an arbitrary imposition is attempted upon the subject, undoubtedly it will not bear on its forehead the name of *Ship-money*. There is no danger that an extension of the *Forest laws* should be the chosen mode of oppression in this age. And when we hear any instance of ministerial rapacity, to the prejudice of the rights of private life, it will certainly not be the exaction of two hundred pullets, from a woman of fashion, for leave to lie with her own husband.

Every age has its own manners, and its politics dependent upon them; and the same attempts will not be made against a constitution fully formed and matured, that were used to destroy it in the cradle, or to resist its growth during its infancy.

Against the being of parliament, I am satisfied, no designs

have ever been entertained since the revolution. Every one must perceive, that it is strongly the interest of the court, to have some second cause interposed between the ministers and the people. The gentlemen of the House of Commons have an interest equally strong, in sustaining the part of that intermediate cause. However they may hire out the *usufruct* of their voices, they never will part with the *fee and inheritance*. Accordingly those, who have been of the most known devotion to the will and pleasure of a court, have, at the same time, been most forward in asserting a high authority in the House of Commons. When they knew who were to use that authority, and how it was to be employed, they thought it never could be carried too far. It must be always the wish of an unconstitutional statesman, that a House of Commons, who are entirely dependent upon him, should have every right of the people entirely dependent upon their pleasure. It was soon discovered that the forms of a free, and the ends of an arbitrary, government, were things not altogether incompatible. 10

The power of the crown, almost dead and rotten as Pre-rogative, has grown up anew, with much more strength, and far less odium, under the name of Influence. An influence, which operated without noise and without violence; an influence, which converted the very antagonist into the instrument of power; which contained in itself a perpetual principle of growth and renovation; and which the distresses and the prosperity of the country equally tended to augment, was an admirable substitute for a prerogative, that, being only the offspring of antiquated prejudices, had moulded in its original stamina irresistible principles of decay and dissolution. The ignorance of the people is a bottom but for a temporary system; the interest of active men in the state is a foundation perpetual and infallible. However, some circumstances, arising, it must be confessed, in a great degree from accident, prevented the effects of this influence for a long time from breaking out in a manner capable of exciting 20 30

any serious apprehensions. Although government was strong and flourished exceedingly, the *court* had drawn far less advantage than one would imagine from this great source of power.

At the Revolution, the crown, deprived, for the ends of the Revolution itself, of many prerogatives, was found too weak to struggle against all the difficulties which pressed so new and unsettled a government. The court was obliged therefore to delegate a part of its powers to men of such
10 interest as could support, and of such fidelity as would adhere to, its establishment. Such men were able to draw in a greater number to a concurrence in the common defence. This connexion, necessary at first, continued long after convenient ; and properly conducted might indeed, in all situations, be an useful instrument of government. At the same time, through the intervention of men of popular weight and character, the people possessed a security for their just proportion of importance in the state. But as the title to the crown grew stronger by long possession, and by the constant
20 increase of its influence, these helps have of late seemed to certain persons no better than encumbrances. The powerful managers for government were not sufficiently submissive to the pleasure of the possessors of immediate and personal favour, sometimes from a confidence in their own strength natural and acquired ; sometimes from a fear of offending their friends, and weakening that lead in the country, which gave them a consideration independent of the court. Men acted as if the court could receive, as well as confer, an obligation. The influence of government, thus divided in
30 appearance between the court and the leaders of parties, became in many cases an accession rather to the popular than to the royal scale ; and some part of that influence, which would otherwise have been possessed as in a sort of mortmain and unalienable domain, returned again to the great ocean from whence it arose, and circulated among the people. This method, therefore, of governing by men of great natural

interest or great acquired consideration, was viewed in a very invidious light by the true lovers of absolute monarchy. It is the nature of despotism to abhor power held by any means but its own momentary pleasure ; and to annihilate all intermediate situations between boundless strength on its own part, and total debility on the part of the people.

To get rid of all this intermediate and independent importance, and to secure to the court the unlimited and uncontrolled use of its own vast influence, under the sole direction of its own private favour, has for some years past been the great object of policy. If this were compassed, the influence of the crown must of course produce all the effects which the most sanguine partisans of the court could possibly desire. Government might then be carried on without any concurrence on the part of the people ; without any attention to the dignity of the greater, or to the affections of the lower sorts. A new project was therefore devised by a certain set of intriguing men, totally different from the system of administration which had prevailed since the accession of the House of Brunswick. This project, I have heard, was first conceived by some persons in the court of Frederic Prince of Wales. 10 20

The earliest attempt in the execution of this design was to set up for minister, a person, in rank indeed respectable, and very ample in fortune ; but who, to the moment of this vast and sudden elevation, was little known or considered in the kingdom. To him the whole nation was to yield an immediate and implicit submission. But whether it was from want of firmness to bear up against the first opposition ; or that things were not yet fully ripened, or that this method was not found the most eligible ; that idea was soon abandoned. The instrumental part of the project was a little altered, to accommodate it to the time, and to bring things more gradually and more surely to the one great end proposed. 30

The first part of the reformed plan was to draw a line which should separate the court from the ministry. Hitherto

these names had been looked upon as synonymous ; but for the future, court and administration were to be considered as things totally distinct. By this operation, two systems of administration were to be formed ; one which should be in the real secret and confidence ; the other merely ostensible, to perform the official and executory duties of government. The latter were alone to be responsible ; whilst the real advisers, who enjoyed all the power, were effectually removed from all the danger.

- 10 Secondly, *A party under these leaders was to be formed in favour of the court against the ministry*: this party was to have a large share in the emoluments of government, and to hold it totally separate from, and independent of, ostensible administration.

- The third point, and that on which the success of the whole scheme ultimately depended, was *to bring parliament to an acquiescence in this project*. Parliament was therefore to be taught by degrees a total indifference to the persons, rank, influence, abilities, connexions, and character of the
 20 ministers of the crown. By means of a discipline, on which I shall say more hereafter, that body was to be habituated to the most opposite interests, and the most discordant politics. All connexions and dependencies among subjects were to be entirely dissolved. As, hitherto, business had gone through the hands of leaders of Whigs or Tories, men of talents to conciliate the people, and to engage their confidence ; now the method was to be altered ; and the lead was to be given to men of no sort of consideration or credit in the country. This want of natural importance was to be
 30 their very title to delegated power. Members of parliament were to be hardened into an insensibility to pride as well as to duty. Those high and haughty sentiments, which are the great support of independence, were to be let down gradually. Points of honour and precedence were no more to be regarded in parliamentary decorum, than in a Turkish army. It was to be avowed, as a constitutional maxim,

that the king might appoint one of his footmen, or one of your footmen, for minister ; and that he ought to be, and that he would be, as well followed as the first name for rank or wisdom in the nation. Thus parliament was to look on, as if perfectly unconcerned, while a cabal of the closet and back-stairs was substituted in the place of a national administration.

With such a degree of acquiescence, any measure of any court might well be deemed thoroughly secure. The capital objects, and by much the most flattering characteristics, of 10 arbitrary power, would be obtained. Everything would be drawn from its holdings in the country to the personal favour and inclination of the prince. This favour would be the sole introduction to power, and the only tenure by which it was to be held : so that no person looking towards another, and all looking towards the court, it was impossible but that the motive which solely influenced every man's hopes must come in time to govern every man's conduct ; till at last the servility became universal, in spite of the dead letter of any laws or institutions whatsoever. 20

How it should happen that any man could be tempted to venture upon such a project of government, may at first view appear surprising. But the fact is, that opportunities very inviting to such an attempt have offered ; and the scheme itself was not destitute of some arguments, not wholly un- plausible, to recommend it. These opportunities and these arguments, the use that has been made of both, the plan for carrying this new scheme of government into execution, and the effects which it has produced, are in my opinion worthy of our serious consideration. 30

His Majesty came to the throne of these kingdoms with more advantages than any of his predecessors since the Revolution. Fourth in descent, and third in succession of his royal family, even the zealots of hereditary right, in him, saw something to flatter their favourite prejudices ; and to justify a transfer of their attachments, without a change in

their principles. The person and cause of the Pretender were become contemptible ; his title disowned throughout Europe ; his party disbanded in England. His Majesty came indeed to the inheritance of a mighty war ; but, victorious in every part of the globe, peace was always in his power, not to negotiate, but to dictate. No foreign habitudes or attachments withdrew him from the cultivation of his power at home. His revenue for the civil establishment, fixed (as it was then thought) at a large, but definite sum, was ample
10 without being invidious. His influence, by additions from conquest, by an augmentation of debt, by an increase of military and naval establishment, much strengthened and extended. And coming to the throne in the prime and full vigour of youth, as from affection there was a strong dislike, so from dread there seemed to be a general averseness, from giving anything like offence to a monarch, against whose resentment opposition could not look for a refuge in any sort of reversionary hope.

These singular advantages inspired his Majesty only with
20 a more ardent desire to preserve unimpaired the spirit of that national freedom to which he owed a situation so full of glory. But to others it suggested sentiments of a very different nature. They thought they now beheld an opportunity (by a certain sort of statesmen never long undiscovered or employed) of drawing to themselves, by the aggrandizement of a court faction, a degree of power which they could never hope to derive from natural influence or from honourable service ; and which it was impossible they could hold with the least security, whilst the system of
30 administration rested upon its former bottom. In order to facilitate the execution of their design, it was necessary to make many alterations in political arrangement, and a signal change in the opinions, habits, and connexions of the greatest part of those who at that time acted in public.

In the first place, they proceeded gradually, but not slowly, to destroy everything of strength which did not derive its

principal nourishment from the immediate pleasure of the court. The greatest weight of popular opinion and party connexion were then with the Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Pitt. Neither of these held their importance by the *new tenure* of the court ; they were not therefore thought to be so proper as others for the services which were required by that tenure. It happened very favourably for the new system, that under a forced coalition there rankled an incurable alienation and disgust between the parties which composed the administration. Mr. Pitt was first attacked. Not satisfied with removing him from power, they endeavoured by various artifices to ruin his character. The other party seemed rather pleased to get rid of so oppressive a support ; not perceiving that their own fall was prepared by his, and involved in it. Many other reasons prevented them from daring to look their true situation in the face. To the great Whig families it was extremely disagreeable, and seemed almost unnatural, to oppose the administration of a prince of the House of Brunswick. Day after day they hesitated, and doubted, and lingered, expecting that other counsels would take place ; and were slow to be persuaded, that all which had been done by the cabal was the effect not of humour, but of system. It was more strongly and evidently the interest of the new court faction, to get rid of the great Whig connexions, than to destroy Mr. Pitt. The power of that gentleman was vast indeed and merited ; but it was in a great degree personal, and therefore transient. Theirs was rooted in the country. For, with a good deal less of popularity, they possessed a far more natural and fixed influence. Long possession of government ; vast property ; obligations of favours given and received ; connexion of office ; ties of blood, of alliance of friendship ; (things at that time supposed of some force ;) the name of Whig, dear to the majority of the people ; the zeal early begun and steadily continued to the royal family : all these together formed a body of power in the nation, which was criminal and devoted. The great

ruling principle of the cabal, and that which animated and harmonized all their proceedings, how various soever they may have been, was to signify to the world, that the court would proceed upon its own proper forces only; and that the pretence of bringing any other into its service was an affront to it, and not a support. Therefore when the chiefs were removed, in order to go to the root, the whole party was put under a proscription, so general and severe as to take their hard-earned bread from the lowest officers, in a
 10 manner which had never been known before, even in general revolutions. But it was thought necessary effectually to destroy all dependencies but one; and to show an example of the firmness and rigour with which the new system was to be supported.

Thus for the time were pulled down, in the persons of the Whig leaders and of Mr. Pitt, (in spite of the services of the one at the accession of the royal family, and the recent services of the other in the war,) the *two only securities for the importance of the people; power arising from*
 20 *popularity; and power arising from connexion.* Here and there indeed a few individuals were left standing, who gave security for their total estrangement from the odious principles of party connexion and personal attachment; and it must be confessed that most of them have religiously kept their faith. Such a change could not however be made without a mighty shock to government.

To reconcile the minds of the people to all these movements, principles correspondent to them had been preached up with great zeal. Every one must remember that the
 30 cabal set out with the most astonishing prudery, both moral and political. Those, who in a few months after soused over head and ears into the deepest and dirtiest pits of corruption, cried out violently against the indirect practices in the electing and managing of parliaments, which had formerly prevailed. This marvellous abhorrence which the court had suddenly taken to all influence, was not only

circulated in conversation through the kingdom, but pompously announced to the public, with many other extraordinary things, in a pamphlet which had all the appearance of a manifesto preparatory to some considerable enterprise. Throughout it was a satire, though in terms managed and decent enough, on the politics of the former reign. It was indeed written with no small art and address.

In this piece appeared the first dawning of the new system ; there first appeared the idea (then only in speculation) of *separating the court from the administration* ; of 10 carrying everything from national connexion to personal regards ; and of forming a regular party for that purpose, under the name of *king's men*.

To recommend this system to the people, a perspective view of the court, gorgeously painted, and finely illuminated from within, was exhibited to the gaping multitude. Party was to be totally done away, with all its evil works. Corruption was to be cast down from court, as *Atè* was from heaven. Power was thenceforward to be the chosen residence of public spirit ; and no one was to be supposed 20 under any sinister influence, except those who had the misfortune to be in disgrace at court, which was to stand in lieu of all vices and all corruptions. A scheme of perfection to be realized in a monarchy far beyond the visionary republic of Plato. The whole scenery was exactly disposed to captivate those good souls, whose credulous morality is so invaluable a treasure to crafty politicians. Indeed there was wherewithal to charm everybody, except those few who are not much pleased with professions of supernatural virtue, who know of what stuff such professions are made, for what 30 purposes they are designed, and in what they are sure constantly to end. Many innocent gentlemen, who had been talking prose all their lives without knowing anything of the matter, began at last to open their eyes upon their own merits, and to attribute their not having been lords of the treasury and lords of trade many years before, merely to

the prevalence of party, and to the ministerial power, which had frustrated the good intentions of the court in favour of their abilities. Now was the time to unlock the sealed fountain of royal bounty, which had been infamously monopolized and huckstered, and to let it flow at large upon the whole people. The time was come, to restore royalty to its original splendour. *Mettre le Roy hors de page* [to make the king independent], became a sort of watchword. And it was constantly in the mouths of all the runners
 10 of the court, that nothing could preserve the balance of the constitution from being overturned by the rabble, or by a faction of the nobility, but to free the sovereign effectually from that ministerial tyranny under which the royal dignity had been oppressed in the person of his Majesty's grandfather.

These were some of the many artifices used to reconcile the people to the great change which was made in the persons who composed the ministry, and the still greater which was made and avowed in its constitution. As to individuals, other
 20 methods were employed with them ; in order so thoroughly to disunite every party, and even every family, that *no concert, order, or effect, might appear in any future opposition*. And in this manner an administration without connexion with the people, or with one another, was first put in possession of government. What good consequences followed from it, we have all seen ; whether with regard to virtue, public or private ; to the ease and happiness of the sovereign ; or to the real strength of government. But as so much stress was then laid on the necessity of this new project, it will not
 30 be amiss to take a view of the effects of this royal servitude and vile durance, which was so deplored in the reign of the late monarch, and was so carefully to be avoided in the reign of his successor. The effects were these.

In times full of doubt and danger to his person and family, George II. maintained the dignity of his crown connected with the liberty of his people, not only unimpaired, but im-

proved, for the space of thirty-three years. He overcame a dangerous rebellion, abetted by foreign force, and raging in the heart of his kingdoms ; and thereby destroyed the seeds of all future rebellion that could arise upon the same principle. He carried the glory, the power, the commerce of — England, to a height unknown even to this renowned nation in the times of its greatest prosperity : and he left his succession resting on the true and only true foundations of all national and all regal greatness ; affection at home, reputation abroad, trust in allies, terror in rival nations. 10 The most ardent lover of his country cannot wish for Great Britain a happier fate than to continue as she was then left. A people, emulous as we are in affection to our present sovereign, know not how to form a prayer to heaven for a greater blessing upon his virtues, or a higher state of felicity and glory, than that he should live, and should reign, and, when Providence ordains it, should die, exactly like his illustrious predecessor.

A great prince may be obliged (though such a thing cannot happen very often) to sacrifice his private inclination to his 20 public interest. A wise prince will not think that such a restraint implies a condition of servility ; and truly, if such was the condition of the last reign, and the effects were also such as we have described, we ought, no less for the sake of the sovereign whom we love, than for our own, to hear arguments convincing indeed, before we depart from the maxims of that reign, or fly in the face of this great body of strong and recent experience.

One of the principal topics which was then, and has been since, much employed by that political school, is an effectual 30 terror of the growth of an aristocratic power, prejudicial to the rights of the crown, and the balance of the constitution. — Any new powers exercised in the House of Lords, or in the House of Commons, or by the crown, ought certainly to excite the vigilant and anxious jealousy of a free people. Even a new and unprecedented course of action in the whole

legislature, without great and evident reason, may be a subject of just uneasiness. I will not affirm, that there may not have lately appeared in the House of Lords a disposition to some attempts derogatory to the legal rights of the subject. If any such have really appeared, they have arisen, not from a power properly aristocratic, but from the same influence which is charged with having excited attempts of a similar nature in the House of Commons ; which House, if it should have been betrayed into an unfortunate quarrel
10 with its constituents, and involved in a charge of the very same nature, could have neither power nor inclination to repel such attempts in others. Those attempts in the House of Lords can no more be called aristocratic proceedings, than the proceedings with regard to the county of Middlesex in the House of Commons can with any sense be called democratical.

It is true, that the peers have a great influence in the kingdom, and in every part of the public concerns. While they are men of property, it is impossible to prevent it,
20 except by such means as must prevent all property from its natural operation : an event not easily to be compassed, while property is power ; nor by any means to be wished, while the least notion exists of the method by which the spirit of liberty acts, and of the means by which it is preserved. If any particular peers, by their uniform, upright, constitutional conduct, by their public and their private virtues, have acquired an influence in the country ; the people on whose favour that influence depends, and from whom it arose, will never be duped into an opinion, that
30 such greatness in a peer is the despotism of an aristocracy, when they know and feel it to be the effect and pledge of their own importance.

I am no friend to aristocracy, in the sense at least in which that word is usually understood. If it were not a bad habit to moot cases on the supposed ruin of the constitution, I should be free to declare, that if it must perish,

I would rather by far see it resolved into any other form, than lost in that austere and insolent domination. But, whatever my dislikes may be, my fears are not upon that quarter. The question, on the influence of a court, and of a peerage, is not, which of the two dangers is the more eligible, but which is the more imminent. He is but a poor observer, who has not seen, that the generality of peers, far from supporting themselves in a state of independent greatness, are but too apt to fall into an oblivion of their proper dignity, and to run headlong into an abject servitude. 10 Would to God it were true, that the fault of our peers were too much spirit! It is worthy of some observation that these gentlemen, so jealous of aristocracy, make no complaints of the power of those peers (neither few nor inconsiderable) who are always in the train of a court, and whose whole weight must be considered as a portion of the settled influence of the crown. This is all safe and right; but if some peers (I am very sorry they are not as many as they ought to be) set themselves, in the great concern of peers and commons, against a back-stairs influence and clandestine 20 government, then the alarm begins; then the constitution is in danger of being forced into an aristocracy.

I rest a little the longer on this court topic, because it was much insisted upon at the time of the great change, and has been since frequently revived by many of the agents of that party: for, whilst they are terrifying the great and opulent with the horrors of mob-government, they are by other managers attempting (though hitherto with little success) to alarm the people with a phantom of tyranny in the nobles. All this is done upon their favourite principle 30 of disunion, of sowing jealousies amongst the different orders of the state, and of disjoining the natural strength of the kingdom; that it may be rendered incapable of resisting the sinister designs of wicked men, who have engrossed the royal power.

Thus much of the topics chosen by the courtiers to recom-

mend their system ; it will be necessary to open a little more at large the nature of that party which was formed for its support. Without this, the whole would have been no better than a visionary amusement, like the scheme of Harrington's political club, and not a business in which the nation had a real concern. As a powerful party, and a party constructed on a new principle, it is a very inviting object of curiosity.

It must be remembered, that since the Revolution, until the period we are speaking of, the influence of the crown had been always employed in supporting the ministers of state, and in carrying on the public business according to their opinions. But the party now in question is formed upon a very different idea. It is to intercept the favour, protection, and confidence of the crown in the passage to its ministers ; it is to come between them and their importance in parliament ; it is to separate them from all their natural and acquired dependencies ; it is intended as the control, not the support, of administration. The machinery of this system is perplexed in its movements, and false in its principle. It is formed on a supposition that the king is something external to his government ; and that he may be honoured and aggrandized, even by its debility and disgrace. The plan proceeds expressly on the idea of enfeebling the regular executory power. It proceeds on the idea of weakening the state in order to strengthen the court. The scheme depending entirely on distrust, on disconnexion, on mutability by principle, on systematic weakness in every particular member ; it is impossible that the total result should be substantial strength of any kind.

As a foundation of their scheme, the cabal have established a sort of *rota* in the court. All sorts of parties, by this means, have been brought into administration ; from whence few have had the good fortune to escape without disgrace ; none at all without considerable losses. In the beginning of each arrangement no professions of confidence and support

are wanting, to induce the leading men to engage. But while the ministers of the day appear in all the pomp and pride of power, while they have all their canvass spread out to the wind, and every sail filled with the fair and prosperous gale of royal favour, in a short time they find, they know not how, a current, which sets directly against them ; which prevents all progress ; and even drives them backwards. They grow ashamed and mortified in a situation, which, by its vicinity to power, only serves to remind them the more strongly of their insignificance. They are obliged either to 10 execute the orders of their inferiors, or to see themselves opposed by the natural instruments of their office. With the loss of their dignity they lose their temper. In their turn they grow troublesome to that cabal which, whether it supports or opposes, equally disgraces and equally betrays them. It is soon found necessary to get rid of the heads of administration ; but it is of their heads only. As there always are many rotten members belonging to the best connexions, it is not hard to persuade several to continue in office without their leaders. By this means the party 20 goes out much thinner than it came in ; and is only reduced in strength by its temporary possession of power. Besides, if by accident, or in course of changes, that power should be recovered, the junto have thrown up a retrenchment of these carcasses, which may serve to cover themselves in a day of danger. They conclude, not unwisely, that such rotten members will become the first objects of disgust and resentment to their ancient connexions.

They contrive to form in the outward administration two parties at the least ; which, whilst they are tearing one 30 another to pieces, are both competitors for the favour and protection of the cabal ; and, by their emulation, contribute to throw everything more and more into the hands of the interior managers.

A minister of state will sometimes keep himself totally estranged from all his colleagues ; will differ from them in

their councils, will privately traverse, and publicly oppose, their measures. He will, however, continue in his employment. Instead of suffering any mark of displeasure, he will be distinguished by an unbounded profusion of court rewards and caresses ; because he does what is expected, and all that is expected, from men in office. He helps to keep some form of administration in being, and keeps it at the same time as weak and divided as possible.

However, we must take care not to be mistaken, or to
10 imagine that such persons have any weight in their opposition. When, by them, administration is convinced of its insignificance, they are soon to be convinced of their own. They never are suffered to succeed in their opposition. They and the world are to be satisfied, that neither office, nor authority, nor property, nor ability, eloquence, counsel, skill, or union, are of the least importance ; but that the mere influence of the court, naked of all support, and destitute of all management, is abundantly sufficient for all its own purposes.

20 When any adverse connexion is to be destroyed, the cabal seldom appear in the work themselves. They find out some person of whom the party entertains a high opinion. Such a person they endeavour to delude with various pretences. They teach him first to distrust, and then to quarrel with, his friends ; among whom, by the same arts, they excite a similar diffidence of him ; so that in his mutual fear and distrust, he may suffer himself to be employed as the instrument in the change which is brought about. Afterwards they are sure to destroy him in his turn, by setting up in his
30 place some person in whom he had himself reposed the greatest confidence, and who serves to carry off a considerable part of his adherents.

When such a person has broke in this manner with his connexions, he is soon compelled to commit some flagrant act of iniquitous, personal hostility against some of them, (such as an attempt to strip a particular friend of his family

estate,) by which the cabal hope to render the parties utterly irreconcilable. In truth, they have so contrived matters, that people have a greater hatred to the subordinate instruments than to the principal movers.

As in destroying their enemies they make use of instruments not immediately belonging to their corps, so in advancing their own friends they pursue exactly the same method. To promote any of them to considerable rank or emolument, they commonly take care that the recommendation shall pass through the hands of the ostensible ministry : such a recom- 10 mendation might however appear to the world, as some proof of the credit of ministers, and some means of increasing their strength. To prevent this, the persons so advanced are directed in all companies, industriously to declare that they are under no obligations whatsoever to administration ; that they have received their office from another quarter ; that they are totally free and independent.

When the faction has any job of lucre to obtain, or of vengeance to perpetrate, their way is, to select, for the execution, those very persons to whose habits, friendships, 20 principles, and declarations, such proceedings are publicly known to be the most adverse ; at once to render the instruments the more odious, and therefore the more dependent, and to prevent the people from ever reposing a confidence in any appearance of private friendship or public principle.

If the administration seem now and then, from remissness, or from fear of making themselves disagreeable, to suffer any popular excesses to go unpunished, the cabal immediately sets up some creature of theirs to raise a clamour against the ministers, as having shamefully betrayed the dignity of 30 government. Then they compel the ministry to become active in conferring rewards and honours on the persons who have been the instruments of their disgrace ; and, after having first vilified them with the higher orders for suffering the laws to sleep over the licentiousness of the populace, they drive them (in order to make amends for their former

inactivity) to some act of atrocious violence, which renders them completely abhorred by the people. They who remember the riots which attended the Middlesex election, the opening of the present parliament, and the transactions relative to Saint George's Fields, will not be at a loss for an application of these remarks.

- That this body may be enabled to compass all the ends of its institution, its members are scarcely ever to aim at the high and responsible offices of the state. They are distributed with art and judgment through all the secondary, but efficient, departments of office, and through the households of all the branches of the royal family : so as on one hand to occupy all the avenues to the throne ; and on the other to forward or frustrate the execution of any measure, according to their own interests. For with the credit and support which they are known to have, though for the greater part in places which are only a genteel excuse for salary, they possess all the influence of the highest posts ; and they dictate publicly in almost everything, even with a parade of superiority. Whenever they dissent (as it often happens) from their nominal leaders, the trained part of the senate, instinctively in the secret, is sure to follow them ; provided the leaders, sensible of their situation, do not of themselves recede in time from their most declared opinions. This latter is generally the case. It will not be conceivable to any one who has not seen it, what pleasure is taken by the cabal in rendering these heads of office thoroughly contemptible and ridiculous. And when they are become so, they have then the best chance for being well supported.
- The members of the court faction are fully indemnified for not holding places on the slippery heights of the kingdom, not only by the lead in all affairs, but also by the perfect security in which they enjoy less conspicuous, but very advantageous, situations. Their places are in express legal tenure, or, in effect, all of them for life. Whilst the first and most respectable persons in the kingdom are tossed

about like tennis balls, the sport of a blind and insolent caprice, no minister dares even to cast an oblique glance at the lowest of their body. If an attempt be made upon one of this corps, immediately he flies to sanctuary, and pretends to the most inviolable of all promises. No conveniency of public arrangement is available to remove any one of them from the specific situation he holds ; and the slightest attempt upon one of them, by the most powerful minister, is a certain preliminary to his own destruction.

Conscious of their independence, they bear themselves with 10 a lofty air to the exterior ministers. Like Janissaries, they derive a kind of freedom from the very condition of their servitude. They may act just as they please, provided they are true to the great ruling principle of their institution. It is, therefore, not at all wonderful, that people should be so desirous of adding themselves to that body, in which they may possess and reconcile satisfactions the most alluring, and seemingly the most contradictory ; enjoying at once all the spirited pleasure of independence, and all the gross lucre and fat emoluments of servitude.

20

Here is a sketch, though a slight one, of the constitution, laws, and policy of this new court corporation. The name by which they choose to distinguish themselves, is that of king's men, or the king's friends, by an invidious exclusion of the rest of his Majesty's most loyal and affectionate subjects. The whole system, comprehending the exterior and interior administrations, is commonly called, in the technical language of the court, double cabinet ; in French or English, as you choose to pronounce it.

Whether all this be a vision of a distracted brain, or the 30 invention of a malicious heart, or a real faction in the country, must be judged by the appearances which things have worn for eight years past. Thus far I am certain, that there is not a single public man, in or out of office, who has not, at some time or other, borne testimony to the truth of what I have now related. In particular, no persons have

been more strong in their assertions, and louder and more indecent in their complaints, than those who compose all the exterior part of the present administration ; in whose time that faction has arrived that at such an height of power, and of boldness in the use of it, as may, in the end, perhaps bring about its total destruction.

It is true, that about four years ago, during the administration of the Marquis of Rockingham, an attempt was made to carry on government without their concurrence. However, 10 this was only a transient cloud ; they were hid but for a moment ; and their constellation blazed out with greater brightness, and a far more vigorous influence, some time after it was blown over. An attempt was at that time made (but without any idea of proscription) to break their corps, to discountenance their doctrines, to revive connexions of a different kind, to restore the principles and policy of the Whigs, to reanimate the cause of liberty by ministerial countenance ; and then for the first time were men seen 20 attached in office to every principle they had maintained in opposition. No one will doubt, that such men were abhorred and violently opposed by the court faction, and that such a system could have but a short duration.

It may appear somewhat affected, that in so much discourse upon this extraordinary party, I should say so little of the Earl of Bute, who is the supposed head of it. But this was neither owing to affectation nor inadvertence. I have carefully avoided the introduction of personal reflections of any kind. Much the greater part of the topics which have been used to blacken this nobleman are either 30 unjust or frivolous. At best, they have a tendency to give the resentment of this bitter calamity a wrong direction, and to turn a public grievance into a mean, personal, or a dangerous national quarrel. Where there is a regular scheme of operations carried on, it is the system, and not any individual person who acts in it, that is truly dangerous. This system has not arisen solely from the ambition of Lord Bute, but

from the circumstances which favoured it, and from an indifference to the constitution which had been for some time growing among our gentry. We should have been tried with it, if the Earl of Bute had never existed ; and it will want neither a contriving head nor active members, when the Earl of Bute exists no longer. It is not, therefore, to rail at Lord Bute, but firmly to embody against this court party and its practices, which can afford us any prospect of relief in our present condition.

Another motive induces me to put the personal consideration of Lord Bute wholly out of the question. He communicates very little in a direct manner with the greater part of our men of business. This has never been his custom. It is enough for him that he surrounds them with his creatures. Several imagine, therefore, that they have a very good excuse for doing all the work of this faction, when they have no personal connexion with Lord Bute. But whoever becomes a party to an administration, composed of insulated individuals, without faith plighted, tie, or common principle ; an administration constitutionally impotent, because supported by no party in the nation ; he who contributes to destroy the connexions of men and their trust in one another, or in any sort to throw the dependence of public counsels upon private will and favour, possibly may have nothing to do with the Earl of Bute. It matters little whether he be the friend or the enemy of that particular person. But let him be who or what he will, he abets a faction that is driving hard to the ruin of his country. He is sapping the foundation of its liberty, disturbing the sources of its domestic tranquillity, weakening its government over its dependencies, degrading it from all its importance in the system of Europe.

It is this unnatural infusion of a system of favouritism into a government which in a great part of its constitution is popular, that has raised the present ferment in the nation. The people, without entering deeply into its principles, could plainly perceive its effects, in much violence, in a great

spirit of innovation, and a general disorder in all the functions of government. I keep my eye solely on this system; if I speak of those measures which have arisen from it, it will be so far only as they illustrate the general scheme. This is the fountain of all those bitter waters, of which, through an hundred different conduits, we have drunk until we are ready to burst. The discretionary power of the crown in the formation of ministry, abused by bad or weak men, has given rise to a system, which without directly
 10 violating the letter of any law, operates against the spirit of the whole constitution.

A plan of favouritism for our executory government is essentially at variance with the plan of our legislature. One great end undoubtedly of a mixed government like ours, composed of monarchy, and of controls, on the part of the higher people and the lower, is that the prince shall not be able to violate the laws. This is useful indeed and fundamental. But this, even at first view, is no more than a negative advantage; an armour merely defensive. It is
 20 therefore next in order, and equal in importance, *that the discretionary powers which are necessarily vested in the monarch, whether for the execution of the laws, or for the nomination to magistracy and office, or for conducting the affairs of peace and war, or for ordering the revenue, should all be exercised upon public principles and national grounds, and not on the likings or prejudices, the intrigues or policies, of a court.* This, I said, is equal in importance to the securing a government according to law. The laws reach but a very little way. Constitute government how you please, infinitely
 30 the greater part of it must depend upon the exercise of the powers which are left at large to the prudence and uprightness of ministers of state. Even all the use and potency of the laws depends upon them. Without them, your commonwealth is no better than a scheme upon paper; and not a living, active, effective constitution. It is possible that through negligence, or ignorance, or design artfully con-

ducted, ministers may suffer one part of government to languish, another to be perverted from its purposes, and every valuable interest of the country to fall into ruin and decay, without possibility of fixing any single act on which a criminal prosecution can be justly grounded. The due arrangement of men in the active part of the state, far from being foreign to the purposes of a wise government, ought to be among its very first and dearest objects. When, therefore, the abettors of the new system tell us, that between them and their opposers there is nothing but a 10 struggle for power, and that therefore we are in no ways concerned in it ; we must tell those who have the impudence to insult us in this manner, that, of all things, we ought to be the most concerned who and what sort of men they are that hold the trust of everything that is dear to us. Nothing can render this a point of indifference to the nation, but what must either render us totally desperate, or soothe us into the security of idiots. We must soften into a credulity below the milkiness of infancy, to think all men virtuous. We must be tainted with a malignity truly diabolical, to 20 believe all the world to be equally wicked and corrupt. Men are in public life as in private, some good, some evil. The elevation of the one, and the depression of the other, are the first objects of all true policy. But that form of government, which, neither in its direct institutions, nor in their immediate tendency, has contrived to throw its affairs into the most trustworthy hands, but has left its whole executory system to be disposed of agreeably to the uncontrolled pleasure of any one man, however excellent or virtuous, is a plan of polity defective not only in that 30 member, but consequentially erroneous in every part of it.

In arbitrary governments the constitution of the ministry follows the constitution of the legislature. Both the law and the magistrate are the creatures of will. It must be so. Nothing, indeed, will appear more certain, on any tolerable consideration of this matter, than that *every sort of govern-*

ment ought to have its administration correspondent to its legislature. If it should be otherwise, things must fall into an hideous disorder. The people of a free commonwealth, who have taken such care that their laws should be the result of general consent, cannot be so senseless as to suffer their executory system to be composed of persons on whom they have no dependence, and whom no proofs of the public love and confidence have recommended to those powers, upon the use of which the very being of the state depends.

- 10 The popular election of magistrates, and popular disposition of rewards and honours, is one of the first advantages of a free state. Without it, or something equivalent to it, perhaps the people cannot long enjoy the substance of freedom ; certainly none of the vivifying energy of good government. The frame of our commonwealth did not admit of such an actual election : but it provided as well, and (while the spirit of the constitution is preserved) better, for all the effects of it, than by the method of suffrage in any democratic state whatsoever. It had always, until of late, been held the first
- 20 *duty of parliament to refuse to support government, until power was in the hands of persons who were acceptable to the people, or while factions predominated in the court in which the nation had no confidence.* Thus all the good effects of popular election were supposed to be secured to us, without the mischiefs attending on perpetual intrigue, and a distinct canvas for every particular office throughout the body of the people. This was the most noble and refined part of our constitution. The people, by their representatives and grandees, were intrusted with a deliberative power in making
- 30 laws ; the king with the control of his negative. The king was intrusted with the deliberative choice and the election to office ; the people had the negative in a parliamentary refusal to support. Formerly this power of control was what kept ministers in awe of parliaments, and parliaments in reverence with the people. If the use of this power of control on the system and persons of administration is gone, every-

thing is lost, parliament and all. We may assure ourselves, that if parliament will tamely see evil men take possession of all the strong-holds of their country, and allow them time and means to fortify themselves, under a pretence of giving them a fair trial, and upon a hope of discovering whether they will not be reformed by power, and whether their measures will not be better than their morals ; such a parliament will give countenance to their measures also, whatever that parliament may pretend, and whatever those measures may be.

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Every good political institution must have a preventive operation as well as a remedial. It ought to have a natural tendency to exclude bad men from government, and not to trust for the safety of the state to subsequent punishment alone : punishment, which has ever been tardy and uncertain ; and which, when power is suffered in bad hands, may chance to fall rather on the injured than on the criminal.

Before men are put forward into the great trusts of the state, they ought by their conduct to have obtained such a degree of estimation in their country, as may be some sort of 20 pledge and security to the public, that they will not abuse those trusts. It is no mean security for a proper use of power, that a man has shown by the general tenor of his actions, that the affection, the good opinion, the confidence of his fellow-citizens have been among the principal objects of his life ; and that he has owed none of the gradations of his power or fortune to a settled contempt, or occasional forfeiture of their esteem.

That man who before he comes into power has no friends, or who coming into power is obliged to desert his friends, or 30 who losing it has no friends to sympathize with him ; he who has no sway among any part of the landed or commercial interest, but whose whole importance has begun with his office, and is sure to end with it ; is a person who ought never to be suffered by a controlling parliament to continue in any of those situations which confer the lead and direction

of all our public affairs ; because such a man *has no connexion with the interest of the people.*

Those knots or cabals of men who have got together avowedly without any public principle, in order to sell their conjunct iniquity at the higher rate, and are therefore universally odious, ought never to be suffered to domineer in the state ; because they have *no connexion with the sentiments and opinions of the people.*

These are considerations which in my opinion enforce the
10 necessity of having some better reason, in a free country, and a free parliament, for supporting the ministers of the crown, than that short one, *That the king has thought proper to appoint them.* There is something very courtly in this. But it is a principle pregnant with all sorts of mischief, in a constitution like ours, to turn the views of active men from the country to the court. Whatever be the road to power, that is the road which will be trod. If the opinion of the country be of no use as a means of power or consideration,
20 the qualities which usually procure that opinion will be no longer cultivated. And whether it will be right, in a state so popular in its constitution as ours, to leave ambition without popular motives, and to trust all to the operation of pure virtue in the minds of kings and ministers, and public men, must be submitted to the judgment and good sense of the people of England.

Cunning men are here apt to break in, and, without directly controverting the principle, to raise objections from the difficulty under which the sovereign labours, to distinguish the genuine voice and sentiments of his people, from
30 the clamour of a faction, by which it is so easily counterfeited. The nation, they say, is generally divided into parties with views and passions utterly irreconcilable. If the king should put his affairs into the hands of any one of them, he is sure to disgust the rest ; if he select particular men from among them all, it is a hazard that he disgusts them all. Those who are left out, however divided before, will soon run

into a body of opposition ; which, being a collection of many discontents into one focus, will without doubt be hot and violent enough. Faction will make its cries resound through the nation, as if the whole were in an uproar, when by far the majority, and much the better part, will seem for awhile as it were annihilated by the quiet in which their virtue and moderation incline them to enjoy the blessings of government. Besides that, the opinion of the mere vulgar is a miserable rule even with regard to themselves, on account of their violence and instability. So that if you were to gratify them in 10 their humour to-day, that very gratification would be a ground of their dissatisfaction on the next. Now as all these rules of public opinion are to be collected with great difficulty, and to be applied with equal uncertainty as to the effect, what better can a king of England do than to employ such men as he finds to have views and inclinations most conformable to his own ; who are least infected with pride and self-will ; and who are least moved by such popular humours as are perpetually traversing his designs, and disturbing his service ; trusting that when he means no ill to 20 his people, he will be supported in his appointments, whether he chooses to keep or to change, as his private judgment or his pleasure leads him ? He will find a sure resource in the real weight and influence of the crown, when it is not suffered to become an instrument in the hands of a faction.

I will not pretend to say that there is nothing at all in this mode of reasoning ; because I will not assert that there is no difficulty in the art of government. Undoubtedly the very best administration must encounter a great deal of opposition ; and the very worst will find more support than it 30 deserves. Sufficient appearances will never be wanting to those who have a mind to deceive themselves. It is a fallacy in constant use with those who would level all things, and confound right with wrong, to insist upon the inconveniences which are attached to every choice, without taking into consideration the different weight and consequence of those

- inconveniences. The question is not concerning *absolute* discontent or *perfect* satisfaction in government ; neither of which can be pure and unmixed at any time, or upon any system. The controversy is about that degree of good-humour in the people, which may possibly be attained, and ought certainly to be looked for. While some politicians may be waiting to know whether the sense of every individual be against them, accurately distinguishing the vulgar from the better sort, drawing lines between the enterprises
- 10 of a faction and the effects of a people, they may chance to see the government, which they are so nicely weighing, and dividing, and distinguishing, tumble to the ground in the midst of their wise deliberation. Prudent men, when so great an object as the security of government, or even its peace, is at stake, will not run the risk of a decision which may be fatal to it. They who can read the political sky will see a hurricane in a cloud no bigger than a hand at the very edge of the horizon, and will run into the first harbour. No lines can be laid down for civil or political wisdom.
- 20 They are a matter incapable of exact definition. But, though no man can draw a stroke between the confines of day and night, yet light and darkness are upon the whole tolerably distinguishable. Nor will it be impossible for a prince to find out such a mode of government, and such persons to administer it, as will give a great degree of content to his people ; without any curious and anxious research for that abstract, universal, perfect harmony, which while he is seeking, he abandons those means of ordinary tranquillity which are in his power without any research at all.
- 30 It is not more the duty than it is the interest of a prince, to aim at giving tranquillity to his government. But those who advise him may have an interest in disorder and confusion. If the opinion of the people is against them, they will naturally wish that it should have no prevalence. Here it is that the people must on their part show themselves sensible of their own value. Their whole importance, in the

first instance, and afterwards their whole freedom, is at stake. Their freedom cannot long survive their importance. Here it is that the natural strength of the kingdom, the great peers, the leading landed gentlemen, the opulent merchants and manufacturers, the substantial yeomanry, must interpose, to rescue their prince, themselves, and their posterity.

We are at present at issue upon this point. We are in the great crisis of this contention ; and the part which men take, one way or other, will serve to discriminate their characters and their principles. Until the matter is decided, the country will remain in its present confusion. For while a system of administration is attempted, entirely repugnant to the genius of the people, and not conformable to the plan of their government, everything must necessarily be disordered for a time, until this system destroys the constitution, or the constitution gets the better of this system.

There is, in my opinion, a peculiar venom and malignity in this political distemper beyond any that I have heard or read of. In former times the projectors of arbitrary government attacked only the liberties of their country ; a design surely mischievous enough to have satisfied a mind of the most unruly ambition. But a system unfavourable to freedom may be so formed, as considerably to exalt the grandeur of the state ; and men may find, in the pride and splendour of that prosperity, some sort of consolation for the loss of their solid privileges. Indeed the increase of the power of the state has often been urged by artful men, as a pretext for some abridgment of the public liberty. But the scheme of the junto under consideration, not only strikes a palsy into every nerve of our free constitution, but in the same degree benumbs and stupifies the whole executive power : rendering government in all its grand operations languid, uncertain, ineffective ; making ministers fearful of attempting, and incapable of executing, any useful plan of domestic arrangement, or of foreign politics. It tends to produce

neither the security of a free government, nor the energy of a monarchy that is absolute. Accordingly, the crown has dwindled away, in proportion to the unnatural and turgid growth of this excrescence on the court.

The interior ministry are sensible, that war is a situation which sets in its full light the value of the hearts of a people; and they well know that the beginning of the importance of the people must be the end of theirs. For this reason they discover upon all occasions the utmost fear
10 of everything, which by possibility may lead to such an event. I do not mean that they manifest any of that pious fear which is backward to commit the safety of the country to the dubious experiment of war. Such a fear, being the tender sensation of virtue, excited, as it is regulated, by reason, frequently shows itself in a seasonable boldness, which keeps danger at a distance, by seeming to despise it. Their fear betrays to the first glance of the eye, its true cause, and its real object. Foreign powers, confident in the knowledge of their character, have not scrupled to violate
20 the most solemn treaties; and, in defiance of them, to make conquests in the midst of a general peace, and in the heart of Europe. Such was the conquest of Corsica, by the professed enemies of the freedom of mankind, in defiance of those who were formerly its professed defenders. We have had just claims upon the same powers; rights which ought to have been sacred to them as well as to us, as they had their origin in our lenity and generosity towards France and Spain in the day of their great humiliation. Such I call the ransom of Manilla, and the demand on France for the East India
30 prisoners. But these powers put a just confidence in their resource of the *double cabinet*. These demands (one of them at least) are hastening fast towards an acquittal by prescription. Oblivion begins to spread her cobwebs over all our spirited remonstrances. Some of the most valuable branches of our trade are also on the point of perishing from the same cause. I do not mean those branches which bear without

the hand of the vine-dresser ; I mean those which the policy of treaties had formerly secured to us ; I mean to mark and distinguish the trade of Portugal, the loss of which, and the power of the cabal, have one and the same era.

If, by any chance, the ministers who stand before the curtain possess or affect any spirit, it makes little or no impression. Foreign courts and ministers, who were among the first to discover and to profit by this invention of the *double cabinet*, attend very little to their remonstrances. They know that those shadows of ministers have nothing to do in the ultimate disposal of things. Jealousies and animosities are sedulously nourished in the outward administration, and have been even considered as a *causa sine qua non* in its constitution : thence foreign courts have a certainty, that nothing can be done by common counsel in this nation. If one of those ministers officially takes up a business with spirit, it serves only the better to signalize the meanness of the rest, and the discord of them all. His colleagues in office are in haste to shake him off, and to disclaim the whole of his proceedings. Of this nature was that astonishing transaction, in which Lord Rochford, our ambassador at Paris, remonstrated against the attempt upon Corsica, in consequence of a direct authority from Lord Shelburne. This remonstrance the French minister treated with the contempt that was natural : as he was assured, from the ambassador of his court to ours, that these orders of Lord Shelburne were not supported by the rest of the (I had like to have said British) administration. Lord Rochford, a man of spirit, could not endure this situation. The consequences were, however, curious. He returns from Paris, and comes home full of anger. Lord Shelburne, who gave the orders, is obliged to give up the seals. Lord Rochford, who obeyed these orders, receives them. He goes, however, into another department of the same office, that he might not be obliged officially to acquiesce, in one situation, under what he had officially remonstrated against, in another. At Paris, the

Duke of Choiseul considered this office arrangement as a compliment to him : here it was spoken of as an attention to the delicacy of Lord Rochford. But whether the compliment was to one or both, to this nation it was the same. By this transaction the condition of our court lay exposed in all its nakedness. Our office correspondence has lost all pretence to authenticity ; British policy is brought into derision in those nations, that a while ago trembled at the power of our arms, whilst they looked up with confidence to the equity, 10 firmness, and candour, which shone in all our negotiations. I represent this matter exactly in the light in which it has been universally received.

Such has been the aspect of our foreign politics, under the influence of a *double cabinet*. With such an arrangement at court, it is impossible it should have been otherwise. Nor is it possible that this scheme should have a better effect upon the government of our dependencies, the first, the dearest, and most delicate objects, of the interior policy of this empire. The colonies know, that administration is separated 20 from the court, divided within itself, and detested by the nation. The *double cabinet* has, in both parts of it, shown the most malignant dispositions towards them, without being able to do them the smallest mischief.

They are convinced, by sufficient experience, that no plan, either of lenity or rigour, can be pursued with uniformity and perseverance. Therefore they turn their eyes entirely from Great Britain, where they have neither dependence on friendship, nor apprehension from enmity. They look to themselves, and their own arrangements. They grow every 30 day into alienation from this country ; and whilst they are becoming disconnected with our government, we have not the consolation to find, that they are even friendly in their new independence. Nothing can equal the futility, the weakness, the rashness, the timidity, the perpetual contradiction in the management of our affairs in that part of the world. A volume might be written on this melan-

choly subject ; but it were better to leave it entirely to the reflections of the reader himself, than not to treat it in the extent it deserves.

In what manner our domestic economy is affected by this system, it is needless to explain. It is the perpetual subject of their own complaints.

The court party resolve the whole into faction. Having said something before upon this subject, I shall only observe here, that, when they give this account of the prevalence of faction, they present no very favourable aspect of the confi- 10
dence of the people in their own government. They may be assured, that however they amuse themselves with a variety of projects for substituting something else in the place of that great and only foundation of government, the confidence of the people, every attempt will but make their condition worse. When men imagine that their food is only a cover for poison, and when they neither love nor trust the hand that serves it, it is not the name of the roast beef of Old England, that will persuade them to sit down to the table that is spread for them. When the people conceive that laws, 20
and tribunals, and even popular assemblies, are perverted from the ends of their institution, they find in those names of degenerated establishments only new motives to discontent. Those bodies, which, when full of life and beauty, lay in their arms and were their joy and comfort, when dead and putrid, become but the more loathsome from remembrance of former endearments. A sullen gloom and furious disorder prevail by fits : the nation loses its relish for peace and prosperity ; as it did in that season of fulness which opened our troubles in the time of Charles the First. A 30
species of men to whom a state of order would become a sentence of obscurity, are nourished into a dangerous magnitude by the heat of intestine disturbances ; and it is no wonder that, by a sort of sinister piety, they cherish, in their turn, the disorders which are the parents of all their consequence. Superficial observers consider such persons as

the cause of the public uneasiness, when, in truth, they are nothing more than the effect of it. Good men look upon this distracted scene with sorrow and indignation. Their hands are tied behind them. They are despoiled of all the power which might enable them to reconcile the strength of government with the rights of the people. They stand in a most distressing alternative. But in the election among evils they hope better things from temporary confusion, than from established servitude. In the mean time, the

10 voice of law is not to be heard. Fierce licentiousness begets violent restraints. The military aim is the sole reliance; and then, call your constitution what you please, it is the sword that governs. The civil power, like every other that calls in the aid of an ally stronger than itself, perishes by the assistance it receives. But the contrivers of this scheme of government will not trust solely to the military power; because they are cunning men. Their restless and crooked spirit drives them to rake in the dirt of every kind of expedient. Unable to rule the multitude, they endeavour

20 to raise divisions amongst them. One mob is hired to destroy another; a procedure which at once encourages the boldness of the populace, and justly increases their discontent. Men become pensioners of state on account of their abilities in the array of riot, and the discipline of confusion. Government is put under the disgraceful necessity of protecting from the severity of the laws that very licentiousness, which the laws had been before violated to repress. Everything partakes of the original disorder. Anarchy predominates without freedom, and servitude without submission or

30 subordination. These are the consequences inevitable to our public peace, from the scheme of rendering the executory government at once odious and feeble; of freeing administration from the constitutional and salutary control of parliament, and inventing for it a new control, unknown to the constitution, an interior cabinet; which brings the whole body of government into confusion and contempt.

After having stated, as shortly as I am able, the effects of this system on our foreign affairs, on the policy of our government with regard to our dependencies, and on the interior economy of the commonwealth ; there remains only, in this part of my design, to say something of the grand principle which first recommended this system at court. The pretence was, to prevent the king from being enslaved by a faction, and made a prisoner in his closet. This scheme might have been expected to answer at least its own end, and to indemnify the king, in his personal capacity, for all the confusion into which it has thrown his government. But has it in reality answered this purpose ? I am sure, if it had, every affectionate subject would have one motive for enduring with patience all the evils which attend it.

In order to come at the truth in this matter, it may not be amiss to consider it somewhat in detail. I speak here of the king, and not of the crown ; the interests of which we have already touched. Independent of that greatness which a king possesses merely by being a representative of the national dignity, the things in which he may have an individual interest seem to be these ;—wealth accumulated ; wealth spent in magnificence, pleasure, or beneficence ; personal respect and attention ; and above all, private ease and repose of mind. These compose the inventory of prosperous circumstances, whether they regard a prince or a subject ; their enjoyments differing only in the scale upon which they are formed.

Suppose then we were to ask, whether the king has been richer than his predecessors in accumulated wealth, since the establishment of the plan of favouritism ? I believe it will be found that the picture of royal indigence, which our court has presented until this year, has been truly humiliating. Nor has it been relieved from this unseemly distress, but by means which have hazarded the affection of the people, and shaken their confidence in parliament. If the public treasures had been exhausted in magnificence and splendour, this dis-

tress would have been accounted for, and in some measure justified. Nothing would be more unworthy of this nation, than with a mean and mechanical rule to mete out the splendour of the crown. Indeed I have found very few persons disposed to so ungenerous a procedure. But the generality of people, it must be confessed, do feel a good deal mortified, when they compare the wants of the court with its expenses. They do not behold the cause of this distress in any part of the apparatus of royal magnificence. In all this,

10 they see nothing but the operations of parsimony, attended with all the consequences of profusion. Nothing expended, nothing saved. Their wonder is increased by their knowledge, that besides the revenue settled on his Majesty's civil list to the amount of £800,000 a year, he has a further aid from a large pension list, near £90,000 a year, in Ireland; from the produce of the duchy of Lancaster (which we are told has been greatly improved); from the revenue of the duchy of Cornwall; from the American quit-rents; from the four and a half *per cent.* duty in the Leeward Islands; this

20 last worth to be sure considerably more than £40,000 a year. The whole is certainly not much short of a million annually.

These are revenues within the knowledge and cognizance of our national councils. We have no direct right to examine into the receipts from his Majesty's German dominions, and the bishopric of Osnaburg. This is unquestionably true. But that which is not within the province of parliament, is yet within the sphere of every man's own reflection. If a foreign prince resided amongst us, the state of his revenues could not fail of becoming the subject of our speculation.

30 Filled with an anxious concern for whatever regards the welfare of our sovereign, it is impossible, in considering the miserable circumstances into which he has been brought, that this obvious topic should be entirely passed over. There is an opinion universal, that these revenues produce something not inconsiderable, clear of all charges and establishments. This produce the people do not believe to be hoarded, nor

perceive to be spent. It is accounted for in the only manner it can, by supposing that it is drawn away, for the support of that court faction, which, whilst it distresses the nation, impoverishes the prince in every one of his resources. I once more caution the reader, that I do not urge this consideration concerning the foreign revenue, as if I supposed we had a direct right to examine into the expenditure of any part of it ; but solely for the purpose of showing how little this system of favouritism has been advantageous to the monarch himself ; which, without magnificence, has sunk him 10 into a state of unnatural poverty ; at the same time that he possessed every means of affluence, from ample revenues, both in this country, and in other parts of his dominions.

Has this system provided better for the treatment becoming his high and sacred character, and secured the king from those disgusts attached to the necessity of employing men who are not personally agreeable ? This is a topic upon which for many reasons I could wish to be silent ; but the pretence of securing against such causes of uneasiness, is the corner-stone of the court party. It has however so hap- 20 pened, that if I were to fix upon any one point, in which the system has been more particularly and shamefully blameable, the effects which it has produced would justify me in choosing for that point its tendency to degrade the personal dignity of the sovereign, and to expose him to a thousand contradictions and mortifications. It is but too evident in what manner these projectors of royal greatness have fulfilled all their magnificent promises. Without recapitulating all the circumstances of the reign, every one of which is, more or less, a melancholy proof of the truth of what I have advanced, let 30 us consider the language of the court but a few years ago, concerning most of the persons now in the external administrations : let me ask, whether any enemy to the personal feelings of the sovereign could possibly contrive a keener instrument of mortification, and degradation of all dignity, than almost every part and member of the present arrangement ?

Nor, in the whole course of our history, has any compliance with the will of the people ever been known to extort from any prince a greater contradiction to all his own declared affections and dislikes, than that which is now adopted in direct opposition to everything the people approve and desire.

An opinion prevails, that greatness has been more than once advised to submit to certain condescensions towards individuals, which have been denied to the entreaties of a nation. For the meanest and most dependent instrument
10 of this system knows, that there are hours when its existence may depend upon his adherence to it; and he takes his advantage accordingly. Indeed it is a law of nature, that whoever is necessary to what we have made our object, is sure, in some way, or in some time or other, to become our master. All this however is submitted to, in order to avoid that monstrous evil of governing in concurrence with the opinion of the people. For it seems to be laid down as a maxim, that a king has some sort of interest in giving uneasiness to his subjects: that all who are pleasing to them,
20 are to be of course disagreeable to him: that as soon as the persons who are odious at court are known to be odious to the people, it is snatched at as a lucky occasion of showering down upon them all kinds of emoluments and honours. None are considered as well-wishers to the crown, but those who advised to some unpopular course of action; none capable of serving it, but those who are obliged to call at every instant upon all its power for the safety of their lives. None are supposed to be fit priests in the temple of government, but the persons who are compelled to fly into it
30 for sanctuary. Such is the effect of this refined project; such is ever the result of all the contrivances, which are used to free men from the servitude of their reason, and from the necessity of ordering their affairs according to their evident interests. These contrivances oblige them to run into a real and ruinous servitude, in order to avoid a supposed restraint, that might be attended with advantage.

If therefore this system has so ill answered its own grand pretence of saving the king from the necessity of employing persons disagreeable to him, has it given more peace and tranquillity to his Majesty's private hours? No, most certainly. The father of his people cannot possibly enjoy repose, while his family is in such a state of distraction. Then what has the crown or the king profited by all this fine-wrought scheme? Is he more rich, or more splendid, or more powerful, or more at his ease, by so many labours and contrivances? Have they not beggared his exchequer, 10 tarnished the splendour of his court, sunk his dignity, galled his feelings, discomposed the whole order and happiness of his private life?

It will be very hard, I believe, to state in what respect the king has profited by that faction which presumptuously choose to call themselves *his friends*.

If particular men had grown into an attachment, by the distinguished honour of the society of their sovereign; and, by being the partakers of his amusements, came sometimes to prefer the gratification of his personal inclinations to the 20 support of his high character, the thing would be very natural, and it would be excusable enough. But the pleasant part of the story is, that these *king's friends* have no more ground for usurping such a title, than a resident freeholder in Cumberland or in Cornwall. They are only known to their sovereign by kissing his hand, for the offices, pensions, and grants, into which they have deceived his benignity. May no storm ever come, which will put the firmness of their attachment to the proof; and which, in the midst of confusions, and terrors, and sufferings, may demonstrate the 30 eternal difference between a true and severe friend to the monarchy, and a slippery sycophant of the court! *Quantum infido scurræ distabit amicus* [*How great will be the difference between an untrustworthy parasite and a friend*].

So far I have considered the effect of the court system, chiefly as it operates upon the executive government, on the

temper of the people, and on the happiness of the sovereign. It remains that we should consider, with a little attention, its operation upon parliament.

Parliament was indeed the great object of all these politics, the end at which they aimed, as well as the instrument by which they were to operate. But, before parliament could be made subservient to a system, by which it was to be degraded from the dignity of a national council into a mere member of the court, it must be greatly changed from its
10 original character.

In speaking of this body, I have my eye chiefly on the House of Commons. I hope I shall be indulged in a few observations on the nature and character of that assembly; not with regard to its *legal form and power*, but to its *spirit*, and to the purposes it is meant to answer in the constitution.

The House of Commons was supposed originally to be *no part of the standing government of this country*. It was considered as a *control*, issuing *immediately* from the people, and speedily to be resolved into the mass from whence it arose.

20 In this respect it was in the higher part of government what juries are in the lower. The capacity of a magistrate being transitory, and that of a citizen permanent, the latter capacity it was hoped would of course preponderate in all discussions, not only between the people and the standing authority of the crown, but between the people and the fleeting authority of the House of Commons itself. It was hoped that, being of a middle nature between subject and government, they would feel with a more tender and a nearer interest every-
30 thing that concerned the people, than the other remoter and more permanent parts of legislature.

Whatever alterations time and the necessary accommodation of business may have introduced, this character can never be sustained, unless the House of Commons shall be made to bear some stamp of the actual disposition of the people at large. It would (among public misfortunes) be an evil more natural and tolerable, that the House of Commons should be

infected with every epidemical phrensy of the people, as this would indicate some consanguinity, some sympathy of nature with their constituents, than that they should in all cases be wholly untouched by the opinions and feelings of the people out of doors. By this want of sympathy they would cease to be a House of Commons. For it is not the derivation of the power of that House from the people, which makes it in a distinct sense their representative. The king is the representative of the people ; so are the lords ; so are the judges. They all are trustees for the people, as well as the Commons ; 10 because no power is given for the sole sake of the holder ; and although government certainly is an institution of Divine authority, yet its forms, and the persons who administer it, all originate from the people.

A popular origin cannot therefore be the characteristical distinction of a popular representative. This belongs equally to all parts of government, and in all forms. The virtue, spirit, and essence of a House of Commons consists in its being the express image of the feelings of the nation. It was not instituted to be a control *upon* the people, as of late 20 it has been taught, by a doctrine of the most pernicious tendency. It was designed as a control *for* the people. Other institutions have been formed for the purpose of checking popular excesses ; and they are, I apprehend, fully adequate to their object. If not, they ought to be made so. The House of Commons, as it was never intended for the support of peace and subordination, is miserably appointed for that service ; having no stronger weapon than its mace, and no better officer than its sergeant at arms, which it can command of its own proper authority. A vigilant and jealous eye over 30 executory and judicial magistracy ; an anxious care of public money ; an openness, approaching towards facility, to public complaint : these seem to be the true characteristics of a House of Commons. But an addressing House of Commons, and a petitioning nation ; a House of Commons full of confidence, when the nation is plunged in despair ; in the utmost

harmony with ministers, whom the people regard with the utmost abhorrence ; who vote thanks, when the public opinion calls upon them for impeachments ; who are eager to grant, when the general voice demands account ; who, in all disputes between the people and administration, presume against the people ; who punish their disorders, but refuse even to inquire into the provocations to them ; this is an unnatural, a monstrous state of things in this constitution. Such an assembly may be a great, wise, awful senate ; but it is not, to any popular purpose, a House of Commons. This change from an immediate state of procuration and delegation to a course of acting as from original power, is the way in which all the popular magistracies in the world have been perverted from their purposes. It is indeed their greatest, and sometimes their incurable, corruption. For there is a material distinction between that corruption by which particular points are carried against reason, (this is a thing which cannot be prevented by human wisdom, and is of less consequence,) and the corruption of the principle itself. For then the evil is not accidental, but settled. The distemper becomes the natural habit.

For my part, I shall be compelled to conclude the principle of parliament to be totally corrupted, and therefore its ends entirely defeated, when I see two symptoms : first, a rule of indiscriminate support to all ministers ; because this destroys the very end of parliament as a control, and is a general, previous sanction to misgovernment ; and secondly, the setting up any claims adverse to the right of free election ; for this tends to subvert the legal authority by which the House of Commons sits.

I know that, since the Revolution, along with many dangerous, many useful powers of government have been weakened. It is absolutely necessary to have frequent recourse to the legislature. Parliaments must therefore sit every year, and for great part of the year. The dreadful disorders of frequent elections have also necessitated a sep-

ennial instead of a triennial duration. These circumstances, I mean the constant habit of authority, and the unfrequency of elections, have tended very much to draw the House of Commons towards the character of a standing senate. It is a disorder which has arisen from the cure of greater disorders; it has arisen from the extreme difficulty of reconciling liberty under a monarchical government, with external strength and with internal tranquillity.

It is very clear that we cannot free ourselves entirely from this great inconvenience ; but I would not increase an evil, 10 because I was not able to remove it ; and because it was not in my power to keep the House of Commons religiously true to its first principles, I would not argue for carrying it to a total oblivion of them. This has been the great scheme of power in our time. They who will not conform their conduct to the public good, and cannot support it by the prerogative of the crown, have adopted a new plan. They have totally abandoned the shattered and old-fashioned fortress of prerogative, and make a lodgment in the strong-hold of parliament itself. If they have any evil design to which there is no 20 ordinary legal power commensurate, they bring it into parliament. In parliament the whole is executed from the beginning to the end. In parliament the power of obtaining their object is absolute ; and the safety in the proceeding perfect : no rules to confine, no after-reckonings to terrify. Parliament cannot, with any great propriety, punish others for things in which they themselves have been accomplices. Thus the control of parliament upon the executory power is lost ; because parliament is made to partake in every considerable act of government. *Impeachment, that great guardian 30 of the purity of the constitution, is in danger of being lost, even to the idea of it.*

By this plan several important ends are answered to the cabal. If the authority of parliament supports itself, the credit of every act of government, which they contrive, is saved : but if the act be so very odious that the whole

strength of parliament is insufficient to recommend it, then parliament is itself discredited ; and this discredit increases more and more that indifference to the constitution, which it is the constant aim of its enemies, by their abuse of parliamentary powers, to render general among the people. Whenever parliament is persuaded to assume the offices of executive government, it will lose all the confidence, love, and veneration, which it has ever enjoyed whilst it was supposed the *corrective and control* of the acting powers of the
 10 state. This would be the event, though its conduct in such a perversion of its functions should be tolerably just and moderate ; but if it should be iniquitous, violent, full of passion, and full of faction, it would be considered as the most intolerable of all the modes of tyranny.

For a considerable time this separation of the representatives from their constituents went on with a silent progress ; and had those, who conducted the plan for their total separation, been persons of temper and abilities any way equal to the magnitude of their design, the success would have
 20 been infallible : but by their precipitancy they have laid it open in all its nakedness ; the nation is alarmed at it : and the event may not be pleasant to the contrivers of the scheme. In the last session, the corps called the *king's friends* made a hardy attempt, all at once, *to alter the right of election itself* ; to put it into the power of the House of Commons to disable any person disagreeable to them from sitting in parliament, without any other rule than their own pleasure ; to make incapacities, either general for descriptions of men, or particular for individuals ; and to take into their
 30 body, persons who avowedly had never been chosen by the majority of legal electors, nor agreeably to any known rule of law.

The arguments upon which this claim was founded and combated, are not my business here. Never has a subject been more amply and more learnedly handled, nor upon one side, in my opinion, more satisfactorily ; they who are not

convinced by what is already written would not receive conviction *though one arose from the dead.*

I too have thought on this subject : but my purpose here, is only to consider it as a part of the favourite project of government ; to observe on the motives which led to it ; and to trace its political consequences.

A violent rage for the punishment of Mr. Wilkes was the pretence of the whole. This gentleman, by setting himself strongly in opposition to the court cabal, had become at once an object of their persecution, and of the popular favour. 10 The hatred of the court party pursuing, and the countenance of the people protecting him, it very soon became not at all a question on the man, but a trial of strength between the two parties. The advantage of the victory in this particular contest was the present, but not the only, nor by any means the principal, object. Its operation upon the character of the House of Commons was the great point in view. The point to be gained by the cabal was this ; that the precedent should be established, tending to show, *That the favour of the people was not so sure a road as the favour of the court even to* 20 *popular honours and popular trusts.* A strenuous resistance to every appearance of lawless power ; a spirit of independence carried to some degree of enthusiasm ; an inquisitive character to discover, and a bold one to display, every corruption and every error of government ; these are the qualities which recommend a man to a seat in the House of Commons, in open and merely popular elections. An indolent and submissive disposition ; a disposition to think charitably of all the actions of men in power, and to live in a mutual intercourse of favours with them ; an inclination rather 30 to countenance a strong use of authority, than to bear any sort of licentiousness on the part of the people ; these are unfavourable qualities in an open election for members of parliament.

The instinct which carries the people towards the choice of the former, is justified by reason ; because a man of such

a character, even in its exorbitances, does not directly contradict the purposes of a trust, the end of which is a control on power. The latter character, even when it is not in its extreme, will execute this trust but very imperfectly; and, if deviating to the least excess, will certainly frustrate instead of forwarding the purposes of a control on government. But when the House of Commons was to be new modelled, this principle was not only to be changed, but reversed. Whilst any errors committed in support of power were left

10 to the law, with every advantage of favourable construction, of mitigation, and finally of pardon; all excesses on the side of liberty, or in pursuit of popular favour, or in defence of popular rights and privileges, were not only to be punished by the rigour of the known law, but by a *discretionary* proceeding, which brought on *the loss of the popular object itself*. Popularity was to be rendered, if not directly penal, at least highly dangerous. The favour of the people might lead even to a disqualification of representing them. Their odium might become, strained through the medium of two or three

20 constructions, the means of sitting as the trustee of all that was dear to them. This is punishing the offence in the offending part. Until this time, the opinion of the people, through the power of an assembly, still in some sort popular, led to the greatest honours and emoluments in the gift of the crown. Now the principle is reversed; and the favour of the court is the only sure way of obtaining and holding those honours which ought to be in the disposal of the people.

It signifies very little how this matter may be quibbled away. Example, the only argument of effect in civil life,

30 demonstrates the truth of my proposition. Nothing can alter my opinion concerning the pernicious tendency of this example, until I see some man for his indiscretion in the support of power, for his violent and intemperate servility, rendered incapable of sitting in parliament. For as it now stands, the fault of overstraining popular qualities, and, irregularly if you please, asserting popular privileges, has led

to disqualification ; the opposite fault never has produced the slightest punishment. Resistance to power has shut the door of the House of Commons to one man ; obsequiousness and servility, to none.

Not that I would encourage popular disorder, or any disorder. But I would leave such offences to the law, to be punished in measure and proportion. The laws of this country are for the most part constituted, and wisely so, for the general ends of government, rather than for the preservation of our particular liberties. Whatever therefore 10 is done in support of liberty, by persons not in public trust, or not acting merely in that trust, is liable to be more or less out of the ordinary course of the law ; and the law itself is sufficient to animadvert upon it with great severity. Nothing indeed can hinder that severe letter from crushing us, except the temperament it may receive from a trial by jury. But if the habit prevails of *going beyond the law*, and superseding this judicature, of carrying offences, real or supposed, into the legislative bodies, who shall establish themselves into *courts of criminal equity*, (so the *star chamber* 20 has been called by Lord Bacon,) all the evils of the *star chamber* are revived. A large and liberal construction in ascertaining offences, and a discretionary power in punishing them, is the idea of *criminal equity* ; which is in truth a monster in jurisprudence. It signifies nothing whether a court for this purpose be a committee of council, or a House of Commons, or a House of Lords ; the liberty of the subject will be equally subverted by it. The true end and purpose of that House of Parliament, which entertains such a jurisdiction, will be destroyed by it. 30

I will not believe, what no other man living believes, that Mr. Wilkes was punished for the indecency of his publications, or the impiety of his ransacked closet. If he had fallen in a common slaughter of libellers and blasphemers, I could well believe that nothing more was meant than was pretended. But when I see, that, for years together, full as impious, and

perhaps more dangerous, writings to religion, and virtue, and order, have not been punished, nor their authors discountenanced ; that the most audacious libels on royal majesty have passed without notice ; that the most treasonable invectives against the laws, liberties, and constitution of the country have not met with the slightest animadversion ; I must consider this as a shocking and shameless pretence. Never did an envenomed scurrility against everything sacred and civil, public and private, rage through the kingdom with
 10 such a furious and unbridled licence. All this while the peace of the nation must be shaken, to ruin one libeller, and to tear from the populace a single favourite.

Nor is it that vice merely skulks in an obscure and contemptible impunity. Does not the public behold with indignation, persons not only generally scandalous in their lives, but the identical persons who, by their society, their instruction, their example, their encouragement, have drawn this man into the very faults which have furnished the cabal with a pretence for his persecution, loaded with every kind
 20 of favour, honour, and distinction, which a court can bestow? Add but the crime of servility (the *foedum crimen servitutis*) to every other crime, and the whole mass is immediately transmuted into virtue, and becomes the just subject of reward and honour. When therefore I reflect upon this method pursued by the cabal in distributing rewards and punishments, I must conclude that Mr. Wilkes is the object of persecution, not on account of what he has done in common with others who are the objects of reward, but for that in which he differs from many of them : that he is pursued for
 30 the spirited dispositions which are blended with his vices ; for his unconquerable firmness, for his resolute, indefatigable, strenuous resistance against oppression.

In this case, therefore, it was not the man that was to be punished, nor his faults that were to be discountenanced. Opposition to acts of power was to be marked by a kind of civil proscription. The popularity which should arise from

such an opposition was to be shown unable to protect it. The qualities by which court is made to the people, were to render every fault inexpressible, and every error irretrievable. The qualities by which court is made to power, were to cover and to sanctify everything. He that will have a sure and honourable seat in the House of Commons, must take care how he adventures to cultivate popular qualities ; otherwise he may remember the old maxim, *Breves et infaustos populi Romani amores* [*Short-lived and unfortunate were the favourites of the Roman people*]. If, therefore, a pursuit of popularity 10 expose a man to greater dangers than a disposition to servility, the principle which is the life and soul of popular elections will perish out of the constitution.

It behoves the people of England to consider how the House of Commons, under the operation of these examples, must of necessity be constituted. On the side of the court will be, all honours, offices, emoluments ; every sort of personal gratification to avarice or vanity ; and, what is of more moment to most gentlemen, the means of growing, by innumerable petty services to individuals, into a spreading 20 interest in their country. On the other hand, let us suppose a person unconnected with the court, and in opposition to its system. For his own person, no office, or emolument, or title ; no promotion ecclesiastical, or civil, or military, or naval, for children, or brothers, or kindred. In vain an expiring interest in a borough calls for offices, or small livings, for the children of mayors, and aldermen, and capital burgesses. His court rival has them all. He can do an infinite number of acts of generosity and kindness, and even of public spirit. He can procure indemnity from quarters. 30 He can procure advantages in trade. He can get pardons for offences. He can obtain a thousand favours, and avert a thousand evils. He may, while he betrays every valuable interest of the kingdom, be a benefactor, a patron, a father, a guardian angel, to his borough. The unfortunate independent member has nothing to offer, but harsh refusal, or

pitiful excuse, or despondent representation of a hopeless interest. Except from his private fortune, in which he may be equalled, perhaps exceeded, by his court competitor, he has no way of showing any one good quality, or of making a single friend. In the House, he votes for ever in a dispirited minority. If he speaks, the doors are locked. A body of loquacious place-men go out to tell the world that all he aims at is to get into office. If he has not the talent of elocution, which is the case of many as wise and knowing men as any
10 in the House, he is liable to all these inconveniences, without the *éclat* which attends upon any tolerably successful exertion of eloquence. Can we conceive a more discouraging post of duty than this? Strip it of the poor reward of popularity; suffer even the excesses committed in defence of the popular interest to become a ground for the majority of that House to form a disqualification out of the line of the law, and at their pleasure, attended not only with the loss of the franchise, but with every kind of personal disgrace; if this shall happen, the people of this kingdom may be assured
20 that they cannot be firmly or faithfully served by any man. It is out of the nature of men and things that they should; and their presumption will be equal to their folly if they expect it. The power of the people, within the laws, must show itself sufficient to protect every representative in the animated performance of his duty, or that duty cannot be performed. The House of Commons can never be a control on other parts of government, unless they are controlled themselves by their constituents; and unless these constituents possess some right in the choice of that House,
30 which it is not in the power of that House to take away. If they suffer this power of arbitrary incapacitation to stand, they have utterly perverted every other power of the House of Commons. The late proceeding, I will not say, *is* contrary to law; it *must* be so; for the power which is claimed cannot, by any possibility, be a legal power in any limited member of government.

The power which they claim, of declaring incapacities, would not be above the just claims of a final judicature, if they had not laid it down as a leading principle, that they had no rule in the exercise of this claim, but their own *discretion*. Not one of their abettors has ever undertaken to assign the principle of unfitness, the species or degree of delinquency, on which the House of Commons will expel, nor the mode of proceeding upon it, nor the evidence upon which it is established. The direct consequence of which is, that the first franchise of an Englishman, and that on which all the rest vitally depend, is to be forfeited for some offence which no man knows, and which is to be proved by no known rule whatsoever of legal evidence. This is so anomalous to our whole constitution, that I will venture to say, the most trivial right, which the subject claims, never was, nor can be, forfeited in such a manner. 10

The whole of their usurpation is established upon this method of arguing. We do not *make* laws. No; we do not contend for this power. We only *declare* law; and, as we are a tribunal both competent and supreme, what we declare to be law becomes law, although it should not have been so before. Thus the circumstance of having no *appeal* from their jurisdiction is made to imply that they have no *rule* in the exercise of it: the judgment does not derive its validity from its conformity to the law; but preposterously the law is made to attend on the judgment; and the rule of the judgment is no other than the *occasional will of the House*. An arbitrary discretion leads, legality follows; which is just the very nature and description of a legislative act. 20

This claim in their hands was no barren theory. It was pursued into its utmost consequences; and a dangerous principle has begot a correspondent practice. A systematic spirit has been shown upon both sides. The electors of Middlesex chose a person whom the House of Commons had voted incapable; and the House of Commons has taken in a member whom the electors of Middlesex had not chosen. 30

By a construction on that legislative power which had been assumed, they declared that the true legal sense of the country was contained in the minority, on that occasion ; and might, on a resistance to a vote of incapacity, be contained in any minority.

When any construction of law goes against the spirit of the privilege it was meant to support, it is a vicious construction. It is material to us to be represented really and *bonâ fide*, and not in forms, in types, and shadows, and 10 fictions of law. The right of election was not established merely as a *matter of form*, to satisfy some method and rule of technical reasoning ; it was not a principle which might substitute a *Titius* or a *Mævius*, a *John Doe* or *Richard Roe*, in the place of a man specially chosen ; not a principle which was just as well satisfied with one man as with another. It is a right, the effect of which is to give to the people that man, and *that man only*, whom, by their voices actually, not constructively given, they declare that they know, esteem, love, and trust. This right is a matter within their own 20 power of judging and feeling ; not an *ens rationis* [*a fiction of thought*] and creature of law : nor can those devices, by which anything else is substituted in the place of such an actual choice, answer in the least degree the end of representation.

I know that the courts of law have made as strained constructions in other cases. Such is the construction in common recoveries. The method of construction which in that case gives to the persons in remainder, for their security and representative, the door-keeper, cryer, or sweeper of the 30 court, or some other shadowy being without substance or effect, is a fiction of a very coarse texture. This was however suffered, by the acquiescence of the whole kingdom, for ages ; because the evasion of the old statute of Westminster, which authorized perpetuities, had more sense and utility than the law which was evaded. But an attempt to turn the right of election into such a farce and mockery as a

fictitious fine and recovery, will, I hope, have another fate ; because the laws which give it are infinitely dear to us, and the evasion is infinitely contemptible. ✓

The people indeed have been told, that this power of discretionary disqualification is vested in hands that they may trust, and who will be sure not to abuse it to their prejudice. Until I find something in this argument differing from that on which every mode of despotism has been defended, I shall not be inclined to pay it any great compliment. The people are satisfied to trust themselves with the exercise of their 10 own privileges, and do not desire this kind intervention of the House of Commons to free them from the burthen. They are certainly in the right. They ought not to trust the House of Commons with a power over their franchises ; because the constitution, which placed two other co-ordinate powers to control it, reposed no such confidence in that body. It were a folly well deserving servitude for its punishment, to be full of confidence where the laws are full of distrust ; and to give to a House of Commons, arrogating to its sole resolution the most harsh and odious part of legislative 20 authority, that degree of submission which is due only to the legislature itself.

When the House of Commons, in an endeavour to obtain new advantages at the expense of the other orders of the state, for the benefit of the *commons at large*, have pursued strong measures ; if it were not just, it was at least natural, that the constituents should connive at all their proceedings, because we were ourselves ultimately to profit. But when this submission is urged to us, in a contest between the representatives and ourselves, and where nothing can be put 30 into their scale which is not taken from ours, they fancy us to be children when they tell us they are our representatives, our own flesh and blood, and that all the stripes they give us are for our good. The very desire of that body to have such a trust contrary to law reposed in them, shows that they are not worthy of it. They certainly will abuse it ; because all

men possessed of an uncontrolled discretionary power leading to the aggrandizement and profit of their own body, have always abused it : and I see no particular sanctity in our times, that is at all likely, by a miraculous operation, to overrule the course of nature.

But we must purposely shut our eyes, if we consider this matter merely as a contest between the House of Commons and the electors. The true contest is between the electors of the kingdom and the crown ; the crown acting by an instrumental House of Commons. It is precisely the same, whether the ministers of the crown can disqualify by a dependent House of Commons, or by a dependent court of *star chamber*, or by a dependent court of king's bench. If once members of parliament can be practically convinced that they do not depend on the affection or opinion of the people for their political being, they will give themselves over, without even an appearance of reserve, to the influence of the court.

Indeed, a parliament unconnected with the people is essential to a ministry unconnected with the people ; and therefore those who saw through what mighty difficulties the interior ministry waded, and the exterior were dragged, in this business, will conceive of what prodigious importance the new corps of *king's men* held this principle of occasional and personal incapacitation, to the whole body of their design.

When the House of Commons was thus made to consider itself as the master of its constituents, there wanted but one thing to secure that House against all possible future deviation towards popularity ; an *unlimited* fund of money to be laid out according to the pleasure of the court.

To complete the scheme of bringing our court to a resemblance to the neighbouring monarchies, it was necessary, in effect, to destroy those appropriations of revenue, which seem to limit the property, as the other laws had done the powers, of the crown. An opportunity for this purpose was taken, upon an application to parliament for payment of the

debts of the civil list ; which in 1769 had amounted to £513,000. Such application had been made upon former occasions ; but to do it in the former manner would by no means answer the present purpose.

Whenever the crown had come to the Commons to desire a supply for the discharging of debts due on the civil list, it was always asked and granted with one of the three following qualifications ; sometimes with all of them. Either it was stated, that the revenue had been diverted from its purposes by parliament ; or that those duties had fallen short of the 10 sum for which they were given by parliament ; and that the intention of the legislature had not been fulfilled ; or that the money required to discharge the civil list debt was to be raised chargeable on the civil list duties. In the reign of Queen Anne the crown was found in debt. The lessening and granting away some part of her revenue by parliament was alleged as the cause of that debt, and pleaded as an equitable ground, such it certainly was, for discharging it. It does not appear that the duties which were then applied to the ordinary government produced clear above £580,000 20 a year ; because, when they were afterwards granted to George the First, £120,000 was added, to complete the whole to £700,000 a year. Indeed it was then asserted, and, I have no doubt, truly, that for many years the net produce did not amount to above £550,000. The queen's extraordinary charges were besides very considerable ; equal, at least, to any we have known in our time. The application to parliament was not for an absolute grant of money ; but to empower the queen to raise it by borrowing upon the civil list funds. 30

The civil list debt was twice paid in the reign of George the First. The money was granted upon the same plan which had been followed in the reign of Queen Anne. The civil list revenues were then mortgaged for the sum to be raised, and stood charged with the ransom of their own deliverance.

George the Second received an addition to his civil list. Duties were granted for the purpose of raising £800,000 a year. It was not until he had reigned nineteen years, and after the last rebellion, that he called upon parliament for a discharge of the civil list debt. The extraordinary charges brought on by the rebellion, account fully for the necessities of the crown. However, the extraordinary charges of government were not thought a ground fit to be relied on.

A deficiency of the civil list duties for several years before
10 was stated as the principal, if not the sole, ground on which an application to parliament could be justified. About this time the produce of these duties had fallen pretty low ; and even upon an average of the whole reign they never produced £800,000 a year clear to the treasury.

That prince reigned fourteen years afterwards : not only no new demands were made ; but with so much good order were his revenues and expenses regulated, that, although many parts of the establishment of the court were upon a larger and more liberal scale than they have been since, there
20 was a considerable sum in hand, on his decease, amounting to about £170,000, applicable to the service of the civil list of his present Majesty. So that, if this reign commenced with a greater charge than usual, there was enough, and more than enough, abundantly to supply all the extraordinary expense. That the civil list should have been exceeded in the two former reigns, especially in the reign of George the First, was not at all surprising. His revenue was but £700,000 annually ; if it ever produced so much clear. The prodigious and dangerous disaffection to the very being of
30 the establishment, and the cause of a Pretender then powerfully abetted from abroad, produced many demands of an extraordinary nature both abroad and at home. Much management and great expenses were necessary. But the throne of no prince has stood upon more unshaken foundations than that of his present Majesty.

To have exceeded the sum given for the civil list, and to

have incurred a debt without special authority of parliament, was, *prima facie*, a criminal act : as such, ministers ought naturally rather to have withdrawn it from the inspection, than to have exposed it to the scrutiny, of parliament. Certainly they ought, of themselves, officially to have come armed with every sort of argument, which, by explaining, could excuse a matter in itself of presumptive guilt. But the terrors of the House of Commons are no longer for ministers.

On the other hand, the peculiar character of the House of 10 Commons, as trustee of the public purse, would have led them to call with a punctilious solicitude for every public account, and to have examined into them with the most rigorous accuracy.

The capital use of an account is, that the reality of the charge, the reason of incurring it, and the justice and necessity of discharging it, should all appear antecedent to the payment. No man ever pays first, and calls for his account afterwards ; because he would thereby let out of his hands the principal, and indeed only effectual, means of compelling 20 a full and fair one. But, in national business, there is an additional reason for a previous production of every account. It is a check, perhaps the only one, upon a corrupt and prodigal use of public money. An account after payment is to no rational purpose an account. However, the House of Commons thought all these to be antiquated principles ; they were of opinion, that the most parliamentary way of proceeding was, to pay first what the court thought proper to demand, and to take its chance for an examination into accounts at some time of greater leisure. 30

The nation had settled £800,000 a year on the crown as sufficient for the support of its dignity, upon the estimate of its own ministers. When ministers came to parliament, and said that this allowance had not been sufficient for the purpose, and that they had incurred a debt of £500,000, would it not have been natural for parliament first to have

asked how, and by what means, their appropriated allowance came to be insufficient? Would it not have savoured of some attention to justice, to have seen in what periods of administration this debt had been originally incurred; that they might discover, and if need were animadvert on, the persons who were found the most culpable? To put their hands upon such articles of expenditure as they thought improper or excessive, and to secure, in future, against such misapplication or exceeding? Accounts for any other purposes are but a matter of curiosity, and no genuine parliamentary object. All the accounts which could answer any parliamentary end were refused, or postponed by previous questions. Every idea of prevention was rejected, as conveying an improper suspicion of the ministers of the crown.

When every leading account had been refused, many others were granted with sufficient facility.

But with great candour also, the House was informed, that hardly any of them could be ready until the next session; some of them perhaps not so soon. But, in order firmly to establish the precedent of *payment previous to account*, and to form it into a settled rule of the House, the god in the machine was brought down, nothing less than the wonder-working *law of parliament*. It was alleged, that it is the law of parliament, when any demand comes from the crown, that the House must go immediately into the committee of supply; in which committee it was allowed, that the production and examination of accounts would be quite proper and regular. It was therefore carried, that they should go into the committee without delay, and without accounts, in order to examine with great order and regularity things that could not possibly come before them. After this stroke of orderly and parliamentary wit and humour, they went into the committee; and very generously voted the payment.

There was a circumstance in that debate too remarkable to be overlooked. This debt of the civil list was all along argued

upon the same footing as a debt of the state, contracted upon national authority. Its payment was urged as equally pressing upon the public faith and honour; and when the whole year's account was stated, in what is called *the budget*, the ministry valued themselves on the payment of so much public debt, just as if they had discharged £500,000 of navy or exchequer bills. Though, in truth, their payment, from the sinking fund, of debt which was never contracted by parliamentary authority, was, to all intents and purposes, so much debt incurred. But such is the present notion of 10 public credit, and payment of debt. No wonder that it produces such effects.

Nor was the House at all more attentive to a provident security against future, than it had been to a vindictive retrospect to past, mismanagements. I should have thought indeed that a ministerial promise, during their own continuance in office, might have been given, though this would have been but a poor security for the public. Mr. Pelham gave such an assurance, and he kept his word. But nothing was capable of extorting from our ministers anything which 20 had the least resemblance to a promise of confining the expenses of the civil list within the limits which had been settled by parliament. This reserve of theirs I look upon to be equivalent to the clearest declaration, that they were resolved upon a contrary course.

However, to put the matter beyond all doubt, in the speech from the throne, after thanking parliament for the relief so liberally granted, the ministers inform the two Houses, that they will *endeavour* to confine the expenses of the civil government—within what limits, think you? those which 30 the law had prescribed? Not in the least—"such limits as the *honour of the crown* can possibly admit."

Thus they established an *arbitrary* standard for that dignity which parliament had defined and limited to a *legal* standard. They gave themselves, under the lax and indeterminate idea of the *honour of the crown*, a full loose for all manner of

how does Pelham define

dissipation, and all manner of corruption. This arbitrary standard they were not afraid to hold out to both Houses ; while an idle and unoperative act of parliament, estimating the dignity of the crown at £800,000, and confining it to that sum, adds to the number of obsolete statutes which load the shelves of libraries, without any sort of advantage to the people.

After this proceeding, I suppose that no man can be so weak as to think that the crown is limited to any settled allowance whatsoever. For if the ministry has £800,000 a year by the law of the land ; and if by the law of parliament all the debts which exceed it are to be paid previous to the production of any account ; I presume that this is equivalent to an income with no other limits than the abilities of the subject and the moderation of the court ; that is to say, it is such an income as is possessed by every absolute monarch in Europe. It amounts, as a person of great ability said in the debate, to an unlimited power of drawing upon the sinking fund. Its effect on the public credit of this kingdom must be obvious ; for in vain is the sinking fund the great buttress of all the rest, if it be in the power of the ministry to resort to it for the payment of any debts which they may choose to incur, under the name of the civil list, and through the medium of a committee, which thinks itself obliged by law to vote supplies without any other account than that of the mere existence of the debt.

Five hundred thousand pounds is a serious sum. But it is nothing to the prolific principle upon which the sum was voted : a principle that may be well called, *the fruitful mother* of an hundred more. Neither is the damage to public credit of very great consequence, when compared with that which results to public morals and to the safety of the constitution, from the exhaustless mine of corruption opened by the precedent, and to be wrought by the principle, of the late payment of the debts of the civil list. The power of discretionary disqualification by one law of parliament, and the

necessity of paying every debt of the civil list by another law of parliament, if suffered to pass unnoticed, must establish such a fund of rewards and terrors as will make parliament the best appendage and support of arbitrary power that ever was invented by the wit of man. This is felt. The quarrel is begun between the representatives and the people. The court faction have at length committed them.

In such a strait the wisest may well be perplexed, and the boldest staggered. The circumstances are in a great measure new. We have hardly any land-marks from the wisdom of 10 our ancestors to guide us. At best we can only follow the spirit of their proceeding in other cases. I know the diligence with which my observations on our public disorders have been made; I am very sure of the integrity of the motives on which they are published: I cannot be equally confident in any plan for the absolute cure of those disorders, or for their certain future prevention. My aim is to bring this matter into more public discussion. Let the sagacity of others work upon it. It is not uncommon for medical writers to describe histories of diseases very accurately, on 20 whose cure they can say but very little.

The first ideas which generally suggest themselves, for the cure of parliamentary disorders, are, to shorten the duration of parliaments; and to disqualify all, or a great number, of placemen from a seat in the House of Commons. Whatever efficacy there may be in those remedies, I am sure in the present state of things it is impossible to apply them. A restoration of the right of free election is a preliminary indispensable to every other reformation. What alterations ought afterwards to be made in the constitution, is a matter 30 of deep and difficult research.

If I wrote merely to please the popular palate, it would indeed be as little troublesome to me as to another, to extol these remedies, so famous in speculation, but to which their greatest admirers have never attempted seriously to resort in practice. I confess, then, that I have no sort of reliance upon

either a triennial parliament, or a place-bill. With regard to the former, perhaps, it might rather serve to counteract, than to promote, the ends that are proposed by it. To say nothing of the horrible disorders among the people attending frequent elections, I should be fearful of committing, every three years, the independent gentlemen of the country into a contest with the treasury. It is easy to see which of the contending parties would be ruined first. Whoever has taken a careful view of public proceedings, so as to endeavour
10 to ground his speculations on his experience, must have observed how prodigiously greater the power of ministry is in the first and last session of a parliament, than it is in the intermediate periods, when members sit a little firm on their seats. The persons of the greatest parliamentary experience, with whom I have conversed, did constantly, in canvassing the fate of questions, allow something to the court side, upon account of the elections depending or imminent. The evil complained of, if it exists in the present state of things, would hardly be removed by a triennial parliament: for,
20 unless the influence of government in elections can be entirely taken away, the more frequently they return, the more they will harass private independence; the more generally men will be compelled to fly to the settled systematic interest of government, and to the resources of a boundless civil list. Certainly something may be done, and ought to be done, towards lessening that influence in elections; and this will be necessary upon a plan either of longer or shorter duration of parliament. But nothing can so perfectly remove the evil, as not to render such contentions, too frequently repeated,
30 utterly ruinous, first to independence of fortune, and then to independence of spirit. As I am only giving an opinion on this point, and not at all debating it in an adverse line, I hope I may be excused in another observation. With great truth I may aver, that I never remember to have talked on this subject with any man much conversant with public business, who considered short parliaments as a real improve-

ment of the constitution. Gentlemen, warm in a popular cause, are ready enough to attribute all the declarations of such persons to corrupt motives. But the habit of affairs, if, on one hand, it tends to corrupt the mind, furnishes it, on the other, with the means of better information. The authority of such persons will always have some weight. It may stand upon a par with the speculations of those who are less practised in business ; and who, with perhaps purer intentions, have not so effectual means of judging. It is besides an effect of vulgar and puerile malignity to imagine, 10 that every statesman is of course corrupt ; and that his opinion, upon every constitutional point, is solely formed upon some sinister interest.

The next favourite remedy is a place-bill. The same principle guides in both ; I mean, the opinion which is entertained by many, of the infallibility of laws and regulations, in the cure of public distempers. Without being as unreasonably doubtful as many are unwisely confident, I will only say, that this also is a matter very well worthy of serious and mature reflection. It is not easy to foresee, what the 20 effect would be of disconnecting with parliament the greatest part of those who hold civil employments, and of such mighty and important bodies as the military and naval establishments. It were better, perhaps, that they should have a corrupt interest in the forms of the constitution, than that they should have none at all. This is a question altogether different from the disqualification of a particular description of revenue officers from seats in parliament ; or, perhaps, of all the lower sorts of them from votes in elections. In the former case, only the few are affected ; in the latter, only 30 the inconsiderable. But a great official, a great professional, a great military and naval interest, all necessarily comprehending many people of the first weight, ability, wealth, and spirit, has been gradually formed in the kingdom. These new interests must be let into a share of representation, else possibly they may be inclined to destroy those institutions

of which they are not permitted to partake. This is not a thing to be trifled with ; nor is it every well-meaning man that is fit to put his hands to it. Many other serious considerations occur. I do not open them here, because they are not directly to my purpose ; proposing only to give the reader some taste of the difficulties that attend all capital changes in the constitution ; just to hint the uncertainty, to say no worse, of being able to prevent the court, as long as it has the means of influence abundantly in its power, of
10 applying that influence to parliament ; and perhaps, if the public method were precluded, of doing it in some worse and more dangerous method. Underhand and oblique ways would be studied. The science of evasion, already tolerably understood, would then be brought to the greatest perfection. It is no inconsiderable part of wisdom, to know how much of an evil ought to be tolerated ; lest, by attempting a degree of purity impracticable in degenerate times and manners, instead of cutting off the subsisting ill practices, new corruptions might be produced for the concealment and
20 security of the old. It were better, undoubtedly, that no influence at all could affect the mind of a member of parliament. But of all modes of influence, in my opinion, a place under the government is the least disgraceful to the man who holds it, and by far the most safe to the country. I would not shut out that sort of influence which is open and visible, which is connected with the dignity and the service of the state, when it is not in my power to prevent the influence of contracts, of subscriptions, of direct bribery, and those innumerable methods of clandestine corruption, which
30 are abundantly in the hands of the court, and which will be applied as long as these means of corruption, and the disposition to be corrupted, have existence amongst us. Our constitution stands on a nice equipoise, with steep precipices and deep waters upon all sides of it. In removing it from a dangerous leaning towards one side, there may be a risk of oversetting it on the other. Every project of a material

change in a government so complicated as ours, combined at the same time with external circumstances still more complicated, is a matter full of difficulties ; in which a considerate man will not be too ready to decide ; a prudent man too ready to undertake ; or an honest man too ready to promise. They do not respect the public nor themselves, who engage for more than they are sure that they ought to attempt, or that they are able to perform. These are my sentiments, weak perhaps, but honest and unbiassed ; and submitted entirely to the opinion of grave men, well affected 10 to the constitution of their country, and of experience in what may best promote or hurt it.

Indeed, in the situation in which we stand, with an immense revenue, an enormous debt, mighty establishments, government itself a great banker and a great merchant, I see no other way for the preservation of a decent attention to public interest in the representatives, but *the interposition of the body of the people itself*, whenever it shall appear, by some flagrant and notorious act, by some capital innovation, that these representatives are going to over-leap the fences 20 of the law, and to introduce an arbitrary power. This interposition is a most unpleasant remedy. But, if it be a legal remedy, it is intended on some occasion to be used ; to be used then only, when it is evident that nothing else can hold the constitution to its true principles.

The distempers of monarchy were the great subjects of apprehension and redress, in the last century ; in this, the distempers of parliament. It is not in parliament alone that the remedy for parliamentary disorders can be completed ; hardly indeed can it begin there. Until a confidence in 30 government is re-established, the people ought to be excited to a more strict and detailed attention to the conduct of their representatives. Standards for judging more systematically upon their conduct ought to be settled in the meetings of counties and corporations. Frequent and correct lists of the voters in all important questions ought to be procured.

By such means something may be done. By such means it may appear who those are, that, by an indiscriminate support of all administrations, have totally banished all integrity and confidence out of public proceedings ; have confounded the best men with the worst ; and weakened and dissolved, instead of strengthening and compacting, the general frame of government. If any person is more concerned for government and order, than for the liberties of his country, even he is equally concerned to put an end to this course of indis-

10 criminate support. It is this blind and undistinguishing support, that feeds the spring of those very disorders, by which he is frightened into the arms of the faction which contains in itself the source of all disorders, by enfeebling all the visible and regular authority of the state. The distemper is increased by his injudicious and preposterous endeavours, or pretences, for the cure of it.

An exterior administration, chosen for its impotency, or after it is chosen purposely rendered impotent, in order to be rendered subservient, will not be obeyed. The laws themselves will not be respected, when those who execute them

20 are despised : and they will be despised, when their power is not immediate from the crown, or natural in the kingdom. Never were ministers better supported in parliament. Parliamentary support comes and goes with office, totally regardless of the man, or the merit. Is government strengthened ? It grows weaker and weaker. The popular torrent gains upon it every hour. Let us learn from our experience. It is not support that is wanting to government, but reformation. When ministry rests upon public opinion, it is not

30 indeed built upon a rock of adamant ; it has, however, some stability. But when it stands upon private humour, its structure is of stubble, and its foundation is on quicksand. I repeat it again—He that supports every administration subverts all government. The reason is this : The whole business in which a court usually takes an interest goes on at present equally well, in whatever hands, whether high or

low, wise or foolish, scandalous or reputable ; there is nothing therefore to hold it firm to any one body of men, or to any one consistent scheme of politics. Nothing interposes, to prevent the full operation of all the caprices and all the passions of a court upon the servants of the public. The system of administration is open to continual shocks and changes, upon the principles of the meanest cabal, and the most contemptible intrigue. Nothing can be solid and permanent. All good men at length fly with horror from such a service. Men of rank and ability, with the spirit which ought to animate such men in a free state, while they decline the jurisdiction of dark cabal on their actions and their fortunes, will, for both, cheerfully put themselves upon their country. They will trust an inquisitive and distinguishing parliament ; because it does inquire, and does distinguish. If they act well, they know that, in such a parliament, they will be supported against any intrigue ; if they act ill, they know that no intrigue can protect them. This situation, however awful, is honourable. But in one hour, and in the self-same assembly, without any assigned or assignable cause, to be precipitated from the highest authority to the most marked neglect, possibly into the greatest peril of life and reputation, is a situation full of danger, and destitute of honour. It will be shunned equally by every man of prudence, and every man of spirit.

Such are the consequences of the division of court from the administration ; and of the division of public men among themselves. By the former of these, lawful government is undone ; by the latter, all opposition to lawless power is rendered impotent. Government may in a great measure be restored, if any considerable bodies of men have honesty and resolution enough never to accept administration, unless this garrison of *king's men*, which is stationed, as in a citadel, to control and enslave it, be entirely broken and disbanded, and every work they have thrown up be levelled with the ground. The disposition of public men to keep this corps together,

and to act under it, or to co-operate with it, is a touch-stone by which every administration ought in future to be tried. There has not been one which has not sufficiently experienced the utter incompatibility of that faction with the public peace, and with all the ends of good government : since, if they opposed it, they soon lost every power of serving the crown ; if they submitted to it, they lost all the esteem of their country. Until ministers give to the public a full proof of their entire alienation from that system, however
10 plausible their pretences, we may be sure they are more intent on the emoluments than the duties of office. If they refuse to give this proof, we know of what stuff they are made. In this particular, it ought to be the electors' business to look to their representatives. The electors ought to esteem it no less culpable in their member to give a single vote in parliament to such an administration, than to take an office under it ; to endure it, than to act in it. The notorious infidelity and versatility of members of parliament, in their opinions of men and things, ought in a particular
20 manner to be considered by the electors in the inquiry which is recommended to them. This is one of the principal holdings of that destructive system, which has endeavoured to unhinge all the virtuous, honourable, and useful connexions in the kingdom.

This cabal has, with great success, propagated a doctrine which serves for a colour to those acts of treachery ; and whilst it receives any degree of countenance, it will be utterly senseless to look for a vigorous opposition to the court party. The doctrine is this : That all political connexions are in
30 their nature factious, and as such ought to be dissipated and destroyed ; and that the rule for forming administrations is mere personal ability, rated by the judgment of this cabal upon it, and taken by drafts from every division and denomination of public men. This degree was solemnly promulgated by the head of the court corps, the Earl of Bute himself, in a speech which he made, in the year 1766, against the then

administration, the only administration which he has ever been known directly and publicly to oppose.

It is indeed in no way wonderful, that such persons should make such declarations. That connexion and faction are equivalent terms, is an opinion which has been carefully inculcated at all times by unconstitutional statesmen. The reason is evident. Whilst men are linked together, they easily and speedily communicate the alarm of any evil design. They are enabled to fathom it with common counsel, and to oppose it with united strength. Whereas, when they lie dispersed, without concert, order, or discipline, communication is uncertain, counsel difficult, and resistance impracticable. Where men are not acquainted with each other's principles, nor experienced in each other's talents, nor at all practised in their mutual habitudes and dispositions by joint efforts in business ; no personal confidence, no friendship, no common interest, subsisting among them ; it is evidently impossible that they can act a public part with uniformity, perseverance, or efficacy. In a connexion, the most inconsiderable man, by adding to the weight of the whole, has his value, and his use ; out of it, the greatest talents are wholly unserviceable to the public. No man, who is not inflamed by vain-glory into enthusiasm, can flatter himself that his single, unsupported, desultory, unsystematic endeavours, are of power to defeat the subtle designs and united cabals of ambitious citizens. When bad men combine, the good must associate ; else they will fall, one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle.

It is not enough in a situation of trust in the commonwealth, that a man means well to his country ; it is not enough that in his single person he never did an evil act, but always voted according to his conscience, and even harangued against every design which he apprehended to be prejudicial to the interests of his country. This innoxious and ineffectual character, that seems formed upon a plan of apology and disculpation, falls miserably short of the mark

of public duty. That duty demands and requires, that what is right should not only be made known, but made prevalent ; that what is evil should not only be detected, but defeated. When the public man omits to put himself in a situation of doing his duty with effect, it is an omission that frustrates the purposes of his trust almost as much as if he had formally betrayed it. It is surely no very rational account of a man's life, that he has always acted right ; but has taken special care to act in such a manner that his endeavours could not
10 possibly be productive of any consequence.

I do not wonder that the behaviour of many parties should have made persons of tender and scrupulous virtue somewhat out of humour with all sorts of connexion in politics. I admit that people frequently acquire in such confederacies a narrow, bigoted, and proscriptive spirit ; that they are apt to sink the idea of the general good in this circumscribed and partial interest. But, where duty renders a critical situation a necessary one, it is our business to keep free from the evils attendant upon it ; and not to fly from the situa-
20 tion itself. If a fortress is seated in an unwholesome air, an officer of the garrison is obliged to be attentive to his health, but he must not desert his station. Every profession, not excepting the glorious one of a soldier, or the sacred one of a priest, is liable to its own particular vices ; which, however, form no argument against those ways of life ; nor are the vices themselves inevitable to every individual in those professions. Of such a nature are connexions in politics ; essentially necessary for the full performance of our public duty, accidentally liable to degenerate into faction. Common-
30 wealths are made of families, free commonwealths of parties also ; and we may as well affirm, that our natural regards and ties of blood tend inevitably to make men bad citizens, as that the bonds of our party weaken those by which we are held to our country.

Some legislators went so far as to make neutrality in party a crime against the state. I do not know whether this

might not have been rather to overstrain the principle. Certain it is, the best patriots in the greatest commonwealths have always commended and promoted such connexions. *Idem sentire de republicâ* [to feel in the same way about public matters], was with them a principal ground of friendship and attachment; nor do I know any other capable of forming firmer, dearer, more pleasing, more honourable, and more virtuous habitudes. The Romans carried this principle a great way. Even the holding of offices together, the disposition of which arose from chance, 10 not selection, gave rise to a relation which continued for life. It was called *necessitudo sortis* [the connexion of the lot]; and it was looked upon with a sacred reverence. Breaches of any of these kinds of civil relation were considered as acts of the most distinguished turpitude. The whole people was distributed into political societies, in which they acted in support of such interests in the state as they severally affected. For it was then thought no crime, to endeavour by every honest means to advance to superiority and power those of your own sentiments and opinions. 20 This wise people was far from imagining that those connexions had no tie, and obliged to no duty; but that men might quit them without shame, upon every call of interest. They believed private honour to be the great foundation of public trust; that friendship was no mean step towards patriotism; that he who, in the common intercourse of life, showed he regarded somebody besides himself, when he came to act in a public situation, might probably consult some other interests than his own. Never may we become *plus sages que les sages* [more wise than the wise], as the French 30 comedian has happily expressed it, wiser than all the wise and good men who have lived before us. It was their wish, to see public and private virtues, not dissonant and jarring, and mutually destructive, but harmoniously combined, growing out of one another in a noble and orderly gradation, reciprocally supporting and supported. In one of the

most fortunate periods of our history this country was governed by a *connexion*; I mean the great connexion of Whigs in the reign of Queen Anne. They were complimented upon the principle of this connexion by a poet who was in high esteem with them. Addison, who knew their sentiments, could not praise them for what they considered as no proper subject of commendation. As a poet who knew his business, he could not applaud them for a thing which in general estimation was not highly reputable.

10 Addressing himself to Britain,

“Thy favourites grow not up by fortune’s sport,
Or from the crimes or follies of a court.
On the firm basis of desert they rise,
From long-tried faith, and friendship’s holy ties.”

The Whigs of those days believed that the only proper method of rising into power was through hard essays of practised friendship and experimented fidelity. At that time it was not imagined, that patriotism was a bloody idol, which required the sacrifice of children and parents, or dearest con-
20 nexions in private life, and of all the virtues that rise from those relations. They were not of that ingenious paradoxical morality, to imagine that a spirit of moderation was properly shown in patiently bearing the sufferings of your friends; or that disinterestedness was clearly manifested at the expense of other people’s fortune. They believed that no men could act with effect, who did not act in concert; that no men could act in concert, who did not act with confidence; that no men could act with confidence, who were not bound together by common opinions, common affections, and
30 common interests.

These wise men, for such I must call Lord Sunderland, Lord Godolphin, Lord Somers, and Lord Marlborough, were too well principled in these maxims upon which the whole fabric of public strength is built, to be blown off their ground by the breath of every childish talker. They were not afraid that they should be called an ambitious Junto; or that their

resolution to stand or fall together should, by placemen, be interpreted into a scuffle for places.

Party is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed. For my part, I find it impossible to conceive, that any one believes in his own politics, or thinks them to be of any weight, who refuses to adopt the means of having them reduced into practice. It is the business of the speculative philosopher to mark the proper ends of government. It is the business of the politician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out proper means towards those ends, and to employ them with effect. Therefore every honourable connexion will avow it is their first purpose, to pursue every just method to put the men who hold their opinions into such a condition as may enable them to carry their common plans into execution, with all the power and authority of the state. As this power is attached to certain situations, it is their duty to contend for these situations. Without a proscription of others, they are bound to give to their own party the preference in all things ; 20 and by no means, for private considerations, to accept any offers of power in which the whole body is not included ; nor to suffer themselves to be led, or to be controlled, or to be overbalanced, in office or in council, by those who contradict the very fundamental principles on which their party is formed, and even those upon which every fair connexion must stand. Such a generous contention for power, on such manly and honourable maxims, will easily be distinguished from the mean and interested struggle for place and emolument. The very style of such persons will serve to dis- 30 criminate them from those numberless impostors, who have deluded the ignorant with professions incompatible with human practice, and have afterwards incensed them by practices below the level of vulgar rectitude.

It is an advantage to all narrow wisdom and narrow morals, that their maxims have a plausible air ; and, on a

cursory view, appear equal to first principles. They are light and portable. They are as current as copper coin ; and about as valuable. They serve equally the first capacities and the lowest ; and they are, at least, as useful to the worst men as the best. Of this stamp is the cant of *Not men but measures* ; a sort of charm by which many people get loose from every honourable engagement. When I see a man acting this desultory and disconnected part, with as much detriment to his own fortune as prejudice to the cause of any party, I am
10 not persuaded that he is right ; but I am ready to believe he is in earnest. I respect virtue in all its situations ; even when it is found in the unsuitable company of weakness. I lament to see qualities, rare and valuable, squandered away without any public utility. But when a gentleman with great visible emoluments abandons the party in which he has long acted, and tells you, it is because he proceeds upon his own judgment ; that he acts on the merits of the several measures as they arise ; and that he is obliged to follow his own conscience, and not that of others ; he gives reasons
20 which it is impossible to controvert, and discovers a character which it is impossible to mistake. What shall we think of him who never differed from a certain set of men until the moment they lost their power, and who never agreed with them in a single instance afterwards ? Would not such a coincidence of interest and opinion be rather fortunate ? Would it not be an extraordinary cast upon the dice, that a man's connexions should degenerate into faction, precisely at the critical moment when they lose their power, or he accepts a place ? When people desert their connexions, the desertion
30 is a manifest *fact*, upon which a direct simple issue lies, triable by plain men. Whether a *measure* of government be right or wrong, is *no matter of fact*, but a mere affair of opinion, on which men may, as they do, dispute and wrangle without end. But whether the individual *thinks* the measure right or wrong, is a point at still a greater distance from the reach of all human decision. It is therefore very convenient

to politicians, not to put the judgment of their conduct on overt-acts, cognizable in any ordinary court, but upon such a matter as can be triable only in that secret tribunal, where they are sure of being heard with favour, or where at worst the sentence will be only private whipping.

I believe the reader would wish to find no substance in a doctrine which has a tendency to destroy all test of character as deduced from conduct. He will therefore excuse my adding something more, towards the further clearing up a point, which the great convenience of obscurity to dishonesty 10 has been able to cover with some degree of darkness and doubt.

In order to throw an odium on political connexion, these politicians suppose it a necessary incident to it, that you are blindly to follow the opinions of your party, when in direct opposition to your own clear ideas; a degree of servitude that no worthy man could bear the thought of submitting to; and such as, I believe, no connexions (except some court factions) ever could be so senselessly tyrannical as to impose. Men thinking freely, will, in particular instances, think differently. But still as the greater part of the measures 20 which arise in the course of public business are related to, or dependent on, some great *leading general principles in government*, a man must be peculiarly unfortunate in the choice of his political company if he does not agree with them at least nine times in ten. If he does not concur in these general principles upon which the party is founded, and which necessarily draw on a concurrence in their application, he ought from the beginning to have chosen some other, more conformable to his opinions. When the question is in its nature doubtful, or not very material, the modesty which 30 becomes an individual, and (in spite of our court moralists) that partiality which becomes a well-chosen friendship, will frequently bring on an acquiescence in the general sentiment. Thus the disagreement will naturally be rare; it will be only enough to indulge freedom, without violating concord, or disturbing arrangement. And this is all that ever was

required for a character of the greatest uniformity and steadiness in connexion. How men can proceed without any connexion at all, is to me utterly incomprehensible. Of what sort of materials must that man be made, how must he be tempered and put together, who can sit whole years in parliament, with five hundred and fifty of his fellow-citizens, amidst the storm of such tempestuous passions, in the sharp conflict of so many wits, and tempers, and characters, in the agitation of such mighty questions, in the discussion of such
10 vast and ponderous interests, without seeing any one sort of men, whose character, conduct, or disposition, would lead him to associate himself with them, to aid and be aided, in any one system of public utility?

I remember an old scholastic aphorism, which says, "that the man who lives wholly detached from others, must be either an angel or a devil." When I see in any of these detached gentlemen of our times the angelic purity, power, and beneficence, I shall admit them to be angels. In the mean time we are born only to be men. We shall do enough
20 if we form ourselves to be good ones. It is therefore our business carefully to cultivate in our minds, to rear to the most perfect vigour and maturity, every sort of generous and honest feeling that belongs to our nature. To bring the dispositions that are lovely in private life into the service and conduct of the commonwealth; so to be patriots, as not to forget we are gentlemen. To cultivate friendships, and to incur enmities. To have both strong, but both selected: in the one, to be placable; in the other, immovable. To model our principles to our duties and our situation. To
30 be fully persuaded, that all virtue which is impracticable is spurious; and rather to run the risk of falling into faults in a course which leads us to act with effect and energy, than to loiter out our days without blame and without use. Public life is a situation of power and energy; he trespasses against his duty who sleeps upon his watch, as well as he that goes over to the enemy.

There is, however, a time for all things. It is not every conjuncture which calls with equal force upon the activity of honest men ; but critical exigencies now and then arise ; and I am mistaken, if this be not one of them. Men will see the necessity of honest combination ; but they may see it when it is too late. They may embody, when it will be ruinous to themselves, and of no advantage to the country ; when, for want of such a timely union as may enable them to oppose in favour of the laws, with the laws on their side, they may at length find themselves under the necessity of 10 conspiring, instead of consulting. The law, for which they stand, may become a weapon in the hands of its bitterest enemies ; and they will be cast, at length, into that miserable alternative, between slavery and civil confusion, which no good man can look upon without horror ; an alternative in which it is impossible he should take either part, with a conscience perfectly at repose. To keep that situation of guilt and remorse at the utmost distance is, therefore, our first obligation. Early activity may prevent late and fruitless violence. As yet we work in the light. The scheme of 20 the enemies of public tranquillity has disarranged, it has not destroyed us.

If the reader believes that there really exists such a faction as I have described ; a faction ruling by the private inclinations of a court, against the general sense of the people ; and that this faction, whilst it pursues a scheme for undermining all the foundations of our freedom, weakens (for the present at least) all the powers of executory government, rendering us abroad contemptible, and at home distracted ; he will believe also, that nothing but a firm com- 30 bination of public men against this body, and that, too, supported by the hearty concurrence of the people at large, can possibly get the better of it. The people will see the necessity of restoring public men to an attention to the public opinion, and of restoring the constitution to its original principles. Above all, they will endeavour to keep

- the House of Commons from assuming a character which does not belong to it. They will endeavour to keep that House, for its existence, for its powers, and its privileges, as independent of every other, and as dependent upon themselves, as possible. This servitude is to a House of Commons, (like obedience to the Divine law) "perfect freedom." For if they once quit this natural, rational, and liberal obedience, having deserted the only proper foundation of their power, they must seek a support in an abject and un-
- 10 natural dependence somewhere else. When, through the medium of this just connexion with their constituents, the genuine dignity of the House of Commons is restored, it will begin to think of casting from it, with scorn, as badges of servility, all the false ornaments of illegal power, with which it has been, for some time, disgraced. It will begin to think of its old office of CONTROL. It will not suffer that last of evils to predominate in the country; men without popular confidence, public opinion, natural connexion, or mutual trust, invested with all the powers of government.
- 20 When they have learned this lesson themselves, they will be willing and able to teach the court, that it is the true interest of the prince to have but one administration; and that one composed of those who recommend themselves to their sovereign through the opinion of their country, and not by their obsequiousness to a favourite. Such men will serve their sovereign with affection and fidelity; because his choice of them, upon such principles, is a compliment to their virtue. They will be able to serve him effectually; because they will add the weight of the country to the force
- 30 of the executory power. They will be able to serve their king with dignity; because they will never abuse his name to the gratification of their private spleen or avarice. This, with allowances for human frailty, may probably be the general character of a ministry, which thinks itself accountable to the House of Commons, when the House of Commons thinks itself accountable to its constituents. If other ideas

should prevail, things must remain in their present confusion ; until they are hurried into all the rage of civil violence ; or until they sink into the dead repose of despotism.

NOTES.

Hoc vero occultum, etc., "But this secret evil in one's household not only does not show itself, but takes a man by surprise before he is able to see it and guard against it." By *the evil* is meant the treachery of those whom he naturally regards as his friends. Cicero, in the passage quoted, is alluding to the treachery of Verres to his praetor, Carbo. See note on p. 72, l. 12.

P. 1, l. 1. **of delicacy**, requiring somewhat careful handling.

3. weak and visionary, wanting in intelligence and fanciful. Similarly, in the apology with which he introduces his Speech on Economical Reform, Burke says: "I risk odium if I succeed and contempt if I fail."

5. come near to, touch, to give offence to.

persons of weight, he means the king. It will be noticed that in this pamphlet Burke refrains from naming the king, that he deals tenderly with Bute, and that he abstains from any direct censure of Chatham, though he disliked him very much because he held aloof from all parties, because he refused to join the Rockingham Administration, and opposed some of its measures, and because, in Burke's own words, "that Administration was removed upon a plan settled by the Earl of Chatham."

6. the discovery, the disclosure.

8. the favourites of the people, Chatham.

11. exertions of duty, in everything done for the sake of duty.

13. in some sort, in a manner, to a certain extent. The English law requires all able-bodied citizens, with the exception of clergymen, to assist the magistrates in suppressing a riot. The intention of the law obviously is, Burke says, to authorize private individuals to give any assistance they can to government in times of disturbance and difficulty.

P. 2, l. 2. **narrowly**, closely.

liberally, not in any petty or captious spirit.

7. **Government**, authority, order. It is distinguished from the individuals in power at any given time. It is the opposite of anarchy. Cf. "The settled, habitual, systematic affection I bear to the cause and to the principles of *government*."—Speech on Economical Reform.

9. **to compose**, to tranquillize.

10. **the subject**, the subjects, the people. The singular noun is used collectively.

11. **abstract**, considered in itself, out of reference to any special circumstances which may give it value. Considered in itself it has little value, for the people are ignorant, headstrong, and fickle. Cf. p. 3, l. 3. But it cannot be neglected, because Government depends on its support for its existence, and the reputation of individuals is determined by it. Elsewhere Burke says: "All government stands upon opinion . . . the way utterly to destroy it is to remove that opinion, to take away all reverence, all confidence from it." In his Speech on Economical Reform, Burke says: "The people are the masters. They have only to express their wants at large and in gross. We are the expert artists: we are the skilful workmen, to shape their desires into perfect form, and to fit the utensil to the use. They are the sufferers: they tell the symptoms of the complaint; but we know the exact seat of the disease, and how to apply the remedy according to the rules of art." In his Speech on the Duration of Parliaments, he says: "As to the detail of particular measures, or to any general schemes of policy, the people have neither enough of speculation in the closet, nor of experience in business, to decide upon it. They can well see whether we are tools of a court or their honest servants. Of this they can well judge; but of the particular merits of a measure I have other standards."

12. **the most precious possession**, referring to Shakespeare, *Othello*, 3, 3, 156:

"Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
Who steals my purse steals trash; . . .
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed."

13. **the great support**, etc., the strength of a government lies in the harmony of its policy with the opinions and wishes of its subjects. No mere authority could enforce a law which was repugnant to the whole people.

P. 3, l. 4. **humours**, fancies. Complaints which are heard at all times and in all countries may be neglected by the statesman. But he must pay attention to the special complaints of those

whom he has to govern, because they point to the existence of some special grievance which it is his business to remedy.

8. **distemperature**, unhealthiness of climate. Burke is fond of comparing disturbances in the body politic to diseases.

9. **language of spleen**, etc. A critic of government may be suspected of malice or jealousy. Cf. p. 27, l. 30. Elsewhere, while speaking of this period, Burke says that, in the view of the friends of the Government, "all opposition is to be regarded as the effect of envy and disappointed ambition."

13. **dreaded and contemned**, it is feared without being respected.

14. **the laws are despoiled**, etc., the law, not being the expression of the public conscience, was no longer backed by the force of public opinion.

17. **the solemn plausibilities**, what usually carries weight or respect.

18. **their reverence**, the respect generally paid to them, and the influence usually exerted by them.

19. **our domestic economy**, the management of our home affairs. Burke proves these assertions below, pp. 37, *seqq.* For an account of what was done by Burke's friends to remedy these evils, see his "Short Account of a Late Short Administration"—that of Rockingham.

our dependencies, the reference is to the American colonies.

23. **disconnexion**, etc. It was an age of selfishness and venality, when a man would be guilty of any treachery to his colleagues or party if he could gain anything for himself thereby. The House of Commons was not really representative, and, its proceedings being secret, it was impossible for constituents to exercise any effective control over the members. But the nation was naturally disgusted at the knowledge that politics was but a game in which men sold their votes for pensions and titles. See the defence of party at the end of this pamphlet. Burke gives prominence to this fact of disconnexion because, but for it, the policy to which he attributes the discontent would have been impossible.

28. **the great parties**, Whigs and Tories. The distinction disappeared when the attempts of the Stuarts to regain the throne ceased, and the settlement of 1688 was generally acquiesced in. See *Massey*, vol. 1, ch. 13.

29. **in a manner**, as good as dissolved.

35. **sore from**, smarting under. Reverses in war are naturally attributed to the mismanagement of the Government. Burke

says that the present discontents are all the more remarkable because none of the usual causes of discontent exist.

P. 4, l. 1. **distemper**, disorder. Cf. p. 3, l. 8.

5. **their speculation**, their theory as to the cause of the distemper. The Ministry may be supposed to be better informed than any private individual can be.

7. **by colonization and conquest**, the reference is specially to the conquests in Canada and the West Indies and the extension of British power in India.

11. **the boldness**, etc., poverty drives men to crime.

20. **some libellers**, the reference is especially to the letters of Junius, the first of which appeared in January, 1769, the year before the publication of Burke's pamphlet. By a *libel* is meant not only a publication calculated to injure the reputation of an individual, but also a treasonable, blasphemous, or obscene publication, rendering the author liable to prosecution.

22. **unnatural**, contrary to the usual order of things.

24. **convulsions**, disturbances. The word is properly applied in medicine to describe a violent fit or spasm.

31. **vilify**, lit. make cheap, abuse, hold up to contempt.

33. **puny**, insignificant. It is the French *puis-né*: Lat. *post-natus*; lit. 'born afterwards,' not equal in rank to the eldest son.

34. **parts**, ability.

P. 5, l. 7. **rank**, growing in the wild profusion of nature.

9. **the fruit**, the sedition which, it is alleged, is produced by foreign dominion.

16. **radically and essentially**, incurably and unalterably. Radically means literally 'at the root,' and essentially means 'in their very constitution.'

18. **untoward**, perverse. The language is borrowed from the English Bible, *Acts* 2, 40, "this untoward generation."

20. **present measures**, i.e. of coercion and repression.

23. **our present disposition**, referring to the angry temper of the people.

25. **fermentable...leaven**. Fermentation is properly the condition caused by the action of *leaven*, i.e. a substance, like yeast, 'which raises.' Metaphorically, ferment means excitement or agitation, and leaven the means by which it is produced. There will always be discontented, spiteful, and ambitious men, ready to produce disorder by playing upon the temper of an excitable people.

29. **distempers**. Cf. p. 4, l. 1.

30. **heats**, lit. fevers. Force is the proper remedy for the occasional outbreaks of individuals or sections of the community. But universal discontent, expressing itself in general disorder, can only be allayed by a radical change of policy.

36. **corrective**, another medical term: an antidote. The attempt to coerce, if persevered in, would do harm by increasing the general irritation. The foolish and ignorant never persevere in any course. If, therefore, they begin with coercion, they will not steadily follow it up. So the very changeableness which is their characteristic prevents their doing as much harm as they would do if they were possessed of firmness.

P. 6, l. 5. **upon a par**, equal. In his Speech on Conciliation with America, he says: "In my little reading upon such contests as these, the sense of mankind has, at least, as often decided against the superior as the subordinate power."

25. **a great man**, Sully (1560-1641), the minister of the French King Henry III.

26. **favouritism**, Burke implies that the discontents in England were due to the selection by George III. of the favourite Bute to be Prime Minister. This opinion is qualified on pp. 28-9.

30. **the trustees of power**, those who govern. Power is put into their hands to be used for the benefit of the ruled. It is like money in the hands of a trustee, which he cannot employ as he chooses, or for his own benefit. This *fiduciary* character of power is emphasized in Locke's treatise on civil government, in which the principles of the Revolution of 1688 are expounded. See below, p. 33, l. 18.

34. **the cause**, the case between rulers and people. They are the 'parties' in the suit. The point to be decided is, which is to blame for the present discontents.

P. 7, l. 2. **is fashionable**, is common.

fashionable companies, the society composed of men of birth and rank. He means those who adhered to the Court and favoured its policy.

17. **behind-hand**, they cannot understand contemporary events: and in judging of past history they rightly condemn ideas and practices which they themselves entertain and are guilty of in the present.

20. **a distinct system**, a clear and comprehensive view.

28. **event**, issue, result.

29. **to be a Whig**, to be an opponent of despotic government, and an upholder of the rights of Parliament. Many of those who would praise the opponents of James II. are, for their own

profit, aiding George III. to carry out an equally arbitrary plan of government. Cf. Macaulay on Horace Walpole: "He liked revolution and regicide only when they were a hundred years old. His republicanism, like the courage of a bully, or the love of a fribble, was strong and ardent when there was no occasion for it, and subsided when he had an opportunity of bringing it to the proof," etc. By Whig principles Burke means the principles of the authors of the Revolution of 1688. Cf. p. 80.

33. **to reconcile**, etc., their principles are for the past, their practice is for the present. There can, therefore, be no opposition between them.

35. **a stern republican**, many a man who is in theory, and with regard to past times, a strict and unbending advocate of freedom, who cannot say too much in praise of the republics of ancient Greece, who delights in finding germs of Whig principles in the laws and institutions of the Anglo-Saxon Government, and who cannot find words in which to express his detestation of the tyranny of past kings in England, does not hesitate to do the dirty work of the Court in his own day.

P. 8, l. 1. **true Saxon constitution**. Burke ridicules this notion in the last chapter of his *Abridgment of English History*: "As the advocates for prerogative would, by a very absurd consequence drawn from the Norman conquest, have made all our natural rights and liberties to have arisen from the grants, and therefore to be revocable at the will, of the sovereign, so, on the other hand, those who maintained the cause of liberty would hear of no beginning to any of our privileges, orders, or laws: and, in order to gain them a reverence, would prove that they are as old as the nation. In reality, that ancient constitution and those Saxon laws made little or nothing for any of our modern parties. If there were at present a nation governed by the Saxon laws, we should find it difficult to point out another so entirely different from everything we now see established in England."

splendid bile, anger. It is a literal translation of a phrase from the Roman poet Horace. 'Clear bile' is opposed to melancholy or 'black bile.'

3. **coarsest...homeliest**, the words are naturally applied to the kind of work which we reserve for menial servants.

4. **job**, the word is used to describe any transaction which is not honourable or straightforward.

6. **King James**, though the policy of James was as arbitrary as that of Henry.

8. **Richard the Second**, though there were plenty to flatter the successive favourites of Henry VIII.

18. **worn to rags**, antiquated, obsolete. For example, the Stuarts attempted to override Parliament by the Royal Prerogative: George III. attempted to use Parliament as an instrument for carrying out his own objects.

23. **the subject**, cf. p. 2, l. 10.

24. **Ship-money...the Forest laws**. See Bright's *History of England*, vol. 2, pp. 628-30.

29. **pullets, chickens**.

a woman of fashion, cf. 'fashionable companies,' p. 7, l. 2. In his history of the reign of William the Conqueror, Burke quotes from Madox's *History of the Exchequer* the following entry—the wife of Hugo de Nevil fined in two hundred hens, that she might lie with her husband for one night—"to show from how many sources the king's revenue was fed, and how his power descended to the most inconsiderable actions of private life."

31. **Every age**, etc. For instance, in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Burke shows at length how the character of French policy was changed by the disappearance of the spirit of chivalry. In the present passage Burke means that the country would not tolerate any attempt on the part of the king to rule without Parliament, such as was made by Charles I.

36. **satisfied, convinced**.

P. 9, l. 2. **the interest of the court**, because the unpopularity of the measures proposed by the king's ministers was shifted from them to the Parliament which voted them. Burke shows at length, later on, how an omnipotent but submissive Parliament was made the instrument for carrying out the policy to which he attributes the discontents.

5. **an interest equally strong**, because, as the king cannot carry his measures without their votes, they can always command a price for their votes.

7. **the usufruct**, the right of temporary use or enjoyment.

their voices, their votes.

the fee and inheritance, absolute ownership. Their votes, being always in demand, are a valuable property with which they will not part once and for all. They will simply sell them as they are wanted. The truth of Burke's remark is borne out by the very small majorities which Government could at times command.

8. **Accordingly**, etc. Because, so long as Parliament was a mere tool in the king's hands, to increase the power of Parliament was to increase the power of the king.

12. **who were to use**, etc. It was to be used by the king's nominees to carry out the king's wishes.

17. **It was soon discovered**, etc. In form, the House of Commons was a check upon the Government in the interests of the people: in reality it was an instrument in the hands of Government for the oppression of the people.

19. **not altogether**, was far from being incompatible. In the first book of his *Annals* the Roman historian Tacitus remarks how the Emperors tried to hide the reality of despotism beneath the forms of freedom.

20. **Prerogative**, the word denotes the powers which the sovereign can exercise without reference to Parliament. Cf. p. 51, ll. 15, *seqq.*

21. **more strength**, a sovereign whom Parliament supports is, of course, stronger than one whom Parliament opposes.

22. **less odium**, because the odium fell not upon the sovereign but upon the Parliament which supported him.

Influence, the influence consisted in the rewards which the king could bestow on those who helped him, and the penalties which he could inflict on those who attempted to thwart him. See pp. 57, 58, and 72.

24. **the very antagonist**, the House of Commons itself, which, as explained above, was intended to be a check on any attempt at arbitrary rule.

25. **which contained**, etc. There being practically no limit to what the king could bestow or inflict, he could always extend his influence or revive it if it seemed on the wane.

26. **which the distresses**, etc. See p. 14, l. 10. Burke explains in his *Observations on the Present State of the Nation* that in order to relieve the distress of the people the Government formed a new naval establishment, and imposed a large number of restrictions and regulations to add to the revenue by the prevention of contraband trade, specially in America.

29. **antiquated prejudices**, according to which a monarch possessed a sacred character, and was invested with a divine right to govern, passive obedience being the duty of the subject.

had moulded, etc., *i.e.* was foredoomed from the first to destruction. The metaphor is borrowed from a man born with some constitutional weakness, which renders it impossible that he should live long. It was inevitable that the belief in the divine right of kings should soon be supplanted by a belief in the rights of the people to govern themselves, or, at least, to be governed for their own benefit.

31. **a bottom, a basis, a foundation.** As soon as it gives place to enlightenment, the system that it supported must fall. Burke also uses the verb 'to bottom' in the sense of 'to base.' Cf. "The pensioner has a right to bottom his title in the competency of the crown to give him what he holds."

32. **the interest, etc.** Busy and ambitious men will take care to maintain a system by which they profit. In connection with the whole of this passage the student should read carefully chapters 3 and 4 in Trevelyan's *Early History of Charles James Fox*.

33. **some circumstances,** George the First and George the Second did not meddle much in affairs. George III. was determined to govern not only in name, but in fact. His immediate predecessors had been foreigners, without any real knowledge of or interest in England; and besides, their title to the crown was not undisputed. George III. was more secure. His title was undisputed, and he won popularity to begin with by boasting of his English birth and education. Thus the country was predisposed in his favour. Cf. p. 13, ll. 31, *seqq.*

P. 10, l. 5. **the ends of the Revolution,** namely, the securing of the constitutional rights and liberties of the people.

10. **interest, influence.**

11. **to draw in, to attract.**

14. **in all situations,** under any circumstances. It is always advantageous to Government to have the support of men who are popular and influential.

17. **the people possessed,** the Revolution gave power and importance to the people, because it forced the Government to rely on those who had influence with the people.

20. **these helps, etc.** Courtiers wished to get rid of the great party leaders and popular favourites, whose support was no longer necessary to the Crown.

22. **managers for government,** the leaders and favourites above alluded to, through whose agency the business of Government was transacted.

23. **personal favour, the favour of the sovereign.**

25. **natural and acquired.** Cf. below, l. 36. Burke distinguishes between those whose influence came *from* birth, rank, office, and property, and popular favourites, like Pitt, whose influence was personal. Cf. pp. 15, 16.

26. **lead, prominent position, influence, authority.**

27. **a consideration, a position of power.** Even if the Court had withdrawn its favour they would still, as popular men, have had to be reckoned with.

27. **Men acted as if, etc.** The leaders of parties let it be understood that, if they were indebted to the Court for favours, the Court was, at least, equally indebted to them for support and assistance.

29. **The influence of government, etc.** The struggle between 'the leaders of parties' and 'the possessors of immediate and personal favour' tended to increase the power of the people, because the leaders of parties could only hope to win by keeping the support of the people. But for this they might have felt themselves strong enough to exercise without regard to the people the power for which they were originally indebted to the people. As it was, the power, which they first drew from the people, returned again to the people, just as the vapour which is drawn up from the sea returns to it again in the shape of rain.

33. **as in a sort, etc., as if nothing could deprive them of it.** Inalienable property is held 'in mortmain,' literally 'in the hand of a dead man,' which cannot relax its grasp on what it holds.

P. 11, l. 1. **was viewed, etc.,** was regarded with jealousy and dislike.

11. **compassed, brought about, effected.**

16. **the affections, the feelings.** Burke omits to state how much the aggressive policy of the Court was assisted by jealousies and divisions among the Whigs themselves.

21. **Frederic, the father of George III.** He died when George was only twelve years old. He was a man of the worst character, and his court was the centre of continual intrigue against his father, George II. He aimed at breaking the power of the great Whig magnates.

23. **a person, the Earl of Bute.** "He was scarcely known, even by name, to the country which he was soon to govern. He had, indeed, a short time after he came of age, been chosen to fill a vacancy which, in the middle of a Parliament, had taken place amongst the Scotch representative peers . . . but lost his seat at the next dissolution, and had never been re-elected. Near twenty years had elapsed since he had borne any part in politics. He had passed some of those years at his seat in one of the Hebrides, and from that retirement he had emerged as one of the household of Prince Frederick (the father of George III.)." —*Macaulay*. "The king had from his earliest years been taught that his first duty as a sovereign was to cast off the thralldom in which his grandfather had been held by political combinations. Bute had no doubt inculcated this precept; and it was almost a matter of course that the chief political instructor of George III. should be the minister on whose counsel and aid he first relied in bringing the new system of government into operation. To this

extent Lord Bute enjoyed favour and credit; but when he proved incompetent for the task he had undertaken the king cast him aside and sought for abler services."—*Massey*, ch. 2. Bute resigned in April, 1763.

27. **whether it was**, etc. Bute was unpopular, both on account of his Scotch birth and on account of the scandal which represented him as the favoured lover of the Princess Dowager of Wales. This unpopularity, added to his incompetence, sufficiently explains his inability to dictate the policy of Parliament. Cf. p. 27, l. 33.

31. **The instrumental part**, it was determined to use 'the interior Cabinet,' in place of Bute, as the instrument for carrying out the new policy. There is an air of unreality about this passage, because Burke deliberately refrains from mentioning the king, who was the real author and director of the new policy. There is also a rhetorical exaggeration in his account of the organization and discipline of the corps of king's friends. "There is no doubt that George III. intrigued against the ministers he abhorred, and that he employed irresponsible agents to communicate with his loyal friends in Parliament, as well as with others who were disposed to his service from less honourable motives. But the deep-laid, complicated scheme of a double cabinet, as described by Burke, would have been unintelligible to the limited and practical understanding of George the Third. If he resorted to mystery and secret influence, it was not for the purpose of setting up a cabinet within a cabinet; but simply to disperse the haughty cabals which had enthralled his predecessors, and to recover what he thought fairly belonged to a king—the right, namely, of choosing his own servants and being their master, instead of a puppet in their hands."—*Massey*, ch. 2.

P. 12, l. 1. **as synonymous**, because the Ministers are the responsible advisers of the sovereign.

2. **administration**, the ministry. Cf. l. 14, 'ostensible administration,' i.e. the nominal ministry.

5. **the real secret and confidence**, namely, of the king.

6. **executory**, executive.

17. **Parliament**, etc. Parliament was to be taught to accept as minister whomsoever the king chose to appoint. Constitutionally, Parliament has the right of appointing the ministry, because it has the right of refusing support to a ministry which it disapproves.

21. **that body**, Parliament.

22. **the most discordant politics**, it was expected to support whatever measures the Court might dictate. Ordinarily its

politics are not discordant, but consistent, because the measures of Government represent the views of the party which is in power.

23. **All connexions and dependencies**, the Court proposed to strengthen itself by breaking up parties, and by transferring all patronage from the ministry to itself. No person was to look towards another, but all towards the Court (p. 13, l. 16).

28. **of no sort of consideration**, of no account. Cf. "He was little considered in the kingdom," p. 11, l. 5. Cf. p. 10, l. 27.

30. **title, claim**. Men who had 'a consideration independent of the Court' would not be such pliant instruments as those who would sink into insignificance directly they were deprived of the power which the Court entrusted (delegated) to them.

31. **to pride as well as to duty**, they were to submit to receive as ministers whomsoever the king might set over them, and they were to pass his measures whether they approved of them or not.

33. **let down, humbled**.

34. **Points of honour**, etc. All were to be reduced to an equality of insignificance before the Court. As in a Turkish army, no man was to have any position except such as was conferred upon him by the immediate favour of the sovereign.

precedence, the position which a man enjoys in virtue of his rank.

35. **decorum**, what is becoming. It was not to be considered degrading to any man, whatever his rank, to serve under any one whom the king chose to put over him.

P. 13, l. 3. **for rank**, alluding to the Duke of Newcastle.

4. **for wisdom**, alluding to Pitt. These two were the joint heads of the ministry that was in office when George III. ascended the throne.

5. **of the closet**, lit. of the king's private room.

6. **of the back stairs**, lit. approaching the king privately and secretly—not openly by the public entrance. It is equivalent to "in the real secret and confidence," p. 12, l. 5.

9. **capital, chief**.

12. **holdings in, dependence on**. Influence and popularity were no longer to count for anything.

13. **the prince**, the sovereign. It is the Latin word *princeps*, the first person in the State. Cf. "When the world was wearied by civil strife, Augustus subjected it to Empire under the title of 'Principis'."—Tacitus, *Annals*, l. 1.

17. **the motive**, he must do what the king wished, because he had nothing to hope for except from the king.

19. **the dead letter.** Free institutions existed only in name. Cf. p. 9, l. 18.

23. **opportunities**, namely, dissensions in the Cabinet, where there was strong opposition to the expensive war policy of Pitt.

25. **some arguments**, it was argued that personal rule was the only alternative to mob rule or aristocratic tyranny. See p. 18, ll. 9, *seqq.*

33. **Fourth in descent**, as already explained, his father died during the reign of George II.

34. **the zealots**, the enthusiastic advocates. He refers to the Tory party, who, the hopes of the Stuarts being extinguished, transferred their allegiance to George III.

P. 14, l. 2. **his title**, his claim to the throne.

4. **a mighty war**, that which was waged under the direction of Pitt against France in India, America, and on the continent of Europe where Frederic the Great was supported by England.

6. **to dictate**, his enemies were so humbled that they had no choice but to accept any terms which he imposed.

habitudes, ways, customs. He refers to the attachment of the first two Georges to their country and kingdom of Hanover. George II. could not talk English. His minister Walpole communicated with him in Latin.

9. **a large ... sum**, £800,000 a year. This was ample without being *invidious*, i.e. the people *did not grudge it*, because they recognized that it was not more than enough to defray the expenses and maintain the dignity of the Court. See below, p. 44. By 'the civil establishment' he means what we call 'the civil list,' i.e. the sum voted by Parliament to a sovereign on his accession "for the support of his household and the honour and dignity of the Crown." See May, *Constitutional History*, ch. 4.

10. **additions from conquest.** See on p. 4, l. 7.

11. **augmentation of debt**, to pay the cost of the war. The more money a government owes, the more people are interested in its stability.

an increase, etc. Appointments in the army and navy were in the gift of the king.

18. **reversionary hope**, a hope of being rewarded by his successor. So long as there was any hope of restoring the Stuarts, the Tories might look to them to reward their opposition to the House of Hanover. Reversion is a legal term signifying the right to possession or enjoyment in the future.

19. **inspired his Majesty**, see note on p. 11, l. 31.

22. **to others**, selfish and unprincipled politicians thought that they might profit by the popularity and influence of the king.

30. bottom, cf. p. 9, l. 31.

32. signal, marked.

35. gradually but not slowly, the stages in the process followed one another in quick succession. The first step was an attack upon parties and upon all influence independent of the Court.

P. 15, l. 2. **The greatest weight**, etc. As already stated, Pitt had popular opinion, Newcastle party connexion. Newcastle was the head of the main Whig connexion, and he found room in the cabinet for the representation of the other two sections of the party known as the Grenvilles and the Bedfords.

4. the new tenure, see p. 13, l. 14.

8. a forced coalition, a coalition is a combination in one and the same ministry of men of different parties. "Pitt and Newcastle were co-ordinate chief ministers. The subordinate places had been filled on the principle of including in the Government every party and shade of party, the avowed Jacobites alone excepted; nay, every public man who, from his abilities or from his situation, seemed likely to be either useful in office or formidable in opposition. . . . There had been in the cabinet of George the Second latent jealousies and enmities, which now began to show themselves. Pitt had been estranged from his old ally, Legge, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Some of the ministers were envious of Pitt's popularity. Others were, not altogether without cause, disgusted by his imperious and haughty demeanour. Others, again, were honestly opposed to some parts of his policy."—*Macaulay*.

9. alienation and disgust, estrangement and dislike. The word *disgust* means literally *distaste*: we use it in a stronger sense now to express loathing or abhorrence.

12. to ruin his character, Pitt, upon his retirement, accepted a peerage for his wife, and a pension of £3000 a year, for three lives, for himself. "It was doubtless thought that the reward or honours conferred on the great minister would have a conciliatory effect on the public mind. Perhaps, too, it was thought that his popularity, which had partly arisen from the contempt which he had always shown for money, would be damaged by a pension; and, indeed, a crowd of libels instantly appeared, in which he was accused of having sold his country."—*Macaulay*. Pitt resigned because the cabinet would not support his proposal to attack Spain, which had just entered into a hostile alliance with France against England.

13. so oppressive a support. They could not stand without him, but they disliked the feeling of being dependent on him. Pitt retired in October, 1761, and Newcastle was obliged to retire in the following summer. Lord Bute then became First Lord of the Treasury.

22. **the cabal**, p. 13, l. 5. The word is connected with *cabala*, an occult science supposed to be possessed by certain Jewish rabbis. It means a small secret combination for a party purpose. "In 1671, by a whimsical coincidence, the word was found to be formed by the initial letters of the names of the members of the Cabinet."—*Macaulay*.

humour, a passing fancy or caprice.

23. **system**, a deliberate plan.

29. **natural and fixed**, opposed to personal and transient. See on p. 10, l. 25.

Long possession, the Tories had practically been excluded from power since 1688 on account of their attachment to the Stuart dynasty.

30. **obligations**, none of them stood alone. Everyone was bound to somebody to whom he had shown and from whom he had received kindnesses.

31. **connexion of office**, they had been colleagues in the same cabinets.

32. **of alliance**, by marriage.

things at that time, etc. Burke complains that in his own day selfishness had taken the place of loyalty and fidelity to friends, relatives, colleagues, and party.

33. **the majority of the people**, who thought that the settlement of 1688, effected and maintained by the Whigs, was the only alternative to Popery.

36. **devoted**, doomed to destruction. It is a Latin word applied to an animal chosen for sacrifice.

P. 16, l. 2. **harmonized**, gave unity to.

4. **proper**, a Latin word signifying what belongs to a person in his own right. Cf. the logical term '*property*.'

8. **a proscription**, in the struggles which marked the close of the Roman Republic the leader of a victorious faction 'proscribed' the chief members of the opposite faction, *i.e.* declared them to have forfeited their lives and property. When Bute succeeded Newcastle as First Lord of the Treasury, his first measure was to conclude peace with France. The peace was unpopular, and it was necessary to take measures to secure a majority in favour of it in the House of Commons. Fox was taken into the cabinet on the understanding that he would secure this. By indiscriminate bribery to office-seekers, and threats to office holders, he gained his point. "When Parliament met, it was at once evident that Fox had got value for his money. A motion for delay was defeated by 213 votes to 74, and an address approving the peace was carried by 319 votes to 65. The fight was over

and the butchery began. Everyone who belonged to the beaten party was sacrificed without mercy, with all his kindred and dependents ; and those public officers, who were unlucky enough to have no political connections, fared as ill as the civil population of a district which is the seat of war between two contending armies. Clerks, messengers, excisemen, coastguards, and pensioners were ruined by shoals because they had no vote for a member of Parliament, or because they had supported a member who had opposed the peace. An inquisition was held into the antecedents of every man, woman, or child who subsisted on public money. . . . The old servants and poor relations of peers who had refused to abandon Pitt were hunted from their employments, and thrown back on the world without regard to age, or sex, or merit. . . . No class fared worse than the Whig magnates, to whom, and to whose fathers, George III. owed his throne. . . . The king with his own pen dashed the Duke of Devonshire's name off the list of Privy Councillors. . . . The Duke of Newcastle was stripped of his three Lieutenancies. On the same day the Duke of Grafton and the Marquis of Rockingham were summarily dismissed from the Lord-Lieutenancies of their respective counties. The Duke of Devonshire, with proper spirit, insisted on sharing the honourable disgrace of his friends, and placed the Lord-Lieutenancy of Derbyshire at the disposal of the Government. Every post where a Whig had been drawing salary or exercising authority was now filled by a young Tory or an old Jacobin."—Trevelyan's *Early History of Charles James Fox*, ch. 1. Cf. *Massey*, vol. 1, ch. 3, and Macaulay's *Essay on the Earl of Chatham*.

12. **but one**, viz. dependence on the Court. "Now, indeed, my son is King," exclaimed the Queen's mother after the 'proscription' above described.

19. **power arising**, etc., i.e. the two kinds of power which give to them 'a consideration independent of the Court,' p. 10, l. 27.

22. **odious**, viz. to the Court party.

24. **kept their faith**. They have deserved their immunity from punishment by strictly and scrupulously (religiously) observing their promise to desert their friends and their party.

"Their honour rooted in dishonour stood,
And faith unfaithful kept them falsely true."

25. **Such a change**, it naturally disgusted the people, and made them turbulent. See on p. 2, l. 7.

27. **To reconcile**, etc. The people were told that parties had stood between them and the favour of the Court.

30. **prudery**, a Puritanical strictness with regard to what is right and proper.

32. **soused**, plunged.

33. **the indirect practices**, the use of bribery and influence.

35. **marvellous**, surprising.

P. 17, l. 4. **a manifesto**, an official announcement. Burke is referring to a pamphlet written by Pulteney, who, in the preceding reign, had been the great opponent of Walpole. It was an attack upon the system of government by party. It was written in the spirit of Bolingbroke's *Patriot King*. "The doctrine of Bolingbroke and Bolingbroke's disciples was that a rigorous use of the Prerogative by a patriot king would at once break all factious combinations, and supersede the pretended necessity of bribing members of Parliament. The king had only to resolve that he would be master, that he would not be held in thralldom by any set of men, that he would take for ministers any persons in whom he had confidence, without distinction of party, and that he would restrain his servants from influencing by immoral means either the constituent bodies or the representative body. This childish scheme proved that those who proposed it knew nothing of the nature of the evil with which they proposed to deal."—*Macaulay*, who goes on to argue that the king could not rule without the House of Commons, and that without bribery he could not command it. Still, "absurd as this theory was, it had many admirers, particularly among men of letters. It was now to be reduced to practice."

5. **managed**, conciliatory. The verb 'to manage' was used like the French word *menager*, in the sense of 'to keep a man in a good temper,' 'to abstain from anything that would offend him.' Cf. "I will freely follow the honourable gentleman in his historical discussion, without the least *management* for men or measures, further than as they shall seem to me to deserve it."—Burke, *Speech on American Taxation*.

7. **address**, skill.

9. **only in speculation**, not yet put into operation.

12. **regards**, considerations. "There sprang into existence and into note a reptile species of politicians never before and never since known in our country. These men disclaimed all political ties, except those which bound them to the throne. They were willing to coalesce with any party, to abandon any party, to undermine any party, to assault any party, at a moment's notice. . . . They were the king's friends. It is to be observed that their friendship implied no personal intimacy. Only one or two of them ever saw his face except on public days. The whole band, however, always had early and accurate information as to his personal inclinations. These people were never high in the administration. They were generally to be found in places of much emolument, little labour, and no responsibility; and these

places they continued to occupy while the cabinet was six or seven times reconstructed. Their peculiar business was not to support the ministry against the opposition, but to support the king against the ministry. Whenever his majesty was induced to give a reluctant assent to the introduction of some bill (*e.g. the Repeal of the Stamp Act*) which his constitutional advisers regarded as necessary, his friends in the House of Commons were sure to speak against it, to vote against it, to throw in its way every obstruction compatible with the forms of Parliament. If his majesty found it necessary to admit into his closet a Secretary of State, or a First Lord of the Treasury whom he disliked, his friends were sure to miss no opportunity of thwarting and humbling the obnoxious minister. In return for their services, the king covered them with his protection. It was to no purpose that his responsible servants complained to him (*North, Grenville, and Rockingham all did so*) that they were daily betrayed and impeded by men who were eating the bread of the Government. He sometimes justified the offenders, sometimes excused them, sometimes owned that they were to blame, but said that he must take time to consider whether he could part with them. He never would turn them out; and while everything else in the state was constantly changing, these sycophants seemed to have a life estate in their office."—*Macaulay*. Cf. Trevelyan's *Early History of Charles James Fox*, ch. 4. See note on page 11, l. 31. It must be borne in mind that George found a large body of 'friends' ready to his hand in the Tory party.

14. a perspective view, a picture painted on any semi-transparent substance to be viewed by light which shines through it.

16. gaping, wondering.

18. Atè, according to the Greek mythology Atè, the goddess of mischief and vengeance, was expelled from heaven to dwell among men.

19. the chosen residence, power, henceforth, was to be used exclusively for the public good. The people were told that political parties were but selfish combinations for personal ends.

21. sinister, bad.

22. in lieu of, in place of. "According to his majesty's theory his favour was a testimonial which the world was bound to accept. . . . Personal morality became a party question: the standard of virtue was lowered to meet the convenience of the Court; and whoever was desirous of evincing his attachment to the king was in a hurry to assure mankind that he condoned the vices of the Minister."—*Trevelyan*. Cf. p. 56, ll. 13, *seqq.*

24. the visionary republic, an ideally perfect state sketched by the Greek philosopher Plato.

25. The whole scenery, he carries on the metaphor of 'the perspective view.'

26. good souls, good is an expression of half-contemptuous pity.

credulous morality, an over-readiness to believe in the virtuous professions of others.

29. supernatural, extraordinary, above what is to be expected in men. Cf. p. 62, l. 3. Compare with this passage Macaulay's description of the means by which the Opposition brought about Walpole's fall, and of the consequences. "With gross ignorance, or gross dishonesty, they represented the Minister as the main grievance of the State. His dismissal, his punishment, would prove the certain cure for all the evils which the nation suffered" . . . but afterwards "was heard from without the terrible cry of a people angry, they hardly knew with whom, and impatient, they hardly knew for what. The day of retribution had arrived. The Opposition reaped that which they had sown. . . . They had made the people drunk with calumny and declamation. They had raised expectations which it was impossible to satisfy. The downfall of Walpole was to be the beginning of a political millenium (*era of prosperity*); and every enthusiast had figured to himself that millennium according to the fashion of his own wishes."—*Essay on Walpole's Letters*.

Such professions are 'designed for the purpose' of duping men into supporting the schemes of those who make them, and 'they are sure to end' in disappointment and vexation.

32. constantly, always. We use it now in the sense of frequently. Cf. p. 81, ll. 30, *seqq.*

innocent gentlemen, cf. "good souls" above. They were told, to their surprise, that they ought long ago to have been Ministers of State, and that they would have been so if the Court had been free to recognize their abilities. Unfortunately, the Court had been obliged to set aside their claims in favour of those of men backed by the votes of powerful parties. In a play by the French dramatist, Molière, an ignorant man, having come in to a fortune, resolved to educate himself. He asked his grammar master the difference between prose and verse, and being given a simple sentence as an example of prose, he exclaimed in surprise that he had been talking prose all his life without knowing it.

P. 18, l. 3. sealed, closed.

5. huckstered, bartered. A *huckster*, i.e. a hawker or pedlar, means literally one who *stoops* under the burden of goods that he carries on his back.

7. *Mettre le Roy*, etc. It was said of George III., as it had been said of Louis XI. of France, that he was as dependent upon certain individuals as a ward is upon his guardian.

9. *the runners*, lit. the messengers, those who are paid to do the commonest work of the Court. See on p. 13, l. 25.

14. *His Majesty's grandfather* was George II.

17. *the persons who composed*, the king was to choose those whom he thought fittest.

19. *in its constitution*, it was no longer to be representative of a single party. See below, pp. 76, 77.

22. *concert, order, or effect*, combination, method, or success. On p. 3, l. 24, he says that there prevailed disconnexion 'in *parties and families*.' For example, Pitt was the brother-in-law of Grenville, and Grenville was the brother of Temple. The views of the three did not coincide. By 'the other methods employed with individuals,' Burke means that all who opposed the king were summarily dismissed from their offices and appointments. The king was also enabled by the venality and selfishness of public men to detach and isolate individuals by inducing them to take office apart from their friends and party. See p. 23, l. 18.

25. *good consequences*, ironical.

31. *durance*, captivity. The expression '*durance vile*' first appears, I believe, in Act i. sc. 2, of *Falstaff's Wedding*, by W. Kendrick. This play appeared in 1766.

34. *full of doubt*, etc., because of the Jacobite party, to whose '*dangerous rebellion*,' meaning the attempt to restore the Pretender, he refers below.

P. 19, l. 2. *by foreign force*, by France.

3. *in the heart of his kingdoms*, Charles Edward marched as far as Derby.

4. *the same principle*, the effort to restore the Stuarts.

5. *the commerce*, "In the meantime the nation exhibited all the signs of wealth and prosperity. The merchants of London had never been more thriving. The importance of several great commercial and manufacturing towns, of Glasgow in particular, dates from this period. The fine inscription on the monument of Lord Chatham in Guildhall records the general opinion of the citizens of London, that under his administration commerce had been '*united with and made to flourish by war*.' It must be owned that these signs of prosperity were in some degree delusive. It must be owned that some of our conquests were rather splendid than useful."—Macaulay, *Essay on the Earl of Chatham*. Cf. "No doubt commerce had received an impulse from the war,

and conquests might open fresh markets to manufacturers; the increase in commerce, however, was in no proportion to the permanent charge upon the national income which the war had created."—*Massey*, ch. 3.

15. **a blessing**, any desirable thing regarded as a mark of God's approval or favour.

19. **cannot happen very often**, because a good king will naturally prefer the best men.

22. **a condition of servility**, referring to the argument that a king was a king only in name, who could not choose whom he liked for his ministers. Elsewhere Burke says: "Kings may and ought to bear the freedom of subjects that are obnoxious to them. They may, too, without derogating from themselves, bear even the authority of such persons if it promotes their service."

31. **prejudicial to the balance**, etc., likely to increase the relative power of one of the three members of the Constitution—King, Lords, and Commons—at the expense of the other two. Cf. p. 72, l. 33.

33. **in the House of Lords**, the price of corn having risen owing to the failure of the harvest, and riots and disturbances having occurred owing to the sufferings of the people, the exportation of corn was, during the Parliamentary recess, forbidden by an Order in Council in September, 1766. Instead of being content to justify this measure on the ground of necessity, the law lords justified it as legal, Camden in particular arguing 'that the Crown was entitled to do whatever the safety of the nation may require during the recess of Parliament, which is at most but a forty days' tyranny.' In consequence of the strange unconstitutional doctrines which had been advanced by the great legal authorities of the Government, it was considered right to mark the exceptional character of the proceeding by an Act of Indemnity, in which those who advised, as well as those who had enforced, the Order in Council, were included.—*Massey*, ch. 8.

P. 20, l. 10. **of the very same nature**, viz. of making attempts 'derogatory to the legal rights of the subject.' It is for the constituents to declare who shall represent them in Parliament. The House of Commons, however, refused to accept Wilkes, who stood at the head of the poll, and declared his defeated rival, Luttrell, to be the duly elected member for Middlesex. The policy of the House of Commons in this matter was really the policy of the king. He wrote to Lord North, "I think it highly proper to apprise you that the exclusion of Mr. Wilkes appears to be very essential, and must be effected; and that I make no doubt, when you lay this affair with your usual precision before the

meeting of the gentlemen of the House of Commons this evening, it will meet with the required unanimity and vigour."

23. **the method by which**, etc. Freedom is preserved by the existence of a class which is powerful by its influence with the people, the chief source of such influence being the possession of property. Such a class stands between the Crown and the people, and is a safeguard against despotism. It has already been explained that the policy of the Court party was directed against all who had 'a consideration independent of the Court.'

25. **If any**, etc., he refers to the Marquis of Rockingham and his friends.

31. **the pledge**, the security for. So long as influence with the people meant power, the opinion and wishes of the people could not be disregarded.

34. **usually understood**, i.e. as the tyranny of a proud and oppressive oligarchy. *Domination*, a Latin word which, like the Greek word *despotism*, means literally a rule such as that which a master exercises over his slaves. Burke describes and justifies 'a natural aristocracy' in his Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs.

35. **to moot cases**, etc., i.e. to consider what form of government would be the best supposing the existing one to be overthrown. The tendency of such discussions is, Burke thinks, to weaken the general respect for authority. Elsewhere he argues that a general tendency in a people to discuss political theories is a sign that they are discontented with the existing Government. *Moot* means literally *a meeting*; and so *to moot* means *to discuss at a meeting*. A *moot point* is one reserved for public discussion.

P. 21, l. 3. **upon that quarter**, from that direction. It is a nautical phrase.

10. **servitude**, viz. to the Court.

11. **Would to God**, I wish most earnestly. Probably a corruption of "Would God that." The *to* may be a corruption and remnant of the inflection of 'would,' 'wolde.' Sometimes the construction is misunderstood, and an *I* is prefixed to would from the supposed necessity of a nominative. Another explanation of the expression 'I would to God' is that *to* means 'near' or 'in the sight of'; or that it conveys the meaning of motion, 'I should desire (even carrying my desire *to*) God.'—Abbot, *Shakespearian Grammar*, § 190.

15. **in the train of**, followers of: literally 'dragged behind.'

16. **settled**, fixed, permanent.

17. **This is all safe and right**, ironical.

20. a back-stairs influence. See on p. 13, l. 6.

21. the alarm begins, the cry is raised that the Constitution is in danger. *Alarm* is from the Italian *all' arme*, 'to arms'—the order given to soldiers in case of a sudden attack.

23. this court topic, the argument used by the Court party that the personal rule of the sovereign is the only alternative to the tyranny of an aristocracy. The real danger was not that the peers would monopolize power, but that they would allow themselves to be made the servile instruments of a despotic sovereign.

24. the great change, when the new system of government, described on pp. 11, *seqq.*, was introduced.

27. mob-government, *mob* is a contraction of the Latin word *mobile*, the 'fickle' masses.

29. a phantom of, which is purely imaginary.

in, to be exercised by the Lords.

32. the natural strength, which lies in mutual trust and confidence.

34. sinister, evil. engrossed, monopolized.

P. 22, l. 1. to open, etc., to explain in greater detail.

4. visionary. Cf. p. 1, l. 3.

Harrington's political club, James Harrington (1611-1677) was the author of a political treatise named *Oceana*. The *Rota* was the name of a club formed by him and his friends with a view to giving effect to some of the views expressed in his book, specially to the principle (which was also the principle of the Court party under George III.) that the same men or class of men ought not to hold power long. He advocated rotation by ballot. A third part of the parliament, or whatever the governing body might be, was to be voted out by ballot every year, and to be incapable of election for another three years.

11. in supporting the ministers, see p. 11, l. 35, *seqq.* Macaulay says that, in the debate on the Repeal of the Stamp Act, at least twelve of the king's friends, all men in office, voted against the Government measure.

18. dependencies, dependents. Cf. p. 12, ll. 11, *seqq.*

20. perplexed in its movements, there is no consistency. All was regulated by personal caprice.

25. executory, Cf. p. 12, l. 6.

27. on mutability by principle, the leading idea was that nobody was to be left in power long.

33. administration, cf. p. 12, l. 2.

35. losses, viz. of former friends and adherents.

P. 23, l. 3. **canvass**, the stuff of which sails are made.

6. a **current**, a stream which impedes the course of a ship.

8. **mortified**, annoyed.

12. the **natural instruments**, those who, under ordinary circumstances, would be their servants.

14. it **supports**, if support was promised it was not effectually given.

18. **rotten**, corrupt, worthless.

24. the **junto**, the Court party. It has the same meaning as the word *Cabal*. It comes through the Spanish from the Latin *iunctus*, 'joined.'

a **retrenchment**, an **intrenchment**, a fortification.

these **carcasses**, the 'rotten members.'

25. to **cover**, to protect. If the party which they have betrayed comes back to power, they represent that its former expulsion from office was due to the treachery of some of its own members.

29. the **outward administration**, the *ostensible* ministry (p. 12, l. 5).

30. **tearing**, like wild beasts fighting.

34. the **interior managers** are those 'in the real secret and confidence.'

P. 24, l. 1. **traverse**, cross, thwart. In these paragraphs he is perhaps referring to the haughtiness with which Pitt treated his colleagues, to the exultation of the Duke of Newcastle at the fate of Pitt, and the subsequent dismissal of Newcastle himself.

11. **convinced of its insignificancy**, because the Court looks on with indifference while one man thwarts it.

14. **satisfied**, convinced.

15. **counsel**, wisdom.

17. **destitute of all management**, without the assistance of any agent. Cf. "Managers for government," p. 10, l. 22.

21. **some person**. The story of the proceedings which culminated in the supersession of the Duke of Grafton by Lord North in January, 1770, is told by Massey, vol. 1, ch. 10.

33. **has broke with** etc., has quarrelled with, has separated from. We should write *broken*. Burke refers to the scandalous attempt to transfer to Sir James Lowther, as a tenant of the Crown, certain property carrying considerable electoral influence which had long been enjoyed by the Duke of Portland. The alleged justification was that this property was not specifically included in the grant under which the Portland family derived their estates from William III. It was argued that *nullum tempus*

occurrit regi, i.e. that the Crown can always reclaim what it has never granted away, no matter how long it may have abstained from asserting its right. Ultimately a bill was passed enacting that the Crown could not, under pretence of any flaw in the grant or other defect of title, reclaim any estate which had been enjoyed uninterruptedly for sixty years. See Trevelyan, *Early History of Charles James Fox*, ch. 9.

P. 25, l. 4. **the principal movers**, because they do not appear in it. The whole odium fell on the Duke of Grafton and his colleagues. Sir James Lowther was the son-in-law of Lord Bute.

6. **their corps**, the body of king's friends. For instance, in the proceedings just alluded to, they had employed the Duke of Grafton.

12. **credit**, interest, influence. Cf. p. 26, l. 15.

16. **from another quarter**. Cf. p. 21, l. 3.

18. **the faction** is the Court Party, the Cabal, the Junto.

job of lucre, profitable job. See on p. 8, l. 4.

23. **the more dependent**, he will be the more dependent on the Court as he is estranged from his former friends.

24. **principle**, morality. Burke is perhaps thinking of the assistance which Pitt gave to the king in supplanting the ministry of Rockingham, who was Burke's political leader.

34. **vilified**. See p. 4, l. 31.

P. 26, l. 3. **the Middlesex election**. See on p. 20, l. 10. For an account of the riots, see Massey, ch. 9, and Trevelyan, ch. 5.

5. **Saint George's Fields**, "On the morning of the 10th May, the day fixed for the opening of Parliament, there was a riot in front of the jail in which Wilkes had been imprisoned from the 27th April. The rioters demanded that he should be released in order to take his seat as member for Middlesex. The Riot Act was read. The magistrates and soldiers were assailed with stones and brickbats. A man, mistaken for a rioter, was shot dead before orders were given to fire; and subsequently about twenty persons were killed and wounded by the troops. At the inquest held on the body of the man who had first fallen a verdict of wilful murder was returned against the soldier who killed him, and against the commanding officer and another soldier as accessories. The magistrate who had given the order to fire was also charged with murder. These persons were all acquitted. The government not only instructed their own law officers to appear in defence of the accused, but they anticipated the verdict of the jury by conveying to the commanding officer the royal approbation for his firmness and prudence. The private, whose breach of discipline and precipitation in firing without orders had caused the death of an innocent man, was

publicly presented with a purse of money by his colonel. Gratuities were also given to the soldiers who had been hurt in the conflict with the populace. This unconstitutional interference with the course of justice—these extraordinary rewards bestowed upon soldiers for the discharge of an odious duty, while they exasperated the public discontent, gave just cause of offence to many persons who would be little moved by popular clamour. The employment also of a Scottish regiment, which was probably advised, and not accidental, was regarded as a significant proof that the Court was actuated not merely by the desire of maintaining order, but by bitter resentment of the contumely which had been heaped upon a particular faction.” —*Massey*.

7. **to compass**, etc., to effect all the objects for which it was formed. Cf. p. 27, l. 13.

11. **efficient**, instrumental, executive.

17. **a genteel excuse**, he refers to places in the household of the Royal family. They are mostly sinecures held by persons of rank. Elsewhere Burke says, “For the purpose of influence, and of influence only, are retained, half at least of the household establishments.”

20. **parade**, ostentation.

21. **the senate**, the Parliament.

29. **they have...the best chance**, etc., because the Court wanted a powerless ministry. “Lord Rockingham afterwards declared that he had never enjoyed such distinguished marks of the royal kindness as during a period when the influence of Great Britain was paralyzed abroad by the knowledge that the existing Prime Minister (Rockingham himself) would not remain in office ten minutes after a successor could be found for him, and when all the placemen of the king’s faction were openly denouncing and obstructing the Government.”

31. **on the slippery heights**, so called because of the liability of men in power to a fall.

32. **the lead in**, the direction of.

34. **in express**, etc., they either hold them by a covenant in which they are stated, in so many words, to be tenable for life.

35. **in effect**, practically, because it is perfectly well known that the king will never dismiss them.

36. **respectable**, worthy of respect.

P. 27, l. 2. **to cast**, to reflect even indirectly upon.

3. **an attempt**, namely, to deprive him of his office.

4. **he flies to sanctuary**, he takes refuge in the plea that his office was bestowed upon him by the king for life. The word

sanctuary got the meaning of a refuge or place of security because it was thought wrong to harm those who took refuge in a church. Cf.

“God in Heaven forbid
We should infringe the holy privilege
Of blessed sanctuary.”

—Shakespeare, *Richard III.*, 3. 1. 140.

“On one occasion Lord Rockingham came to the palace, primed with a flagrant case of insubordination on the part of Lord Eglinton, the king’s agent in the House of Lords. ‘Oh,’ said the king, ‘that is abominable; but Eglinton is angry with me too. He says I have not done enough for him.’ George III. at last went so far as to pledge himself that, if Dyson, his spokesman in the House of Commons, did not mend his ways, he should go in the course of the next winter; but, at the time he made the promise, his majesty clearly foresaw that Lord Rockingham himself would not outlast the autumn.”—*Trevelyan*.

11. **the exterior ministers**, cf. p. 23, l. 29.

Like Janissaries, the Janissaries were a corps formed originally in the fourteenth century as a body-guard of the Sultan of Turkey. They were like the Praetorian guard under the Roman Empire. It was necessary to indulge them in order to secure their fidelity. They became a terror both to the people and the sovereign, but it was not until 1820 that their power was broken. Elsewhere Burke describes the king’s friends as ‘the household troops’—‘the mercenary Swiss of State.’ “Mr. Grenville, who had a temper with which neither king nor king’s friends did well to trifle, declared straight out that he would not hold power at the will of a set of Janissaries, who might at any moment be ordered to put the bowstring round his neck.”—*Trevelyan*.

14. **the great ruling principle**, etc., the main object for which they exist, namely, to secure the supremacy of the king.

19. **spirited**, opposed to *humble* or *servile*. **gross...fat**, rich.

24. **invidious**, because it throws upon all others the odious imputation of disloyalty—as if, said Junius, the body of the people were the king’s enemies.

28. **in French or English**, the English and French words are, in this case, the same. The use of French was fashionable.

30. **the vision**, etc. Cf. ‘weak and visionary,’ p. 1, l. 3.

31. **a malicious heart**. Cf. p. 3, l. 9.

33. **for eight years past**, since the resignation of the Earl of Bute. Cf. p. 11, ll. 22-34.

35. **borne testimony**, Grenville, Rockingham, and Lord North have all testified to the substantial justice of Burke’s criticism. It may be convenient to name the heads of the successive

ministries of the first ten years of George III. : Pitt and Newcastle, in office at his accession ; the Earl of Bute, May, 1762 ; George Grenville, April, 1763 ; the Marquis of Rockingham, July, 1765 ; the Earl of Chatham, August, 1766 ; the Duke of Grafton, December, 1767 ; Lord North, January, 1770.

P. 28, l. 3. **the exterior part.** Cf. p. 27, l. 11. Lord North had to compose his Cabinet of "professional office-holders, who received from Buckingham House detailed instructions when and how they were to speak, and on which side they were to go on voting until further orders. . . . George III. now had a Prime Minister clever enough to do him credit as a spokesman, and so thick-skinned as to be invaluable as a whipping-boy ; a Cabinet containing two or three respectabilities without a will of their own, and three or four broken-down men of fashion, who could not afford to throw away a quarter's salary, and a House of Commons which lent itself kindly to the process of parliamentary manipulation. On the 9th January, George desired Lord North to press a member who, with some others, had, in His Majesty's opinion, taken things too easily during the previous session, to exert himself in the coming debate, 'and I have no objection,' said the king, 'to your adding that I have particularly directed you to speak to them on this occasion.' On the 31st, the gentleman found an opportunity to make the kind of speech required of him in the matter of the Middlesex election. The next morning the king signified to Lord North that he was satisfied with the performance ; and, before the week was out, the obedient orator had been rewarded with a good place in the new administration."—*Trevelyan*.

10. **hid but for a moment**, the phrase is from the English Bible, *Isaiah*, 54, 8, "In a little wrath I hid my face from thee for a moment."

12. **influence**, an astrological term suggested by the metaphor of the constellation.

14. **of proscription**, such as had been practised by the Court in its day of success. See on p. 16, l. 8. Elsewhere Burke says : "It is false that the idea of an united administration carries with it that of a proscription of any other party."

15. **of a different kind**, i.e. to substitute for factious and unprincipled combinations a party in the sense of 'a body of men united to promote the national interest by their joint endeavours upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.' See pp. 77, *seqq.*

18. **countenance**, favour, support. The Marquis of Rockingham was Burke's political hero. His Ministry deserves all the credit which Burke gives it for purity of character and honesty of intention. But the members of it were wanting in ability

and in Parliamentary influence and official experience. Its chance of continuing in office was so slight that several great Whigs refused to join it: the support of Pitt could not be counted on; and, of course, as a Whig Ministry, it had to encounter from day to day the insidious opposition of the Court. For an account of the chief members of it, see the concluding pages of chapter 6 of Massey's *History*. Macaulay says that Rockingham and his friends are "to be held in honour as the second founders of the Whig party, as the restorers of its pristine health and energy after half a century of degeneracy," and that in his opinion the use and abuse of party cannot be better illustrated than by a parallel between the Rockinghams and the Bedfords.

33. national, referring to Bute's unpopularity as a Scotsman. The English remembered the terrors of the invasion of 1745, the Scots remembered the severity with which the rebels had been punished by England. Bute was charged with filling the public offices, the army, and the navy with his countrymen.

P. 29, l. 7. **to embody**, used intransitively, to form a body, to unite. See note on p. 6, l. 26, and on p. 11, l. 23.

14. he surrounds them, as he stated before, 'they are distributed through all the efficient departments of office.' It is quite true that George III., and not Bute, was the author of the policy. "It is now well ascertained that, instead of being the ruling genius of a Court cabal for years subsequent to his retirement from office, Bute had scarcely any communication with the Court after that period, and complained, not without reason, of the king's neglect and ingratitude."—*Massey*.

18. becomes a party to, aids in the formation of, or gives any support to. He is thinking of Pitt. "He made an administration so checkered and speckled: he put together a piece of joinery so crossly indented and whimsically dovetailed; a cabinet so curiously inlaid; such a piece of diversified mosaic; such a tessellated pavement without cement; here a bit of black stone and there a bit of white; patriots and courtiers; king's friends and republicans; Whigs and Tories; treacherous friends and open enemies; that it was indeed a very curious show, but utterly unsafe to touch and unsure to stand on." Such is Burke's description, in his Speech on American Taxation, of the Chatham Ministry which succeeded that of Rockingham in 1766. Cf. "No coalition which, under the specious name of independency, carries in its bosom the unreconciled principles of the original discord of parties, ever was, or will be, an healing coalition."—*Burke*.

20. constitutionally, from the principle on which it was constructed.

23. in any sort, in any way, to any extent.

28. He is sapping, etc. Cf. p. 3, ll. 18, *seqq.*, "our foreign politics," etc. *Sapping* means undermining.

32. this unnatural infusion, etc. A constitution, the essence of which is a control through Parliament in the interests of the people upon the executive, of course excludes favouritism. Self-government and government by Court favourites are incompatible.

34. ferment. See on p. 5, l. 25.

P. 30. l. 3. those measures, etc. Such as the prosecution of Wilkes and his exclusion from Parliament.

5. those bitter waters, the phrase is suggested by the English Bible, *Exodus*, 15, 23, "And when they came to Marah, they could not drink of the waters of Marah, for they were bitter."

6. conduits, channels.

10. against the spirit, because though a certain latitude is allowed to the sovereign in the choice of his ministers, yet this choice is limited by the constitutional right of Parliament to refuse its support to a ministry. If the king thinks that the nation would not support the opposition of Parliament, he can, in the last resort, dissolve Parliament and appeal to the people. If the verdict of the people is against him, he must yield. Cf. p. 32, ll. 28, *seqq.* The word *favouritism* is misleading. Grenville and Pitt were heads of cabinets under George III., but he certainly did not like them. In most cases he had to put up with anyone who could get an administration together at all.

15. the higher people, the House of Lords and the House of Commons.

16. the prince. Cf. p. 13, l. 13.

19. merely defensive, the mere prevention of illegality, though good, is not enough. The discretionary powers of the sovereign must be exercised distinctly and positively for the public good.

23. magistracy, any place of authority and power.

31. at large, undefined. With this passage, cf. p. 2, ll. 16, *seqq.*, "Nations are not primarily ruled by laws," etc.

P. 31, l. 6. the active part, etc., those who have to carry out the measures of government. India affords many examples of the best intentions of government being thwarted not only by the corruption and arbitrariness, but, quite as much, by the supineness and indifference of its subordinate agents. Elsewhere Burke says: "Executive magistracy ought to be so constituted that those who compose it should be disposed to love and venerate those whom they are bound to obey. A purposed neglect, or, what is worse, a literal but perverse and malignant obedience,

must be the ruin of the wisest counsels. In vain will the law attempt to anticipate or follow such studied neglect or fraudulent attention. To make men act zealously is not in the competence of law."

11. **we**, the nation at large.

17. **totally desperate**, we may acquiesce because we despair of the possibility of improvement. We are fools if we deliberately allow power to be put into the hands of men who may, and probably will, use it to our disadvantage. Burke means that the people were partly to blame because they did not exercise the power which the constitution gave them. Elsewhere he says: "I was indeed aware that a jealous, ever-waking vigilance, to guard the treasure of our liberty, not only from invasion, but from decay and corruption, was our best wisdom and our first duty."

19. **milkiness**, weakness. Elsewhere Burke uses the expression 'milky good-nature'; and Shakespeare uses the phrases 'milky gentleness' and 'the milk of human kindness.'

20. **diabolical**, devilish.

23. **depression**, used in its literal sense of *keeping down*. We use it now as equivalent to melancholy, dejection. The reader must be struck by the sound common-sense of this passage.

28. **agreeably to**, conformably to. For the use of *executory*, cf. p. 12, l. 6.

34. **of will**, they are what the government chooses that they shall be.

It must be so, see note on p. 30, l. 10. We may compare the anxiety of the educated classes in India to increase the representative element in legislative councils and municipalities.

P. 32, l. 14. **the vivifying energy**, "Liberty is the vital spring and energy of the state itself, which has just such so much life and vigour as there is liberty in it."—*Burke*. Contrast 'the dead repose of despotism,' p. 87, l. 3.

15. **The frame**, the constitution. Though the people do not directly elect the ministers, yet they practically determine who they shall be, except when a king, like George III., chooses them without any reference to the popular will. See note on p. 30, l. 10.

17. **better**, because, as explained on p. 32, l. 24, the English system excludes "all the mischief attending," etc.

27. **refined**, it required considerable ingenuity to secure the benefits of popular election without its evils.

28. **their representatives and grandees**, the two Houses of Parliament.

34. **in reverence with**, respected by. Ministers ceased to fear Parliament when Parliament ceased to represent the people. See note on p. 3, l. 23.

36. **the system**, the principle upon which it is constructed.

P. 33, l. 3. **strong-holds**, places of power.

8. **countenance**, support. Parliament was of no use to the people when its support to the most unpopular measures could be bought by the ministry. For instance, in the case of Wilkes, the House of Commons decreed that it, and not the people, should decide who should sit in it.

11. **a preventive operation**, cf. the common proverb, "Prevention is better than cure."

18. **trusts of the state**, see on p. 6, l. 30. Mr. Payne remarks on this passage that England now possesses a greater security for the excellence of her chief ruler than any other country has ever had. He must be chosen, as it were, by a triple election. A constituency must return him, public opinion and Parliament must accept him as a leader, and the Sovereign must send for him. This is not quite accurate so far as the first condition is concerned, for the Sovereign may entrust a peer with the formation of a Government.

22. **no mean security**, etc. Cf. "Nor will the mind of our sovereign ever know repose, his kingdom settlement, or his business order, efficiency, or grace with his people, until things are established upon the basis of some set of men who are trusted by the public, and who can trust one another."—*Burke*.

32. **landed or commercial interest**, great owners of property. Burke often insists that the prosperity and dignity of England was due mainly to its constitution and *its commerce*, both of which he had studied carefully.

35. **a controlling parliament**, see p. 32, l. 34.

P. 34, l. 3. **Those knots**, etc. "The Bedford party, as a party, had, as far as we can discover, no principle whatever. Rigby and Sandwich wanted public money, and thought that they should fetch a higher price jointly than singly. They therefore acted in concert."—*Macaulay*.

13. **courtly**, flattering to the king.

15. **of active men**, cf. p. 9, l. 32.

18. **consideration**, influence.

21. **so popular**, which gives so much power to the people.

to leave ambition, etc., as will be the case when the objects of ambition can only be attained by the favour of the sovereign.

22. **to trust all**, to think that, though irresponsible, they will be too good to abuse their power. Cf. p. 31, l. 18, "We must soften," etc.

27. **the principle**, viz. that the king should be guided by the popular will in his choice of ministers.

34. **if he select**, if he composes the ministry of representatives of all parties.

P. 35, l. 3. **Faction will make**, etc. Cf. "Because half a dozen grasshoppers under a fern make the field ring with their importunate chink, whilst thousands of great cattle, reposed beneath the shadow of the British oak, chew the cud and are silent, pray do not imagine that those who make the noise are the only inhabitants of the field; that, of course, they are many in number; or that, after all, they are other than the little shrivelled, meagre, hopping, though loud and troublesome insects of the hour."—*Reflections on the Revolution in France*.

8. **the opinion**, etc. Cf. p. 2, l. 10.

13. **collected**, gathered or inferred. All tests or indications of public opinion are fallible.

19. **humours**, whims, caprices. **traversing**, thwarting.

31. **Sufficient appearances**, cf. the proverb, "There are none so blind as those who will not see."

32. **have a mind to**, are bent upon.

33. **level all things**, abolish all distinctions.

P. 36, l. 2. **satisfaction in**, contentment of the subjects with Government.

6. **to be looked for**, to be expected, to be counted on. However bad a Government may be it will have some supporters. However good it may be there will be some grumblers.

8. **accurately distinguishing**, alluding to the alleged difficulty of distinguishing between the will of the vulgar and that of the educated, between the popular voice and the cry of a small but noisy faction.

11. **nicely**, accurately.

13. **wise**, ironical. In practical matters a man must be content to act upon probabilities, and to trust to such evidence as he can obtain. This passage affords an excellent example of Burke's persuasive common sense.

16. **They who can read**, etc., as sailors forecast the weather by the appearance of the sky. Cf. the proverb, "A straw shows which way the wind blows."

17. **no bigger than a hand**, from the English Bible, 1 *Kings*, 18,
44. Elijah having prophesied rain in a time of famine to King

Ahab, and being anxious as to the fulfilment of his prophecy, sent up his servant seven times to look toward the sea. At the seventh time the servant said, "Behold, there ariseth a little cloud out of the sea, *like a man's hand*" . . . and soon afterwards "the heaven was black with clouds and wind, and there was a great rain."

19. **No lines**, etc. It is impossible to give a mathematically exact definition of wisdom, or to lay down precise rules by obedience to which a man may be sure of acting wisely. Still, the difference between wisdom and folly is obvious. The wise thing to do in any case depends entirely upon the circumstances of the case. The idea, which is a favourite one with Burke, is borrowed from Aristotle. Cf. "It is the mark of an educated man to require, in each kind of inquiry, just so much exactness as the subject admits of. It is equally absurd to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician, and to demand scientific proof from an orator."—*Ethics*, Bk. 1, ch. 3.

21. **a stroke**, a line of demarcation.

confines, boundaries. No man can say exactly at what moment day ends and night begins.

22. **tolerably distinguishable**, ironical. It is fairly easy to see the difference between night and day, *i.e.* there is obviously no difficulty in seeing it. Equally obvious is the distinction between wisdom and folly. Mr. Payne points out that the illustration is borrowed from Pope :

"If white and black blend, soften, and unite
A thousand ways, is there no black and white?"

—*Essay on Man*.

23. **a prince**. Cf. p. 13, l. 13.

26. **curious**, over-careful.

27. **abstract**, always a term of depreciation with Burke. Cf. p. 2, l. 11. The statesman is concerned not with what is ideally perfect, but with what is practically attainable.

29. **without any research**, they are obvious. A government will find itself overthrown if it will not set about the removal of discontent until it has devised a policy which will satisfy every single individual.

36. **value**, importance. See on p. 31, l. 17.

P. 37, l. 2. **Their freedom**, etc. Those who can safely be despised and neglected will naturally be oppressed.

5. **substantial**, possessed of considerable property.

yeomanry, the better class of farmers, owning their own land and ranking next below the gentry. These are the classes

who everywhere and in the ordinary course of things are powerful. Cf. p. 20, l. 22; p. 33, l. 32.

14. **the genius, the spirit : the character.**

not comformable, see on p. 30, l. 10.

18. **venom and malignity**, virulence. The words are properly used of poisons. See on p. 3, l. 8.

23. **unruly**, extravagant, unlimited.

27. **solid**, as opposed to the empty satisfaction of military glory. In the management of a war it is an advantage that the uncontrolled direction of affairs should be in the hands of one man. It secures unity of plan and promptness of execution.

28. **artful**, cunning.

30. **junto**. See on p. 23, l. 24.

a palsy, paralysis.

32. **benumbs and stupifies**, deprives of all power of action. The reference is to the power of excessive cold, or of an intoxicating drug.

35. **domestic arrangement**. Cf. "our domestic economy," p. 3, l. 19.

P. 38, l. 1. **the security**, a free government is secure because it can count on the support of those whom it governs; an absolute government can act with energy because it is not hampered by any control, is not obliged to consult anybody, nor to obtain the consent of anybody to its measures.

3. **turgid growth**, etc. The Cabal is compared to a tumour which saps the vitality of the body. See on p. 3, l. 8.

5. **The interior ministry**, see p. 12, ll. 1, *seqq.*

are sensible, know. It was the support of the people which enabled Pitt to carry on his expensive war with France in America and in Germany.

9. **they discover, they disclose, they show**. The first object of the new reign was the conclusion of peace with France.

11. **pious**, the word in Latin signifies the affection of a child for its parent.

12. **is backward**, hesitates.

14. **tender**, sensitive. In his *Speech on American Taxation*, Burke says that "timidity with regard to the well-being of our country is heroic virtue."

17. **seasonable**, timely. Any appearance of cowardice may provoke attack.

16. **Their fear**, i.e. the fear felt by the king's friends. What they are afraid of is the importance which the people would gain

by war, because they know that it would be the end of their own importance.

22. **the professed enemies**, the French.

24. **its professed defenders**, the English. Corsica was subject to Genoa, and had made several efforts to regain its independence. In 1755 there was a rising, which with the aid of England might have succeeded, under Paoli. But by a proclamation issued in 1762, English subjects were forbidden to aid "the rebels of Corsica." The Genoese became so weary of the struggle that in 1768 they ceded their rights on Corsica for a sum of money to France. Paoli is well known to all readers of Boswell.

27. **our lenity**, etc. He refers to the easy terms granted to France and Spain in the treaty of peace in 1762. Cf. p. 14, ll. 3, *seqq.* In September of that year the English captured Manila. The Archbishop, who was acting as General and Governor, and his officers "were admitted to a capitulation for the whole cluster of islands and the ships in harbour, by which they consented to pay as ransom for their property two millions of dollars in money, and the same sum in bills upon the Treasury at Madrid."—Mahon, *Eng. Hist.*, ch. 38.

29. **the East India prisoners**. In January, 1761, the English captured Pondicherry, and 2000 French, under Lally, fell into their hands.

30. **put a just confidence**, etc., they would not pay, because they knew that 'the interior ministry' would not go to war to enforce payment.

31. **one of them**, the Manila ransom.

32. **an acquittal by prescription**, lit. 'a discharge by lapse of time': a claim, which is not pressed for a certain time, lapses. Burke, in his *Observations on The Present State of the Nation*, says that when the Rockingham ministry pressed for payment in August, 1765, "the argument on which the Court of Madrid most relied, was the dereliction of that claim by the preceding ministers."

34. **spirited**, ironical. Burke means that, if the demands had been pressed boldly and backed by a threat of war, they would have been paid.

36. **which bear**, etc., which do not require the assistance of governments.

P. 39, l. 1. **the vine-dresser**, i.e. the statesman, is literally the gardener who prunes the vines.

the policy of treaties, there is an account of the commercial treaty between England and Portugal in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, Bk. iv., ch. 6.

5. **who stand before the curtain**, as distinguished from those who are behind the scenes. The *ostensible* as opposed to the *interior* cabinet. The metaphor is borrowed from the theatre. Writing of the Grenville ministry in 1763, Lord Chesterfield said: "The public looked still at Lord Bute through the curtain, which indeed was a very transparent one."

6. **affect**, pretend to.

spirit, boldness, independence.

10. **shadows of ministers**, they have only the show, without the substance, of power.

11. **disposal**, settlement.

13. **a causa sine qua non**, essential to.

15. **common**, united.

22. **upon Corsica**. See on p. 38, l. 24.

25. **that was natural**, that was to be expected.

27. **I had like to have said**, I wish I could have said. He cannot call it a ministry because, as already explained, it was a ministry only in name.

32. **the seals**, the badge of a Secretary of State.

35. **under**, we should say *in*.

to acquiesce means literally *to remain quiet under*.

what he had, etc., viz., the union of Corsica to France.

P. 40, l. 1. **as a compliment**, as intended to spare him the unpleasantness of continuing to do business with a man who had once addressed strong remonstrances to him.

2. **as an attention**, etc., as intended to spare the feelings of.

6. **Our office correspondence**, it is perfectly well understood abroad that the despatches from the British Foreign Office do not represent the opinions and intentions either of the ministry or the nation. Choiseul was at first inclined to listen to the remonstrances of Lord Rochford, who attributed his sudden change of attitude to the imprudent declaration of Lord Mansfield, who was then in Paris, at one of the ministers' tables, that the English ministry were too weak, and the nation too wise, to go to war for the sake of Corsica.

18. **delicate**. See on p. 1, l. 1.

interior, as opposed to foreign.

19. **The colonies**, the American colonies.

administration. Cf. p. 12, l. 2.

21. **in both parts of it**, the American policy was supported by the king's friends as well as by the ministry. It was indeed the policy of the king, a policy which found considerable support in the nation.

28. **nor apprehension**, England was not strong enough, or not united enough, to harm them.

P. 41, l. 2. **not to treat** it, it is treated at length in Burke's speeches on *American Taxation* and on *Conciliation with America*.

4. **our domestic economy**, p. 3, l. 19.

7. **into faction**. Cf. pp. 4-5.

13. **something else**, viz., the will and the favour of the Court.

18. **the roast beef**, the supposed national dish of the English. If the constitution were arbitrary in form as well as in fact there would be less discontent. What enrages the people is that they have the forms of a free with the reality of an arbitrary Government. See p. 10. The people distrust every measure of the Government. Burke had in his mind the song introduced into Fielding's *Grub Street Opera*, Act 3, sc. 3:

“ When mighty roast beef was the Englishman's food,
It ennobled our hearts and enriched our blood,
Our soldiers were brave and our courtiers were good.
Oh, the roast beef of England,
And old England's roast beef.

“ But since we have learnt from all-conquering France
To eat their ragouts as well as to dance,
Oh what a fine figure we make in romance !
Oh, the roast beef of England,
And old England's roast beef.”

In Hullah's song book the reader will find the whole of the song, “The Roast Beef of Old England,” quoted from a collection of songs with music published by Richard Leveridge in 1727. The chorus throughout is :

“ Oh, the roast beef of old England,
And oh for old England's roast beef.”

21. **even popular assemblies**, he alludes to the House of Commons.

22. **the ends of their institution**, the objects for which they were established. Intended as a control upon the executive in the interests of the people, the House of Commons, as already explained, had become an instrument in the hands of the Court for governing without reference to the wishes of the people.

24. **Those bodies**, etc. The law and the constitution had become a dead letter.

28. **by fits**, spasmodically.

its relish, its taste.

29. **which opened**, etc., which introduced, or was the beginning of. Prosperity made the people proud and insubordinate.

30. **A species of men**, it was the policy of Government, which gave all their popularity to men like Wilkes and Junius. Cf. "Instead of annihilating Wilkes by buying or neglecting him, his enemies have pushed the Court on a series of measures which have made him excessively important; and now every step they take must serve to increase his faction and make themselves more unpopular."—*Horace Walpole*.

34. **sinister**, evil, ill-directed. For **piety** see note on p. 38, l. 11. Such men are, at the same time, the effects and the causes of disorder. This is a very true remark. In times of good government no one will listen to denunciations of government.

35. **which are the parents of**, to which they owe all their importance.

P. 42, l. 3. **Their hands are tied**, they are helpless.

9. **the voice of law**, he refers to the Roman saying, "The laws are silent amid the din of arms."

13. **like every other**, the reader will recall the fable of the horse who found himself for ever enslaved to the man whose aid he had invoked to drive the stag from his pasture.

17. **crooked**, the opposite of '*straight-forward*.'

18. **to rake**, to search minutely, as when a man turns up the ground with a garden rake to find something.

23. **pensioners of state**, they are rewarded by the Government.

24. **the array of riot**, etc., using a mob, as if it were a disciplined force, to suppress another mob. For the reference, see note on p. 26, l. 5. When Glynn and Proctor were contesting Middlesex, Proctor hired a gang of Irish chairmen to attack and disperse his opponent's supporters. Two men, partisans of the unsuccessful candidate, were tried for murder and convicted; yet the Government not only granted a free pardon to these persons, but conferred a pension upon one of them.—*Massey*. When Luttrell stood against Wilkes he surrounded himself with a body-guard of some two dozen friends, who, however, retired before the crowd. There was in those days no police force capable of quelling a riot. The constables were few in number, timid, and unused to act in concert. This will explain the prevalence of riots at the time.

28. **Anarchy**, literally 'absence of government.' It is a favourite point with Burke that true freedom cannot exist without order. "Liberty," he says, "inheres in good and steady government as in its substance and vital principle."

29. **and servitude**, etc., the government is despotic (see note on p. 20, l. 34), but is not obeyed. Elsewhere Burke characterizes the Government of the day as one of '*disorderly despotism*.'

31. **executory**. Cf. p. 12, l. 6.

32. **administration**, p. 12, l. 2.

P. 43, l. 8. **in his closet**. Cf. p. 13, l. 5.

10. **personal**, *i.e.* as a man. It is opposed to official. Cf. l. 16, "I speak of the King, not of the Crown." Cf. p. 18, ll. 25-6.

18. **touched**, indicated, alluded to. See p. 38, ll. 2-4, and note on p. 33, l. 22. George III. once exclaimed that he would as soon see the devil in his room as George Grenville.

24. **the inventory**, a catalogue of goods or valuables.

30. **favouritism**, see p. 29, l. 32.

33. **by means**, etc. This is explained on pp. 63, *seqq.* It must be remembered that George III. was exceedingly simple in his tastes. In the early years of his reign, Horace Walpole writes that, when the King and Queen retired to Richmond, all sorts of people were disgusted by "his excess of privacy and economy," which was carried to such a pitch that Her Majesty's hairdresser waited on them at dinner, and that they allowed only four pounds of beef daily for their soup.

P. 44, l. 3. **mean and mechanical**, stingy and fixed.

to mete out, to measure out, to dole out.

7. **mortified**. Cf. p. 23, l. 8. It was suspected that the revenues of the sovereign had been expended in corrupting the House of Commons.

15. **a pension list**, a sum put at the disposal of the sovereign for the bestowal of pensions.

18. **quit-rents**, a quit-rent is properly a sum paid by a tenant in discharge of all other service. It was a small rent reserved in grants of land by the Crown.

19. **the Leeward Islands**, one of the groups of islands that compose the West Indies.

20. **to be sure**, undoubtedly.

22. **the cognizance**, the jurisdiction or control.

25. **Osnaburg**, of course, as tenable by a layman, the bishopric was only titular.

26. **the province**, the sphere. It is a Latin word which signified originally any department of the public service.

35. **clear of**, after paying all costs : net revenue.

P. 45, l. 6. **as if I supposed**, notice how careful Burke is to abstain from giving offence to the king. See on p. 1, l. 5.

9. **system of favouritism**, p. 29, l. 32.

11. **unnatural**, not to be expected or accounted for.

16. **disgusts**, unpleasantness. Cf. p. 15, l. 9.

19. **securing**, used intransitively, providing against.

20. **the corner-stone**, a frequent expression in the English Bible. "Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? or who laid the corner-stone thereof?" *Job*, 38, 6. "The stone which the builders refused is become the headstone of the corner," *Psalms* 118, 22.

26. **mortifications**, p. 23, l. 8.

but too evident, it is painfully evident. George III. was himself to blame for the annoyance to which Burke alludes. He wanted to choose his own ministers and to dictate his own measures. But he had to take as ministers those who could manage Parliament, and he could only get them on their own terms. Having taken them unwillingly the king intrigued against them, and they naturally resented and remonstrated against this. Grenville was a man who held as decided views as the king himself, and was just as obstinate. The strength of Pitt lay in his popularity. Rockingham would not purchase office at the cost of unconditional submission. Horace Walpole writes: "With all their propensity to servility, the House of Commons must be managed; if left to themselves they will exert their freedom, though it be only to choose a new master." To illustrate the mortifications which the king had to undergo. read Horace Walpole's letters to Sir Horace Mann, dated May 20 and June 26, 1765.

32. **the external administrations**, p. 12, l. 1.

P. 46, l. 4. in ... **opposition to everything**. Macaulay says that "Grenville's public acts may be classed under two heads, outrages on the liberty of the people, and outrages on the dignity of the Crown."

6. **greatness**, the king. Though the wishes of the nation were disregarded, special favour was shown to those who were active in support of the Government policy. Mr. Payne says that the allusion is explained by the following passage in Walpole's letter to Sir Horace Mann, dated May 12, 1768: "Lord Suffolk moved the Lords to address the king to confer some mark of favour on the Lord Mayor Harley for his active and spirited behaviour (during the Wilkes' riots). The Duke of Grafton answered that it was intended; and the House was very zealous."

16. **that monstrous evil**, as it appears to the Court faction.

27. **the safety**, etc., to protect them from the rage of the people. When George III. proposed the exclusion of Wilkes from Parliament, "Granby, Hawke, and Conway, the three men of the most approved valour in the kingdom, confessed that

they had not the courage to face the consequences of a step which would make every second Englishman a rebel at heart, and convert London into a hostile capital."—*Trevelyan*.

28. **fit priests**, etc., fit to serve the Government.

30. **for sanctuary**, see on p. 27, l. 4.

refined, subtle. Cf. "fine-wrought," p. 47, l. 8; and cf. p. 60, l. 31. It is used as a term of condemnation, and is opposed to simple: plain: commonsense. "Refined policy ever has been the parent of confusion. Plain good intention is of no mean force in the government of mankind. Genuine simplicity of heart is a healing and cementing principle."—Burke, *Speech on Conciliation with America*.

35. **a supposed restraint**, what they regard as a restraint, viz. a regard for the popular will. They will not be slaves to their own reason and interests, i.e. they won't obey the obvious dictates of reason or submit to the only conditions on which well-being can be had. The result is that they have to purchase the protection of the Court at the cost of becoming its absolute slaves. Writing in 1769, Horace Walpole says: "It is amazing to me that men do not prefer the safe, amiable, and honourable method of governing the people as they like to be governed, to the invidious and restless task of governing them contrary to their inclinations. If princes or ministers considered that despair makes men fearless instead of making them cowards, surely they would abandon that fruitless policy." And elsewhere he talks in the same connexion of "the comfort of going to bed every night without the fear of being assassinated."

P. 47, l. 2. **pretence**, aim, object.

10. **his exchequer**, his treasury, his private purse.

15. **presumptuously**. See on p. 27, l. 24.

17. **If particular men**, etc. He refers to the influence which Bute would naturally have with the king from his position in the household of his father and mother.

22. **pleasant**, amusing.

26. **kissing his hand**, the form of homage still done to the sovereign on the receipt of any office. See note on p. 17, l. 12.

32. **slippery**, untrustworthy.

sycophant, an interested flatterer, who of course will desert his patron in the day of danger and difficulty. It must be borne in mind that the party of '*king's friends*' did not include more than twelve men who held paid offices. There is no doubt that they very often behaved with what would now be considered disloyalty to the ministry, that the ministry often remonstrated, and that the king supported his friends. The name King's

Friends was really bestowed upon all on whose votes it was assumed that the king could rely. Amongst these, of course, in addition to the paid officials just alluded to, were all those whose seats were at the disposal of the sovereign, and a number of worthless men whose votes could always be purchased. But there was also a very large number of perfectly honest and disinterested men, with Tory notions of the prerogative, with a deep veneration for the king's office, and a great respect for his personal character. Of these members of the party Burke takes no account. Of the unwisdom of the king's general policy there can be no doubt. "Englishmen," as Walpole wrote at the time, "may be soothed. I never read that they were to be frightened." But it is fair to remember that Burke's condemnation of those who supported this policy is too sweeping.

P. 48, l. 10. **its original character**, which was to act as a control. Cf. p. 32, and see p. 8, ll. 36, *seqq.*

20. **In this respect**, etc. A man could only be taxed by his representatives as he could only be tried by his peers. Read carefully Green's *Short History of the English People*, pp. 167-174, where it is pointed out that representatives of the Commons were originally summoned simply with a view to legalizing contributions, and that their attendance was enforced with difficulty.

27. **of a middle nature**, *i.e.* citizens occasionally and for short periods invested with the power of levying taxes or enforcing contributions of money.

28. **nearer**, closer.

29. **remoter**, etc., the sovereign and the baronage.

34. **stamp**, impress.

P. 49, l. 1. **phrensy**, madness.

5. **out of doors**, outside Parliament.

10. **They are all trustees**, etc. Cf. p. 6, l. 30.

12. **although government**, etc. God willed that there should be government; but left each nation free to choose how and by whom it shall be governed.

19. **the express image**, the exact representation. In the English Bible the Son of God is described as being "the brightness of His glory and the express image of His person."—*Hebrews*, 1, 3.

27. **appointed**, furnished, equipped.

28. **its mace**, a mace was originally a metal staff or club used as a weapon. It now signifies a metal staff carried in front of an official as a sign of authority. It is borne before the Speaker of the House of Commons, and rests on the table in front of him when he is in the chair. The Sergeant-at-Arms executes the

orders of the Speaker upon disorderly and refractory members. Occasionally he has to call in the aid of the police.

30. **proper.** Cf. p. 16, l. 4.

31. **executory,** p. 12, l. 6.

34. **an addressing House,** etc. It is a monstrous thing that the House should be expressing its approval of a policy at the very moment that the people are petitioning for a change of it. The 'address,' of course, is directed to the king. Numerous petitions for the dissolution of Parliament were sent to the king in 1770 from the counties round London, but no notice was taken of them. A deputation from the city of London addressed a most strongly worded remonstrance to the king in person. The petitions related to the treatment of Wilkes. "The majority of the House of Commons," said the remonstrants, "have deprived your people of their dearest rights. They have done a deed more ruinous in its consequences than the levying of ship-money by Charles I., or the dispensing power assumed by James II.;" and they concluded with a prayer that the king "would restore the constitutional government and quiet of his people by dissolving the Parliament, and removing his evil ministers forever from his councils." A joint address of both Houses was then presented to the king declaring the conduct of the city to be "highly unwarrantable and tending to disturb the peace of the kingdom."

P. 50, l. 2. **vote thanks,** namely to the ministers.

3. **impeachments,** namely for unconstitutional conduct. Burke calls impeachment "the great guardian of the purity of the constitution," p. 51.

to grant, to vote money which the ministers ask for, without asking what it is wanted for. This is explained on pp. 65-7.

10. **to any popular purpose,** for any benefit which the people derive from it.

11. **procuration,** proxy, representative.

12. **original,** opposed to delegated. The House of Commons acted as if, instead of being a mere trustee, its power was its own, to use as it pleased.

20. **The distemper,** the disease.

21. **habit,** state, condition. The House of Commons, designed originally to protect the people, is now habitually, and as a matter of course, against the people.

23. **its ends,** the purposes for which it was established.

27. **previous sanction,** it is equivalent to giving notice to the ministers beforehand that they may do what they please.

28. **claims adverse,** see note on p. 20, l. 10.

P. 51, l. 2. **the constant habit**, this is contrasted with the occasional and short sessions of the House in the beginning. See p. 48.

4. **It is a disorder**, etc. The powers which, in the interests of liberty, were at the Revolution taken from the Crown were necessarily transferred to Parliament. There must be some permanent authority to maintain order in the country and to look after its interests abroad.

6. **liberty**, which requires a standing control upon the powers of the Crown. The Triennial Act, under which every Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, came to a natural end in three years, was passed in the sixth year of William and Mary. On the accession of George I. this period was extended to seven years by the Septennial Act. This Act, though supported on the ground of general expediency, was passed at a time of political danger—when the country had scarcely recovered from the rebellion of 1715, and the Jacobite adherents of the Pretender were still an object of apprehension to the Government. Attempts to repeal this Act were made as early as 1734.—May, *Constitutional History*, ch. 6. See below, pp. 69, *seqq.* In illustration of Burke's remarks here it is sufficient to note that the English army is only maintained from year to year by a vote of Parliament.

10. **this great inconvenience**, of making the House of Commons a standing Government instead of an occasional control. The only alternative was the greater evil of a despotic Crown.

12. **religiously**, strictly.

14. **of power**, of the Court, the policy of which was to use an omnipotent parliament as an instrument for carrying out its own policy.

17. **They have totally abandoned**, cf. p. 9, ll. 20, *seqq.*

19. **made a lodgment in**, have established themselves in. The expression is properly applied to a military occupation.

25. **no after-reckonings**, there is no one to call them to account. The members of the House of Commons were not really responsible to their constituents, and, even if they had been, the people could hardly complain of what their own elected representatives had done.

33. **answered to**, secured by.

34. **supports itself**, if Parliament is legally competent to do what it does.

P. 52, l. 4. **abuse**, misuse. If the people cease to keep Parliament up to its duty, they of course throw away their only 'control' upon the Government.

9. **the acting powers**, the executive.

10. **the event**, the result. Cf. l. 22.

14. **most intolerable**, because incurable. Against the tyranny of the Crown the people might look for a remedy in the popular House. But if that House itself tyrannized over them, there was no remedy.

24. **to alter the right**, see note on p. 20, l. 10. Lord Chatham condemned the proceedings of the House of Commons as "refusing, by a resolution of one branch of the Legislature, to the subject his common right, and depriving the electors of Middlesex of their free choice of a representative." In the same debate the Chancellor, Lord Camden, declared the incapacitating vote to be a direct attack on the first principles of the constitution.

26. **to disable**, to incapacitate. Wilkes was first elected for Middlesex in 1768, and was expelled by a vote of the House of Commons on the 3rd February, 1769, "for having in the course of the last six years published five seditious and impious libels." On the 16th of the same month he was again elected, and on the following day the House of Commons decided that, having been expelled the House, he was incapable of serving in Parliament. On the 16th March he was again elected, no one appearing to nominate the rival candidate, Dingley, who had been set up to oppose him by the agents of Government. On the 13th April he was elected for a fourth time by a very large majority over the rival candidate, Luttrell. On the following day the election was reversed and, after a long debate, Luttrell was declared to be duly elected. A lively account of these proceedings is given in Trevelyan's *Early History of Charles James Fox*, ch. 5. See also May, *Constitutional History*, ch. 7.

28. **descriptions**, classes.

31. **agreeably to**, in conformity with.

35. **upon one side**, the side of those who condemned the action of the House. Burke and Grenville especially distinguished themselves in these debates.

P. 53, l. 2. **though one arose**, etc., another reminiscence of the English Bible. "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead," *Luke*, 16, 31.

11. **countenance**, favour, support. Cf. "to countenance," l. 31.

21. **popular honours**, etc., a seat in the House of Commons. For the word **trusts**, see on p. 6, l. 30. The interests of the people are specially entrusted to the members of the House of Commons. See p. 54, l. 2.

27. *merely, entirely.* He means when the people are free to choose whom they wish. This passage should be noted.

P. 54, l. 1. *its exorbitances, its extravagances.*

4. *but, only.* A man, all whose prepossessions and prejudices are in favour of the powers that be, is not likely to be a very effective guardian and champion of popular rights and interests.

10. *construction, interpretation.*

14. *a discretionary proceeding,* the Commons had practically asserted the right of excluding any man who was objectionable to the majority of the day.

15. *the popular object, viz. control by representatives.*

16. *Popularity, etc.* Upon this May remarks, "This view is too deep and philosophical to have been the real one. The Court party, having been defied and insulted by a political opponent, were determined to crush him; and scarcely stopped to consider whether the laws were outraged or not."

19. *strained, etc.,* by means of forced and unnatural interpretations. For instance, it was argued that the right to expulsion carried with it necessarily the right to quash a re-election of the member expelled, and, by implication, to declare the next candidate elected. The answer to this, of course, was that the disability under which Wilkes laboured was created, not by the law, but simply by an arbitrary resolution of the House.

20. *sitting as the trustee, etc.* Cf. p. 31, l. 15.

21. *This is punishing, etc.* Popularity was the offence, and the people were punished by having their interests committed to one whose unpopularity was attested by the small number of votes that he received.

23. *in some sort,* to some extent. Many of the so-called representatives of the people were mere nominees of the Crown, or of peers or great landowners, or at any rate owed their seats to their interest and influence.

27. *in,* we should say *at.*

28. *It signifies very little,* no matter by what ingenious arguments the Government may try to prove that their object was not what I have stated it to be, the people will judge of their policy by their actions. They have shown how popular favourites are to be dealt with. For the publication of the famous No. 45 of his paper, the *North Briton*, Wilkes, then member for Aylesbury, was arrested on a *general warrant* issued by the Secretary of State, *i.e.* a warrant to seize—not any person named—but the authors, printers, and publishers of the paper. In anticipation of the verdict of the courts the House of Commons declared the paper to be "a false, scandalous, and

sedition libel, containing expressions of the most unexampled insolence and contumely towards His Majesty, etc." As a matter of fact Wilkes had merely exercised his constitutional right of criticising the speech from the throne, which he properly treated as a ministerial declaration of policy. See on p. 67, l. 26. Besides, even the issue of a general warrant for his arrest was of questionable legality. There was only one passage in the paper which brought Wilkes within the jurisdiction of Parliament: "As to the entire approbation of the Parliament (of the peace with France) which is so vainly boasted of, the world knows how that was obtained. The large debt on the Civil List, already above half a year in arrears, shows pretty clearly the transactions of the winter." This was pronounced to be "the grossest aspersion upon both Houses of Parliament, and the most audacious defiance of the whole legislature," and in conclusion the general tendency of the paper was declared to be "most manifestly to alienate the affections of the people from His Majesty, to withdraw them from their obedience to the laws of the realm, and to incite them to traitorous insurrection against His Majesty's Government," which was just the question still pending before the courts. Again, in 1769, Lord Weymouth, as Secretary of State, wrote to the magistrates of Surrey advising them to be on their guard against riots and tumults, and, if necessary, to make an early application for a military force. Wilkes published the letter with a comment of his own, describing it as "a hellish project," tending to a "horrid massacre." Weymouth complained of this as a breach of privilege. The House of Commons declared Wilkes to be guilty of "an insolent, scandalous, and seditious libel." There was no reason for the House of Commons to protect the privilege of a member of the other House; and besides, on the question of sedition, it was for the courts of law to pronounce.

36. if you please, I am willing to concede that the popular favourites have been guilty of irregularities.

P. 55, l. 5. Not that, Burke guards himself against a possible misunderstanding.

11. not in public trust, i.e. by private individuals, as distinguished from Government officials acting in their official capacity.

14. to animadvert upon, to take notice of, to punish. Cf. 'animadversion,' p. 56, l. 6. The individual must not take the law into his own hands. If he thinks himself aggrieved, he must apply to the magistrate for redress.

16. the temperaments, the modifications.

a trial by jury, Burke has already explained why a juror will naturally lean to the side of mercy, p. 48, ll. 20, *seqq.* If the law as it stands defeats or fails to secure any of "the general

objects for which Government exists," it is difficult to obtain a conviction for actual resistance to it.

17. of going beyond the law, etc., as when the House of Commons pronounced Wilkes guilty of the offence of sedition before the judges had decided whether he had committed an offence or not.

20. equity, lit. *fairness*. It means the resort to general principles of justice to correct or supplement the provisions of the law. The equity of a statute is the interpretation of it according to its reason and spirit, so as to make it provide for cases which the law did not contemplate, or in which the operation of law would be unfair. Such decisions, taken as precedents, have grown into an organized body of law, side by side with the common and statute law, and superseding them when they conflict. Cf. Aristotle's definition of the virtue of equity and fairness: "A correction of the law where it is defective on account of its necessary generality." 'Criminal equity' would be the monstrosity of leaving it to the judge to decide whether an act was an offence or not. It is essential that we should know beforehand what we may do and what not.

22. construction, see p. 54, l. 19.

23. ascertaining, fixing, defining. The Court of Star Chamber was finally abolished in 1641. Its jurisdiction was a continuance of that of the Curia Regis, or King's Court, of Norman times—the jurisdiction of the King in Council. From the fifteenth century onwards the Court was composed of "a Committee of the Council" only. It was intended either to supplement the ordinary law courts or to supersede them when they were too weak to act. In practice its jurisdiction was almost unlimited, and its procedure was unfettered by the legal forms and rules of the ordinary courts. It was, therefore, a convenient instrument in the hands of a despotic sovereign. Side by side with the Court of Chancery, which he describes as "possessing the Praetorian power for equity," Bacon proposed to establish 'Censorian courts'—an improved Star Chamber—invested with a discretionary power in criminal cases, or, to use his own words, "having the censorian power for offences under the degree of capital."

32. the indecency, referring to the *Essay on Woman* and a paraphrase of the hymn called 'Veni Creator,' found among Wilkes' papers which were seized under the 'general warrant' already described. The first was a parody of Pope's *Essay on Man*, with burlesque notes appended, in the name of the Bishop of Gloucester, in imitation of Warburton's commentary upon Pope's poem. These notes might constitute a breach of Parliamentary privilege, the Bishop being a member of the House of Lords. The

Essay on Woman was condemned by Parliament as 'a scandalous, obscene, and impious libel.' The seizure of the paper was illegal. It was never intended for publication, and, as not published, was not criminal. A few copies had been printed for private circulation only, and the Government had only obtained a copy by bribing the printer. Finally, the attack on Wilkes was led by Lord Sandwich, and supported by Dashwood, afterwards made Lord Despencer, both of whom were notorious profligates, and had been boon-companions of Wilkes. This added to the public indignation. Cf. p. 56, ll. 13, *seqq.* See Walpole's Letter to Sir Horace Mann, Nov. 17, 1763. A strong proof of the popular sentiment was given at Covent Garden Theatre as the Beggars' opera was acting. When Macheath came to the words, "That Jemmy Twitcher should peach (inform against me) I own surprises me," the whole audience marked the application by applause. Sandwich was thenceforth generally known as Jemmy Twitcher.

34. **in a common slaughter of**, in a general prosecution of.

P. 56, l. 2. **discountenanced**, treated with disfavour.

8. **envenomed**, malignant, virulent, lit. poisoned.

14. **Does not the public**, referring to Sandwich, who was Secretary of State, and to Dashwood's elevation to the peerage, "Mr. Wilkes complains that he never read the *Essay on Woman* but to two persons, who both approved it highly, Lord Sandwich and Lord Despencer. The style, to be sure, is at least not unlike that of the last. The wicked even affirm that very lately, at a club with Mr. Wilkes, held at the top of the play-house in Drury Lane, Lord Sandwich talked so profanely that he drove two harlequins out of company."—*Walpole*. Lord Chesterfield, too, wrote ironically of the mercy of God in raising up the Earl of Sandwich to vindicate and promote true religion and morality!

21. **Add but the crime**, etc. See note on p. 17, l. 22. The quotation is from the Roman historian Tacitus, *Hist.* 1. 1.

30. **spirited**, bold, independent. The profligacy and indecency of Wilkes' private life were scandalous; but whether we like it or not, Mr Gladstone declared that his name must be enrolled among the great champions of English freedom. He secured, at any rate, the right of election, the right of criticising the king's speech, and the security of person and property, which had been threatened by general warrants.

36. **civil proscription**, a deprivation of rights. See on p. 16, l. 8.

P. 57, l. 2. **court is made to**, their favour is sought, lit. wooed.

7. **adventures**, we should say *ventures*. The quotation which follows is from Tacitus, *Ann.* 2, 41.

12. **the principle**, etc. Popular election is a farce if the so-called representatives are to be, not those who sympathize with the people, but those who are the slaves of the Court. He refers of course to the substitution of Luttrell for Wilkes.

18. **to avarice or vanity**, pensions and titles.

19. **moment**, importance.

20. **spreading interest**, a growing and widely extended importance.

26. **an expiring interest**, a member who is losing his influence with his constituents, and is, therefore, in danger of losing his seat.

27. **livings**, benefices for clergymen. The spiritual charge of a parish, with house and salary attached, is called a *living*. The good things at the disposal of the Crown were given away on the recommendation of those members only who supported the policy of the Court.

A **mayor** is the chief magistrate of a borough. A **burgess** is an inhabitant of a borough, as a citizen is of a city. A borough is generally distinguished from other towns by possessing the right to representation in Parliament. The **capital burgesses** are the members of the Common Council which took the place of the original Assembly of incorporated burgesses. It is from among them that the **aldermen**, who, together with the mayor, are the magistrates of the borough, are elected. Burke means to say, 'For the children of those who have votes.' In some places the right to vote was possessed by the mayor and aldermen only. In others it was extended to a few of the burgesses. See May, *Constitutional Hist.*, ch. 6. Elsewhere Burke says: "We must know that the candidate, instead of trusting at his election to the testimony of his behaviour in Parliament, must bring the testimony of a large sum of money, the capacity of liberal expense in entertainments, the power of serving and obliging the rulers of corporations, of winning over the popular leaders of political clubs, associations, and neighbourhoods."

30. **indemnity from quarters**, exemption from having soldiers lodged in the houses of the inhabitants. For the means of influence possessed by the Crown, see May, *Constitutional History*, ch. 1.

35. **a guardian angel**, referring to the belief, which has been held, that a spirit is appointed by God to watch over every individual, and to protect him from temptations and from all dangers to his spiritual welfare. The Romans called this guardian spirit a man's *Genius*.

independent, who speaks and votes without regard to the wishes of the Court. If his constituents ask a favour of such

a man, he must either curtly refuse, or offer some lame excuse, or else sadly confess that he has no influence with those who dispense patronage.

P. 58, l. 1. *pitiful* means *contemptible*.

6. *the doors are locked*, the rule for the exclusion of strangers was enforced, so that what he said could not be reported amongst, or in any way made known to the people. The exclusion of strangers from its debates is still among the privileges of Parliament; and the publication of debates is still technically a breach of privilege. See May, *Constitutional History*, ch. 7.

7. *place-men*, holders of office under Government. Everyone will remember Johnson's famous definition of patriotism as 'the last refuge of a scoundrel.'

9. *knowing*, intelligent. This use of the word is obsolete.

11. *éclat*, a French word, applause, reputation.

16. *out of the line of*, not defined by the law. Cf. p. 54, l. 14, and p. 55, l. 17.

21. *out of the nature*, etc., it is not to be expected.

25. *animated*, courageous.

26. *The House of Commons*. In Burke's day the House of Commons was neither representative of, nor responsible to the people. See May, *Constitutional History*, ch. 6.

35. *in any limited member*, for instance, either of the Houses acting by itself. Sir Fletcher Norton, the Attorney General, declared in Parliament that, were he a judge, he should regard a resolution of the House of Commons no more than the oaths of so many drunken porters in Covent Garden. "Though the words might be rough and coarse, the sentiment was in its substance just and true. It expressed the immense constitutional interval between an enactment concurred in by both branches of the Legislature and a resolution voted by only one." —Mahon's *History*, ch. 42.

P. 59, l. 10. *the first franchise*, the most valuable privilege, that, namely, of being represented in Parliament by a man of his own choosing.

25. *preposterously*, used in its literal sense, 'that coming first which ought to come last.'

27. *the occasional will*, the will of the majority of the day.

28. *An arbitrary discretion*, etc., whatever they choose to declare law becomes law.

which is just, etc., they are doing precisely what they say they are not doing; they are *making* law, not *declaring* it. It is the business of a judge to *declare*, i.e. to interpret and apply a

pre-existing law. His verdict presupposes a law. There was no law disqualifying Wilkes. When, therefore, the House pronounced him to be disqualified, they practically enacted a new law, viz. that any one whom they declared to be disqualified was disqualified. 'The law attended on the judgment,' i.e. it was not until after their verdict was delivered that the law existed. It *made* the law; it did not *declare* a law already in existence. Similarly, on p. 61, l. 19, he says that the House was "arrogating to itself the most harsh and odious part of *legislative authority*."

P. 60, l. 1. **a construction**, etc., an interpretation of, an inference from. See on p. 54, l. 19.

3. **the minority**, viz. of electors. Luttrell, who was declared legally elected, polled only 296 votes against 1143 given for Wilkes.

6. **When any construction**, the laws of England give to the people the right of choosing their representatives. It must therefore be a mistake so to interpret them as to deprive them of that right.

7. **vicious**, bad, faulty.

9. **forms...types**, etc., i.e. the mere semblance, as opposed to the reality of representation.

13. **Titius**, etc., the names used in Roman and English law respectively to denote the parties to an imaginary law-suit.

18. **constructively**, inferentially. The argument of the House of Commons was that a vote given for a person, not qualified for election, was no vote at all.

23. **answer...the end**, serve the purpose. In all cases it is for the person concerned to declare who is the fittest person to look after his interests.

25. **strained**, forced. Cf. p. 54, l. 19.

31. **of a very coarse texture**, obvious; it is the opposite of 'fine-wrought,' p. 47, l. 8. There is no real analogy between the circumstances which justify a fictitious representation in the law-courts and those which demand a real representation in Parliament. The **statute of Westminster** enacted that an estate left to a man and his heirs or heirs-male should go to his issue, even if he did alienate (dispose of) it. This was acceptable to the nobility, so there was no chance of getting it repealed. But on account of its disadvantages (Stephen's *Blackstone*, 1, 256) it was allowed to be evaded by the application of *common recoveries*—a procedure by which a tenant-in-tail (one who had only a life interest) might dispose of his estates. 'A fine' was another mode of conveyance by fictitious proceedings, in which the person to whom it was proposed to sell the property was supposed to

recover it by legal process. If A, a tenant-in-tail, wanted to break the entail and convey the estate to B, B brought an action against him for the lands, alleging that the title (legal right) to them was not good. A third party (generally the court crier), who had warranted the title to A, was called in to defend it. He disappeared, and judgment was then given for B to recover the property in question from A, and for A to recover property of equal value from the third party. Obviously, as the court crier had no lands, A got no real recompense. *Fines* were so-called because they put an end (Latin, *finis*, an end) to all suits with regard to the matter in hand. A wanted to sell his lands to B. B brought an action against A for breach of a covenant alleged to have been made by A to convey the lands to B. The defendant was allowed by the Court to acknowledge himself in the wrong. The effect of breaking an entail is, of course, to deprive persons, as yet unborn, of property which they would have otherwise inherited. As it is not desired to safe-guard their interests, people are willing to entrust them to worthless representatives. In Parliament, on the other hand, people do desire to have their interests safe-guarded. They do care, therefore, by whom they are represented. *The persons in remainder* are the heirs under the entail—those who have *the reversion* of the property. See on p. 14, l. 18.

32. suffered, permitted.

34. *perpetuities*, the right of entailing property; i.e. of determining the destination of it for an unlimited period by will.

P. 61, l. 1. *another fate*, a different destiny. I hope that it will not be permitted to succeed.

6. *their prejudice*, their hurt, their disadvantage.

9. *to pay it*, etc., to treat it with any respect.

11, 12. *kind...burthen*, both words are, of course, ironical.

15. *two other*, viz. the Crown and the House of Peers. See on p. 58, l. 35.

20. *the most harsh*, etc., the power of creating disqualifications and taking away rights and privileges.

24. *at the expense of*, as, for instance, in their struggle with the Stuart kings.

27. *connive at*, wink at.

33. *all the stripes*, perhaps a reminiscence of the English Bible: "with His stripes we are healed."—*Isaiah*, 53, 5.

P. 62, l. 3. *sanctity*, an unusual degree of virtue; lit. holiness. For a similar distrust of 'professions of supernatural virtue,' see p. 17, l. 29. A *miracle* is a suspension of a law of nature by a direct intervention of Omnipotence.

13. **star chamber**, see on p. 55, l. 23.

The **king's bench**, one of the three superior courts into which the *Curia Regis*, without abandoning its right of jurisdiction, was divided from the time of the Great Charter. The other two were the Court of Exchequer and the Court of Common Pleas. This is a good illustration of the way in which Burke penetrates beneath the passing event to the permanent principle involved.

19. **a Parliament**, etc., because the ministry can only govern through Parliament. After the long struggle with the Stuarts and the final settlement of 1688 it was hopeless to expect that the people would tolerate another attempt on the part of the Crown to dispense with Parliament. The only hope of an arbitrary sovereign lay, therefore, in turning Parliament from *a control* into an *instrument*. Cf. p. 8, l. 36, and p. 11, ll. 7, *seqq.*

22. **interior...exterior**, see p. 12, l. 1.

dragged, he has all along insisted that the nominal ministers were entirely at the mercy of the interior cabinet. See, for instance, p. 27, l. 10.

24. **occasional and personal**, the power of excluding from the House of Commons at any time any individual who might be obnoxious to them. Cf. "Not one of their abettors," etc., p. 59, l. 5.

32. **the neighbouring monarchies**, the absolute monarchies of the Continent.

33. **those appropriations of revenue**, see on p. 14, l. 9. "From the Revolution to the accession of George III. the Crown had enjoyed certain revenues which were calculated by Parliament to produce a sufficient income. George III. agreed to accept a fixed amount as his civil list. This was the first time that the direct control of Parliament over the personal expenditure of the king had been acknowledged. . . . It soon appeared, however, from the debts incurred, that his Majesty was not inclined to permit this concession to diminish the influence of the Crown."—*May*.

P. 63, l. 3. **to do it in the former manner**, if George III. had allowed Parliament, before paying his debts, to ask for an explanation of them, he would have recognized that Parliament was, not his tool, but *a control* upon him. When George II. applied to Parliament for payment of his debts, he explained that the hereditary revenues allowed to him had not produced the amount calculated, and that Parliament was, therefore, bound by its own agreement to make up the deficiency.

6. **a supply**, a technical term for a grant of money.

10. **those duties**, the branches of revenue set aside for the Civil List. Cf. "the Civil List duties," l. 14.

14. **chargeable**, etc., that the sum advanced to the king was to be deducted from his income in the year following. Cf. "borrowing upon (on the security of) the Civil List funds," l. 29.

20. **clear**, cf. p. 44, l. 35.

26. **charges**, expenses. Cf. p. 64, l. 5. The queen is, of course, Queen Anne.

35. **stood charged**, etc., had to get rid of the mortgage by paying the amount owed.

P. 64, l. 4. **the last rebellion**, the invasion of England by the Pretender in 1745.

9. **A deficiency**, that they "had fallen short of the sum," etc., p. 63, l. 10.

12. **the produce**, the amount yielded by.

19. **a more liberal scale**, cf. p. 44.

21. **to the service of**, which could be used for the purposes of.

23. **a greater charge than usual**, "the ministers attributed the debt to various causes, such as the expenses of the late king's funeral, of the present king's marriage, and of his coronation, to the re-purchase of the Crown jewels from the Duke of Cumberland, to whom they had been bequeathed by his father, and the high price of provisions."—*Massey*, ch. 9.

30. **the establishment**, the House of Hanover.

31. **abetted from abroad**, see p. 19, l. 2.

33. **the throne**, etc. He, therefore, has not had to incur the expense of repelling or guarding against a rebellion. Cf. p. 13, l. 31, *seqq.*

P. 65, l. 7. **presumptive guilt**, what we naturally assume to be guilt in the absence of any proof that it is not.

8. **the terrors**, etc. They are reserved for popular favourites. The ministers were sure of 'indiscriminate support,' p. 50, l. 25.

11. **trustee of the public purse**, the right of taxation and granting supplies to the Crown belongs exclusively to the House of Commons.

15. **capital**, chief. This argument was used in the debate by Burke, Grenville, Dowdeswell, and Sir George Savile. The ministers urged that the demand for an account before payment was contrary to precedent; that the preparation of the accounts would take a long time; that the king's necessities were urgent, and that it would be indecent to inquire into his Majesty's private expenses. Both Grenville and Dowdeswell, who had

been Treasury ministers, stated that the accounts could be produced without delay; and as to the impropriety of examining the accounts of the Civil List, Grenville replied that, so long as it defrayed its expenditure, Parliament had no right to inquire: but when the Crown came to Parliament to pay the debts of the Civil List, it then became their duty to do so. As to the assertion that the grant of an extraordinary supply before inquiry was in accordance with precedent, its absurdity was exposed by several speakers, including Burke, both on the general ground of the uselessness of an account after payment, and also on the ground that to infer from the fact of the House in special cases having made a grant without inquiry, that it had altogether abandoned the right of inquiry, was a departure from that great principle of appropriation by which the Convention Parliament had sought to provide for ever against the misuse of public money. The reasons for the debts alleged by Lord North were obviously insufficient; and the refusal of the Crown to produce accounts naturally strengthened the prevalent belief that the money had been spent in bribery and corruption.—*Massey*.

P. 66, l. 1. **their appropriated allowance**, the sum set aside by Parliament for the Civil List.

5. **animadvert on**, p. 55, l. 14.

9. **exceeding**, excess.

12. **by previous questions**, the previous question is—whether a division shall be taken on the matter before the House. If that question is answered in the negative, then the matter drops for the time.

14. **prevention**, used in the literal sense of ‘anticipation’ of supply by inquiry.

22. **the god in the machine**, we generally use the Latin ‘*Deus ex machina*.’ In the Greek drama, when it was necessary to introduce a god to solve some difficulty which could not otherwise be solved, he was swung before the spectators in the air by a crane.

26. **committee of supply**, the term used to describe the House of Commons when deliberating how money shall be raised.

32. **orderly and parliamentary**, ironical. The whole proceeding was a mockery and a farce. “To what purpose,” asked Burke in Parliament, “do we determine to take His Majesty’s gracious message into consideration, if there is nothing to consider? Why deliberate, if we are to be denied any materials for deliberation?”

36. **argued upon**, etc. The ministry assumed throughout that it was like a debt incurred by the State, for the payment of which, therefore, the State was responsible.

P. 67, l. 4. **the budget**, the statement of national income and expenditure, together with the financial proposals for the coming year, annually presented to the House of Commons by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Budget meant originally a leather bag or purse.

5. **valued themselves**, prided themselves, took credit to themselves. Navy and Exchequer bills are two forms of security on which Government borrow money. They correspond to the promissory notes of an individual.

8. **A sinking fund**, a fund set apart for the payment of old debts, though it is often pledged as a security for new ones. See Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, Bk. v., ch. 3.

9. **to all intents**, etc., practically they had added to the debt. For the money which they gave to the king might have been used to pay off so much of the national debt.

14. **a vindictive retrospect**, a punishment of past mismanagement. Burke's own scheme, which embraced at the same time retrenchment and prevention, is set forth at length in his great speech on Economical Reform.

18. **security**, guarantee against a similar debt being incurred in the future.

Mr. Pelham, Prime Minister in the reign of George II.

26. **the speech from the throne**, an address presented by or in the name of the king to Parliament at the opening of a session. It is the official exposition of the proposed ministerial policy. See on p. 54, l. 28.

27. **the relief**, namely, from debt.

36. **a full loose**, perfect freedom from control.

P. 68, l. 1. **dissipation**, extravagance. We use it now in the general sense of *profligacy*.

3. **idle**, existing in name only.

5. **obsolete**, because a law which is disobeyed is as good as non-existent.

9. **weak**, foolish. Cf. p. 1, l. 3.
settled, fixed.

11. **the law of parliament**, p. 66, l. 23. See on p. 65, l. 15.

14. **the subject**, cf. p. 2, l. 10.

15. **every absolute monarch**, cf. p. 62, l. 31.

20. **the great buttress**, upon which all the rest depends. A *buttress* is lit. an external support to a building. Of course the national credit suffers if the fund, nominally set apart for the payment of the national debt, may at any time be used for other purposes.

28. **the prolific principle**, viz. that the ministry may at any time spend as much as, in their opinion, the honour of the Crown requires. £573,511 was the amount for which the king applied to Parliament in February, 1769.

29. **the fruitful mother**, etc. A tavern frequented by Milton bore the sign of a carrier, named Hobson, carrying a bag of £100 with the inscription, "the fruitful mother of an hundred more."

30. **credit** means power of borrowing; lit. 'trust' or 'confidence' in the will and the power of the borrower to repay.

32. **the safety of the constitution**, cf. "With us, in every question of expense, there is always a mixture of constitutional considerations."—*Burke*.

P. 69, l. 7. **committed them**, engaged them in a quarrel.

8. **a strait**, a difficulty; lit. a narrow place.

10. **land-marks**, precedents; lit. directions.

23. **to shorten the duration**, see on p. 51, l. 6. With the whole passage compare Burke's Speech on the Duration of Parliaments. It was delivered on one of those motions which for many successive years were made by Mr. Sawbridge for shortening the duration of Parliaments.

25. **placemen**, cf. p. 58, l. 7. It was desired to exclude them because, as they depended on the Crown for their places, the Crown could always command their votes.

28. **free election**, see on p. 54, l. 23. "He must be very ignorant who does not know that, in all the corporations, all the open boroughs, indeed in every district of the kingdom, there is some leading man, some agitator, some wealthy merchant or considerable manufacturer, some active attorney, some popular preacher, some money-lender, etc., etc., who is followed by the whole flock. This is the style of all free countries. These spirits, each of which informs and governs his own little orb, are neither so many, nor so little powerful, nor so incorruptible, but that a minister may, as he frequently does, find means of gaining them, and through them all their followers."—*Burke's Speech on the Duration of Parliaments*. Elsewhere Burke acknowledges "the immense and dangerous charge of elections; the prostitute and daring venality, the corruption of manners, the idleness and profligacy of the lower sort of voters." Cf. Horace Walpole, Letter to Mann, dated March 3, 1761.

32. **the popular palate**, the popular taste.

34. **in speculation**, in theory. Cf. p. 70, l. 10.

P. 70, l. 5. **committing**, cf. p. 69, l. 7.

12. **the first and last session**, in the first session the feeling of gratitude to ministers, to whom they owe their seats, is fresh.

In the last session they are anxious to bid for the support of ministers in the election which is imminent.

15. **canvassing**, discussing.

16. **did allow something**, etc., thought that the Court had a better chance of carrying its measures.

17. **depending**, lit. hanging over the heads of members. Their gratitude then took the shape of 'an expectation of favours to come.'

21. **they**, elections.

23. **interest**, influence. As Bacon says, "One man's means cannot hold way with a common purse. In his Speech on the Duration of Parliaments, Burke says: "About the close of the last Parliament, and the beginning of this, several agents for boroughs went about, and I remember well that it was in every one of their mouths: 'Sir, your election will cost you £3000 if you are independent; but if the ministry supports you, it may be done for £2000, and perhaps for less. . . . A gentleman of £2000 a year who meets another of the same fortune fights with equal arms; but if to one of the candidates you add £1000 a year in places for himself, and a power of giving away as much among others, one must ruin his adversary, if he is to meet him and fight with him every third year."

25. **something may be done**, viz. by diminishing the funds at the disposal of the ministry. This was a fundamental part of Burke's own plan of reform.

31. **independence of spirit**, in the same speech Burke says that independence of mind will ever be more or less influenced by independence of fortune; and he foresees that, in the ruinous contests between the Treasury and the independent candidate, "private fortunes will be washed away, and every, even to the least, trace of independence borne down by the torrent."

32. **debating it**, etc., discussing it in a hostile spirit.

P. 71, l. 1. **warm**, zealous, enthusiastic. Critics of government officials and their views would do well to bear in mind the sentence that follows.

6. **It may stand upon a par with**, etc., it is at least as deserving of attention as.

12. **is solely formed**, etc., that he is necessarily biassed in his opinions by selfish considerations. Cf. p. 31, l. 20: "We must be tainted," etc. It seems at first sight rather difficult to reconcile Burke's superstitious veneration for the constitution with his merciless exposure of the venality both of electors and of elected. He seems, in his praises of it, to idealize the constitution, as Cicero idealized the government of the *Optimates*.

He knew well "that the constitution on paper is one thing, and in fact and experience is another." But in the same speech he describes it as "an inestimable treasure": he will have nothing to do with quack remedies for restoring it to youth and vigour, but will "nurse its venerable age, and with lenient arts extend a parent's breath." The cast of Burke's mind was essentially conservative. He was consistently opposed to what was called Parliamentary reform. He was deeply impressed with the prescriptive and presumptive title to exist of what is. "It is a deliberate election of ages and generations; it is a constitution made by what is ten thousand times better than choice; it is made by the peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions, and moral, civil, and social habitudes of the people, which disclose themselves only in a long space of time." He distrusted mere legislative tinkering, and was unwilling to start on a process of change, the end of which no man could foresee. Equality and uniformity in representation he regarded as needless. A member represented, in his view, not his own constituents specially, but the whole country. It was no disadvantage, therefore, to any place or class to be without a representative of its own. Burke had the wise man's distrust of the efficiency of mere law and regulation, and the philosopher's contempt for government by the people. On this last point his utterances are quite Socratic. But perhaps the best explanation of his apparent optimism is to be found in such passages as the following: "If corruption and meanness are greatly spread, they are not spread universally. Many public men are hitherto examples of public spirit and integrity. Whole parties, as far as large bodies can be uniform, have preserved character. However they may be deceived in some particular, I know of no set of men among us which does not contain persons on whom the nation, in a difficult exigence, may well value itself. Private life, which is the nursery of the commonwealth, is yet in general pure, and on the whole disposed to virtue; and the people at large want neither generosity nor spirit."

17. **distempers, disorders.** See on p. 3, l. 8. With this passage cf. p. 2, l. 16, *seqq.*

21. **of disconnecting**, *i.e.* of excluding from Parliament all who hold their places from the Crown, and may, at any time, be deprived of them by the Crown. This was the effect of a place-bill. When General Conway was deprived of his place in the household and the command of his regiment for voting against the Government on the subject of general warrants, the king is reported to have said that he could not trust his army in the hands of those who were against his measures.

27. **description**, kind, class. A history of legislation on this matter will be found in ch. 6 of May's *Constitutional History*.

32. **interest**, an influential body of men.

P. 72, l. 4. **open**, unfold, explain in detail.

6. **taste**, specimen, some idea.

capital, important, considerable.

12. **oblique**, not straight-forward, indirect.

13. **tolerably**, ironical. He means that it is thoroughly understood. Cf. p. 36, l. 22.

28. **contracts**, "Lucrative contracts for the public service were found a convenient mode of enriching political supporters. A contract to supply rum or beef for the navy was as great a prize for a member as a share in a loan or lottery. Nor were its attractions confined to the ministers who enjoyed the contracts. Constituents, being allowed to participate in their profits, were zealous in supporting Government candidates."—May, *Constitutional History*, ch. 6.

subscriptions, viz. to loans and lotteries. Shares in these were allotted to the supporters of Government in Parliament before they were thrown open to the public. Obtaining them on favourable terms, the members could afterwards sell them at a profit. The practice of raising revenue by lotteries has been discontinued in England, though it is still practised in some continental states. It was alleged in Parliament that in 1769 20,000 tickets in lotteries had been disposed of to members of Parliament, which afterwards sold at a profit of £2 on each ticket. In 1763, Lord Bute contracted a loan of 3½ millions for the public service; and having distributed shares among his friends, the scrip immediately rose to a premium of 11 per cent. in the market. Here the country sustained a loss of £385,000.—May, *ibid*.

31. **the disposition to be corrupted**, this is the important point. The first condition of any real improvement was to improve the standard of public morals.

32. **Our constitution stands**, etc., a favourite metaphor with Burke. Cf. "A constitution made up of balanced powers must ever be a critical thing." See note on p. 19, l. 31. In his Appeal to the Old Whigs, Burke says: "He who thinks that the British constitution ought to consist of the three members of three very different natures, of which it does consist, and thinks it his duty to preserve each of these members in its proper place, and with its proper proportion of power, must (as each shall happen to be attacked) vindicate the three several parts on the several principles peculiarly belonging to them." Accordingly, in this treatise, seeing that liberty is attacked, he emphasizes the fact that "the distinguishing part of our constitution is its liberty, and that to preserve that liberty inviolate

is the *peculiar* duty and *proper* trust of a member of the House of Commons." In the conclusion of his Speech on Economic Reform, he says: "Let the Commons in Parliament assembled be one and the same thing with the commons at large. The distinctions that are made to separate us are unnatural and wicked contrivances."

P. 73, l. 2. with **external circumstances**, it is explained in ll. 13, *seqq.* what these were.

7. **engage for**, pledge themselves to, undertake to perform.

13. with an **immense revenue**, etc. See note on p. 9, l. 26.

14. **mighty establishments**, the army, the navy, the revenue department, etc., the officers of all of which could be counted on, under penalty of dismissal, to support Government.

15. a **great banker and merchant**, alluding to the great influence which the ministers possessed through their control of loans, lotteries, and contracts.

22. a **legal remedy**, because applied to a violation of a trust. Power is given on certain conditions. When these conditions are not fulfilled, the power is forfeited. The Revolution of 1688 was justified as an act of self-defence on the part of the people. The English constitution is a contract by which the supreme power is divided between Crown, Lords, and Commons. James II. broke, or attempted to break, the terms of this contract, and so the right of allegiance ceased. The injured party had a right to save or recover that constitution in which it had an original interest. See Burke's Appeal to the Old Whigs. Locke sets forth the same doctrine.

26. **The distempers**, etc. The Revolution of 1688 defeated the attempt to substitute Prerogative for Parliamentary Government. An attempt is now being made to annihilate Parliamentary control by Court influence, and unfortunately Parliament abets the scheme.

35. **Frequent and correct lists**, etc. I have already explained that, so long as the debates were not published, it was impossible for constituents to control their representatives. The means, too, for the formation or expression of public opinion hardly existed. Besides, many of the so-called Representatives had no constituents. This was the case with the so-called 'rotten boroughs.' Places like Old Sarum, with fewer inhabitants than an ordinary hamlet (the representatives, in Burke's words, being more in number than the constituents) avowedly returned the nominees of their proprietors. In others, the number of votes was so limited as to bring the representation under the patronage of one or more persons of local influence. Besides, the sale of boroughs was a recognized thing, the right of property in

them being acknowledged, and capable of sale or transfer, like any other property. The number of nominal electors in the whole kingdom was only 160,000—and those who had sold their votes had renounced all rights over their member.

P. 74, l. 2. **an indiscriminate support**, etc. Cf. p. 50, ll. 22, *seqq.*

3. **all integrity**, because the ministers can count on support, whatever their conduct and character may be.

4. **confidence**, because the people cannot trust ministers who are subject to no control.

have confounded, etc., by giving equal support to either.

6. **compacting**, an obsolete term. It means strengthening; *lit.* fastening together.

the general frame, the whole fabric. As Burke has often insisted—if Parliament will accept any ministers that the king appoints and support any measures that they propose, the Government is despotic in reality, whatever it may be in form.

7. **government**, see on p. 2, l. 7.

14. **The distemper**, etc. Why is there disorder? Because the Government is feeble. Why is the Government feeble? Because the Parliament has allowed the Cabal to enfeeble it. The obvious remedy for the disorder, therefore, is to destroy the power of the Cabal and restore the constitutional authority of Government. The disorder will not cease until there is a Government in power which is chosen and controlled by the appointed guardians of the people's rights and privileges. The only way to remove discontent is to remove the causes of it.

17. **An exterior administration**, p. 12, ll. 1, *seqq.*

chosen for its incompetency, p. 22, l. 22; p. 24, l. 6, etc.

22. **not immediate from the crown**, the king's men stand between them and the crown.

natural in the kingdom, see on p. 10, l. 25.

24. **comes and goes**, etc. So long as a man is minister he is supported. When he is dismissed, his successor is supported.

29. **ministry**, cf. administration, p. 12, l. 2.

it is not indeed, it is not absolutely safe.

31. **private humour**, "the caprices and passions of a court." Christ, in one of his parables, contrasts the man who builds his house on a rock, and the man who builds it on the sands; and St. Paul, in one of his Epistles, talks of building on hay and stubble.

P. 75, l. 11. **they decline**, etc., they will not submit to be judged by a secret Cabal.

13. **for both**, viz. their actions and fortunes.
put themselves upon, trust to.

14. **distinguishing**, viz. between good and bad ministers ; not giving an indiscriminate support to all administrations.

19. **awful**, inspiring awe. Cf. "I reverentially look up to the opinions of the people, and with an awe that is almost superstitious."—*Burke*. And "We are under infinite obligations to our constituents, who have raised us to so distinguished a trust, and have imparted such a degree of sanctity to common characters. We ought to walk before them with purity, plainness, and integrity of heart ; with filial love, and not with slavish fear."

26. **the division**, etc. See p. 11, l. 35.

32. **to accept administration**, to form a ministry. The principle of the Cabal was 'to rule by dividing.'

35. **every work**, a military expression. Cf. p. 23, l. 24.

P. 76, l. 6. **lost every power**, because they were dismissed in disgrace.

9. **alienation**, estrangement.

14. **to look to**, to keep an eye upon. Cf. p. 73, l. 31.

18. **versatility**, readiness to change.

21. **holdings**, supports. Cf. p. 13, l. 12.

22. **to unhinge**, to dissolve, to break up.

23. **connexions**, political parties.

26. **a colour to**, a specious justification of. To colour means literally to make a thing seem what it is not.

27. **countenance**, favour, support.

30. **dissipated**, used in its literal sense of scattered, broken up. George III. defined party as a body of men combined to hinder a beneficent ruler from selecting for public employment the best and wisest of his subjects wherever he can meet with them. This was the idea of Bolingbroke's *Patriot King*.

33. **drafts**, lit. drawings, detachments.

denomination, section. The word is most frequently applied to a religious sect.

36. **the then administration**, that of Lord Rockingham.

P. 77, l. 2. **directly and publicly**, it was matter of dispute to what extent Bute interfered, or exercised any influence in politics after his retirement from office.

8. **the alarm**, see on p. 21, l. 21.

15. **habitudes**, ways, characters. Cf. p. 79, l. 8.

23. **enthusiasm**, fanaticism, a man must be intoxicated with self-conceit, if he thinks, etc.

27. **an unpitied sacrifice**, no one will pity the victim who walks into a trap with his eyes open.

29. **of trust, of power.** Cf. "persons in public trust," p. 55. Burke is alluding to the Earl of Chatham, whose personal character was irreproachable. For the grounds of Burke's dislike of him see on p. 1, l. 5.

34. **innocuous, harmless.**

36. **apology, self-defence.** Chatham's was only a negative virtue. He had done no harm, but he took up a position in which he could do no good. It was only by the combined opposition of a party that the Cabal could be defeated.

P. 78, l. 6. **the purposes of his trust**, the object for which power was put into his hands. See on p. 6, l. 30. Cf. "They who are legally invested with public trust, or stand on the high ground of rank and dignity which is trust implied, can hardly in any case remain indifferent, without the certainty of sinking into insignificance, and thereby in effect deserting that post in which, with the fullest authority, and for the wisest purposes, the laws and institutions of their country have fixed them."—*Burke*.

12. **tender and scrupulous**, sensitive and strict.

15. **proscriptive spirit.** See on p. 28, l. 14.

16. **circumscribed, limited.** Men are apt to sacrifice the interests of the country to the interests of their party.

30. **free commonwealths**, under a despotism of course anything approaching concerted opposition to Government would be regarded as treason. But when the people have a right to *control* the Executive, they have the right to make that control effectual. By a *free* commonwealth Burke understands one in which the people control the Government. Cf. "To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love to our country and to mankind."—*Burke*. The idea was perhaps suggested to him by *Cicero*. See *De Finibus* 2, 14, and 5, 23.

35. **Some legislators**, for example, Solon in Athens. It was essential that the Government should know precisely who were its friends and who were its enemies.

P. 79, l. 1 **to overstrain**, to carry it too far.

4. **Idem sentire**, etc., from *Cicero* "On Friendship"; in modern times the friendship of Cobden and Bright may serve to illustrate Burke's remark.

7. **firmer, dearer**, etc. Cf. "If they are the friends of any one great man rather than another, it is not that they make

his aggrandizement the end of their union, or because they know him to be most active in caballing for his connexions the largest and speediest emoluments. It is because they know him by personal experience to have wise and enlarged ideas of the public good, and an invincible constancy in adhering to it; because they are convinced, by the whole tenor of his actions, that he will never negotiate away his honour or their own; and that, in or out of power, change of situation will make no alteration in his conduct."—*Burke*.

12. *necessitudo sortis*, it was thought by the Romans that association in office ought to bind men to one another in much the same way as the tie of natural relationship does. This idea is emphasized in Cicero's indictment of Verres, from which also Burke takes the quotation which he has prefixed to this pamphlet.

14. *civil*, as opposed to natural or blood relationship.

15. *distinguished*, marked.

16. *The whole people*, etc., referring to the divisions into tribes and centuries.

18. *affected*, favoured.

to endeavour, etc. Cf. "The idea of a united administration implies the necessity of having the great strongholds of Government in well-united hands, in order to secure the predominance of right and uniform principles; of having the capital offices of deliberation and execution in the hands of those who can deliberate with mutual confidence, and who will execute what is resolved with firmness and fidelity."—*Burke*.

22. *had no tie*, involved no obligations. A man was dishonoured by political treachery.

24. *They believed*, etc. In the defence of party with which he closes his letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, Burke says that the members of the Rockingham party to which he belonged "grafted public principles on private honour."

30. *plus sages*, etc., the expression is borrowed from the French dramatist Molière. Cf. "We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason, because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages."—*Burke*.

33. *dissonant and jarring*, discordant. Those who are friends in private life should stick to one another in public, and their political association should in turn strengthen their private friendship.

P. 80, l. 8. *his business*, namely, to recommend them to the public. The quotation is from Addison's Campaign.

16. **essays, trials.**

17. **practised, put to the test.**

experimented, tried. Before a man can be received as a colleague in office, he must show himself to be honourable and trustworthy, not a man who will throw his colleagues over for his own advantage.

18. **a bloody idol**, the name patriot was often assumed by, or bestowed on, politicians out of office and bidding for office, and ready to sacrifice everything and everybody to gain it. See note on p. 58, l. 7. Burke has in mind Milton's lines :

"First Moloch, horrid king, besmeared with blood
Of human sacrifice, and parents' tears,
Though, for the noise of drums and timbrels loud,
Their children's cries unheard, that passed through fire
To his grim idol." P.L. 1, 392.

21. **that, such an.** It is a Latinism.

paradoxical, lit. what runs counter to common opinion. In a similar spirit Burke says elsewhere, "Men may tolerate injuries whilst they are only personal to themselves. But it is not the first of virtues to bear with moderation the indignities that are offered to our country."

25. **They believed**, Burke here sums up in a sentence his justification of party. The student will notice how high his ideal of party is. The basis of it, as he says elsewhere, is "unshaken adherence to principle, and attachment to connexion, against every allurements of interest."

36. **an ambitious Junto.** See on p. 23, l. 24.

P. 81, l. 2. **a scuffle for places**, cf. p. 58, l. 7.

9. **speculative**, theoretical, as distinguished from the practical statesman whose business it is to secure the objects for which he has learnt from the philosopher that Government exists. Burke has already said that it is only by united action that anything can be effected.

16. **common plans**, plans on which they are all agreed.

19. **Without a proscription**, see on p. 28, l. 14. Elsewhere Burke says of the Rockingham party that, however they differed from others "they were desirous not to extend the misfortune by unnecessary bitterness; they wished to prevent a difference of opinion on the Commonwealth from falling into rancorous and incurable hostility."

25. **fundamental principles**, viz. of mutual attachment and good faith. Burke is alluding to the artifices by which the Court party weakened and dissolved administrations. See pp. 24-26.

34. **vulgar, common, ordinary.** See on p. 17, l. 29.

P. 82, l. 1. **first principles**, axioms, self-evident truths, lit. the principles which are the basis of all demonstration, but do not themselves admit of or stand in need of proof.

light and portable, lit. easy to carry about, *i.e.* easily remembered, repeated, and applied.

2. **They are as current**, etc., they are accepted without examination. By deducing his conclusions from principles, which are apparently self-evident, a man gets credit for a wisdom which he does not possess, and his opinions pass generally for unquestionable certainties.

5. **stamp**, kind.

the cant, the hypocritical pretension. It signifies properly the whining tone of a beggar's story.

Not men, etc. This was the argument used by the king's men to discredit party connexions. Short-sighted people would at once assent to the proposition that a wise man, instead of voting consistently for any party, will look simply to the merits of the bill upon which he has to vote. They do not see that it may be used as an excuse for shifting from party to party as interest requires.

6. **charm**, a spell.

7. **engagement**, obligation.

9. **prejudice**, harm.

12. **weakness**, want of sense.

13. **qualities**, **rare**, etc., conscientiousness.

20. **discovers**, discloses, shows.

26. **cast upon the dice**, chance, piece of good luck. The enemies of party, of course, identified it with faction, *i.e.* a combination for selfish ends.

30. **issue**, a question. Burke uses legal phraseology.

31. **by plain men**, it requires no ability or knowledge to see that what the trimmer says is only an excuse for trimming. We know that he is lying, but, of course, we can't prove it.

P. 83, l. 1. **to put...on**. Cf. p. 75, l. 13.

2. **cognizable**, another legal term, 'upon which plain men can decide.'

3. **that secret tribunal**, his own conscience. A man's motives and intentions are known for certain only to himself.

5. **private whipping**, self-reproach, distinguished from public condemnation.

8. **as deduced from conduct**, cf. p. 54, ll. 28, *seqq.*

10. **the great convenience**, etc. Burke has just shown that, if dishonesty can only be proved by intention, it cannot be proved

at all, which is just what the dishonest man wants. Cf. "It is false virtue and plausible error that do the mischief."—*Burke*.

18. **senselessly**, because no man worth having would join a party on such terms.

27. **a concurrence**, an agreement of opinion as to the measures required to give effect to them.

33. **the general sentiment**, the feeling of the party as a whole. The Court party, of course, wished all men to be ready to abandon their political associates at any time. Burke's point is that a man will be inclined to defer to the judgment of friends whom he has chosen because he can respect them. In all party arrangements it is understood that there are certain 'open questions' upon which the party is not expected to vote as a whole.

P. 84, l. 5. **tempered**, constituted.

9. **agitation**, discussion.

10. **ponderous**, used in its literal sense of *weighty*.

14. **scholastic aphorism**, Aristotle, *Politics* 1, 1, says that a man may be so degraded as to be unfit for society, or he may be self-sufficient, and therefore not need it. In the first case he resembles a beast, in the second a god. Bacon quotes the saying: "Whosoever is delighted in solitude is either a beast or a god."—*Essay* xxvii.

15. **detached**, bound to no party.

23. **the dispositions**, unselfishness, loyalty to friends, etc.

25. **so to be patriots**, etc., to be patriots without being dishonourable. He refers to those who justified their treachery to their colleagues on the ground that they looked not to men but to measures. See on p. 82, l. 5.

27. **selected**, cf. "a well-chosen friendship," p. 83, l. 32.

28. **To model our principles**, etc. Cf. Plato's definition of virtue as "doing one's own work." Burke elsewhere says: "The place of every man determines his duty."

33. **without blame**, etc. Students of Dante will recall his contemptuous treatment of those who "lived without disgrace and without praise." Cf. the saying of Bacon, "Men must know that, in this theatre of man's life, it is reserved only for God and angels to be lookers on."

35. **who sleeps upon his watch**, the metaphor here is from a sentry on duty.

P. 85, l. 1. **a time for all things**, a reminiscence of the English Bible, "To everything there is a season, and a time to every purpose under heaven."—*Ecclesiastes* 3, 1.

6. **embody**, used intr., form themselves into a body, unite.

16. **with a conscience**, etc. In his appeal to the old Whigs Burke puts, as a nice and therefore dangerous point of casuistry, the question—whether, after the people have discharged themselves of (virtually abdicated) their original power by an habitual delegation (to the executive), no occasion can possibly occur which may justify the resumption of it. Upon which he says: “This question, in this latitude, is very hard to affirm or deny; but I am satisfied that no occasion can justify such a resumption, which would not equally authorize a dispensation with any other moral duty, perhaps with all of them together.” “Such devious proceedings must be ever on the edge of crimes.”

20. **we work in the light**. It is not too late to prevent the Revolution which is being attempted by the Court Party. Another reminiscence of the English Bible: “Work while it is yet day; for the night cometh in which no man can work.”

27. **undermining**, etc. Burke recapitulates the points which he has separately proved at length.

28. **executory**. Cf. p. 12, l. 6.

P. 86, l. 4. **every other**, every one else, etc.

6. **perfect freedom**, the phrase is taken from the English Prayer Book.

7. **natural**, prescribed by the circumstances of the case.

liberal, opposed to servile. He is the true slave who is subject to the arbitrary caprices of an individual. Cf. “War with the world and peace with our constituents.” Be this our motto and our principle. Then indeed we shall be truly great. Respecting ourselves, we shall be respected by the world. . . . Let us give a faithful pledge to the people that we honour, indeed, the Crown, but that we *belong* to them; that we are their auxiliaries and not their taskmasters; their fellow labourers in the same vineyard, not lording over their rights, but helpers of their joy; that to tax them is a grievance to ourselves; but to cut off from our enjoyments to forward theirs is the highest gratification we are capable of receiving.”—*Speech on Economical Reform*.

14. **the false ornaments**, in the speech from which I have just quoted Burke compares the House of Commons, seduced by the blandishments of the Court into an alliance with power, to a faithless wife, seduced by presents into an adulterous connection. Cf. “They who are wedded to the constitution will not act the part of wittols. They will drive such seducers from the house on the first appearance of their love letters and offered assignations.”—*Appeal to the Old Whigs*.

16. **old**, which it has for the present given up. Cf. p. 32, l. 35.

last of evils, greatest of evils. Burke elsewhere calls arbitrary will the last corruption of ruling power.

17. **without popular confidence**, etc. Cf. on p. 10, l. 25.

22. **but one**, only one. See p. 11, l. 35.

24. **the opinion of**, the esteem in which they are held by.

27. **upon such principles**, because they are generally respected.

33. **may probably be**, may be expected to be. The best of men cannot be trusted to make a right use of power if they are subject to no control. It is the business of the people to see that their representatives exercise an effective control upon the Executive.

P. 87, l. 2. **civil violence**, see p. 85, l. 8.

the dead repose, etc. See on p. 32, l. 14. Either the people will have to recover by force the rights of which they have allowed themselves to be deprived, or they will sink into an unresisting submission to despotism.

SUMMARY.

- ✓ Pp. 1-3. Burke wishes to discover the causes of the distracted condition of the nation. Whoever, he says, can discover the causes and suggest the remedies for social disorder does a service to society. Government does not rest on force. The strength of a government comes from the sympathy and support which it receives from the people, because its laws and its policy suit the temper of the people. Statesmen, therefore, must study the temper of their subjects, and must be able to distinguish between the universal complaints of human nature and the peculiar grievances of their own time and country.
- ✓ Pp. 3, 4. What Burke complains of in his own time is that men despise the character and policy of their governors, though they dread their power. They laugh at them when they cannot enforce the law, and hate them when they do. They have no respect for rank and authority. The colonies neither love nor obey the Mother country, which in turn is neither strong enough to enforce nor gracious enough to withdraw her demands. In England itself Burke finds divisions and confusion wherever he had been accustomed to look for union and the strength that comes of union.
- ✓ Pp. 4-7. The Government contend that these evils are due simply to the fact that the people have become insubordinate—the rich through the pride of prosperity, the poor through the recklessness of guilt. Burke rejects this explanation. People who are well governed, he says, do not generally rise against their rulers. Besides, if the explanation is true, the case is hopeless. For we can alter the members of a government, but we cannot change the character of a people. It is of no use to say that the people may be coerced into order. Coercion is a remedy for occasional outbreaks, but it irritates instead of pacifying men, whose ill-temper is caused by *systematic* misgovernment. For governments are, as a general rule, to blame if their subjects are discontented and mutinous.

✓ Pp. 7-10. The majority of men, though they know that things are mismanaged, are unable to explain the mismanagement. Their mistakes are due partly to bias, partly to want of ability. It is silly to argue that Government is perfect simply because it is not only not practising the peculiar forms of tyranny which have been practised in other times, but is loud in its expressions of detestation of them. Those who blame the crimes of past rulers, because they would gain nothing by praising them, are yet ready to practise the same crimes themselves for their own benefit. Moreover, governments are not likely to rush on their own destruction by attempting what has ruined their predecessors. The attempts of ambitious men upon the liberty of their fellows take different forms at different times. The Stuarts attempted to rule by the Prerogative without the Parliament. The Court at present is attempting to rule absolutely by converting the Parliament into a mere instrument of its will.

✓ Pp. 10-13. The Revolution of 1688 secured influence to the people, because it forced the Crown to rely upon the support of men who were influential with the people. The policy at present is to discredit influence with the *people* in favour of influence with the *court*. The nomination of Bute was an assertion of the right of the sovereign to govern by his own nominees. The people were not prepared for such a sudden and open substitution of arbitrary for constitutional rule. So preparation was made to secure the same end more gradually, but not less completely. Behind the nominal advisers of the sovereign there was to be a Secret Cabinet of Courtiers, and the Parliament was to be turned into a mere instrument for carrying out the commands communicated to it by the trusted advisers of the Court. Thus England, though possessed of the forms of a free constitution, would be subjected to a complete despotism.

✓ Pp. 13-21. It may be asked—(a) how did it ever occur to any one to attempt such a change in the principles of the constitution, and (b) how were the people induced to consent to such a surrender of their liberties?

With regard to the first question, the Cabinet was so weakened by internal dissensions as to invite attack. The Whigs could not believe that a sovereign of the House of Brunswick would treat them badly, so they offered no opposition to the disgrace of Pitt. When deprived of his support, they were too weak to stand alone. Not only were the leaders of the party dismissed, but also the humblest servants who owed their places to Whigs, so as to show to the nation at large that no one henceforth could look for anything except through the favour of the Court.

The answer to the second question is that the authors of the change persuaded the people that the great leaders of parties had stood between them and the favour of the sovereign, and that, therefore, the people had nothing to fear and everything to hope from a policy which would make the sovereign independent. They had an argument for everybody. They told the peers that they had to choose between government by the sovereign and government by the mob, and they told the people that they had to choose between government by a beneficent king and government by selfish aristocrats. These representations were all false. A sovereign is not the less independent because he cannot choose as his minister a personal favourite of his own. And as for the fear of an aristocracy, the House of Lords was not a whit more despotically inclined than the House of Commons. Peers who are worthy of their name and rank are a security for popular liberty. The object of these attempts to set one part of the nation against another was simply to prevent the possibility of any united resistance to the new policy.

✓ Pp. 22-30. Having described the system which caused the existing discontent, the circumstances which favoured the introduction of it, and the arguments by which the various classes of the people were induced to acquiesce in it, Burke proceeds to describe the way in which it was worked.

The Court party deliberately undertook to discredit and weaken the ministry. This was equivalent to a subversion of the constitution. For the ministers being the responsible advisers of the sovereign, there can be no talk of opposing the ministry in the interests of the sovereign. Under the new system, however, the ministry and the nation were effectually taught that the Court neither wanted advice nor would tolerate independence.

As the new party not only had exclusive access to the sovereign, but also monopolized the subordinate administrative offices, they had the advantage of possessing power without responsibility.

There was a short interval of freedom and constitutional government while Rockingham was in office. Burke purposely says nothing of Bute. The system would have been devised and worked even if Bute had never been born; and besides, it is much more important to consider the system and its results than it is to consider individuals who may have had a share in introducing it.

To sum up.—According to English constitutional theory, the king's nomination of ministers requires to be ratified by the people. Under the new system he appointed whom he

liked without reference to the people. The consequence was a government of the country by Court favourites, which is naturally an arbitrary government.

✓ Pp. 30-34. The two Houses of Parliament are no doubt intended to prevent the king from abusing the power which the constitution gives him. What does it matter, then, it may be asked, whom the king appoints as ministers, so long as there is the Parliament to prevent them from doing what is illegal? Burke replies, you must not only guard against illegality, but must ensure Government in the public interest. The people are interested in the character of ministers for this reason, that it is of no avail to have popular laws unless they are administered by popular agents. According to the theory of the constitution the king must choose ministers whom the people approve, because if he does not the people won't vote him money. Now, if the people allow themselves to be deprived of this check upon Government, they give up their share of power, and make themselves no better than slaves. Men are not virtuous enough to use power, for which they are not indebted to the people, in the interests of the people.

✓ Pp. 34-37. But, it may be objected, the king cannot know whom the people wish to be appointed ministers, because the voice of the people is indistinguishable from the cry of faction. Burke says that it is very easy to excuse wrong doing by insisting on the difficulties which beset every course that is open. Governments that really wish to make their subjects happy, will not find it difficult to make them fairly happy. Besides, it is the duty of the natural leaders of the people to make themselves heard, and to rescue the Government from being misled by evil advisers.

✓ Pp. 37-40. The people are not compensated for their loss of freedom at home by any increase of reputation abroad. Foreign nations treat England with contempt, because they know that the nominal Government of England is divided and powerless. The Court party will never under any circumstances venture upon war, because if there were a war, it would be necessary for the king to court the good will of the people of England.

✓ Pp. 40, 41. The new system has alienated the Colonies. They would respect and fear a Government which was united, consistent, and backed by the whole people. But they are naturally disgusted by a Government from whom they have nothing to hope and nothing to fear.

✓ Pp. 41, 42. The English people themselves are rendered furious by the perversion of the national institutions of Government. In

their discontent they are naturally driven to riot. The Government meets violence by violence. The unpopularity of the Government robs the laws of all their terrors: its feebleness prevents it from maintaining order. Content will not be restored until the people regain that control over the Executive which by right belongs to them.

✓ Pp. 43-47. One plausible argument by which the new system was recommended was that it would free the king from the servitude to which the great Whig leaders had reduced him. As a matter of fact the expense of maintaining his new friends has reduced him to poverty. He has been obliged to accept as ministers whomsoever his friends forced upon him, no matter how distasteful they might be to himself. The exigencies of the system have forced him to submit to indignities which a loyal people would never have put upon him. His peace of mind has been destroyed by the distracted state of the nation. All these things he has been made to endure for the sake of so-called friends whom he does not know, and who will desert him when there is nothing more to be got from him.

✓ Pp. 47-62. The Court party proposed to make the House of Commons the instrument for carrying their system of arbitrary government into effect. The House was originally a body of citizens summoned occasionally and invested with a temporary authority in the interests of that body of citizens to which the members belonged. Its justification in the Constitution is that it reflects the temper and the wishes of the citizens. The necessity of providing a constant check on the Executive tended from the Revolution onwards to give to the House a more permanent character and a more independent authority than it originally possessed. The Court party pushed this tendency to the extreme of making the House absolute in its power. This power they then proceeded to use as an instrument in the hands of the Government for controlling the people. To such extremes did they proceed in the case of Wilkes that they absolutely gave to the House the power of disqualifying those whom the people elect from sitting in it. In this way all who could or would promote the interests of the people are excluded from the House. The House is to be composed of men whom the people do not wish to sit in it, and thus the freedom of the Executive from popular control is to be made perfect. It is a monstrous thing that the House of Commons should claim a discretionary power of ejecting those whom the people elect. It rests with the people to say whether they will allow themselves thus to be deprived of their rights. They must know that the House would not claim

this power unless it was intended to use it against the people. They must know that if a regard for the people's wishes is made penal, Government will cease to regard the people's wishes. They must know that, when Court service becomes more profitable than the service of the people, all will enter into the service of the Court. The people must say whether they mean to allow the House to be changed from a control upon the Government to an accomplice and supporter of Government in whatever it may choose to do. The energy displayed by Government in the affair of Wilkes shows what importance it attaches to securing a House of Commons filled with its own nominees and supporters.

Pp. 62-76. The next object of the Court party was to obtain an unlimited sum of money to be employed in bribery. The House of Commons culpably allowed them to exceed the sum voted for the Civil List and to draw to any extent upon the National revenues for any sums which the Court might think it proper to spend. No account of the money spent was to be given or demanded. Thus the burdens of the nation were increased, public credit was weakened, and public morality was corrupted. The power of the Court was now absolutely unlimited—for on the one hand it could exclude distasteful persons from the House of Commons, and it could bribe to any extent those who were allowed to become members of that House.

It has been proposed to render Members of Parliament more dependent on the people and less dependent on the Court by making elections more frequent. If, however, this course were adopted things would grow worse instead of better. Disorder will not be diminished by rendering more frequent the disorders which attend elections. Moreover, as votes can be purchased and as Governments are richer than individuals, Government would outbid independent candidates for votes at every election. And the more frequent elections were made, the sooner would private candidates be ruined.

It has been proposed also to diminish the influence of the Court upon Parliament by enacting that no one who holds an office under the Crown shall be allowed to sit in Parliament. This measure again would aggravate instead of diminishing the evils complained of. The powerful classes of office-holders, if excluded from Government, would become disloyal to it. Besides, the bestowal of an office is not the only means by which the Crown can bribe a member, and if we prevent the Crown from bribing men openly it will bribe them secretly, which would be worse.

The fact is, that the people themselves must interfere and exercise a supervision over the conduct of their representa-

tives. The House of Commons, which ought to control the ministry, now supports any ministry whom the Court chooses to appoint. Of course the people are disgusted. The country is governed by the caprices of the Court, and there is nothing to tempt good men to become ministers. For when they accept office, they must either obey the orders of the Court party or be expelled from their office with disgrace. The people must compel their representatives to offer a conscientious resistance to the attempts of the Court to rule the country through a puppet ministry. The Court party, knowing that their strength lies in the disunion of public men, naturally discourages party combinations.

- P. 76 to end. Union is strength, and the justification of party connexions is that they are necessary to the detection and prevention of wrong-doing. He who stands alone fails in his duty, because he takes up a position in which he cannot perform his duty. Of course men have sometimes sacrificed their country to their party, but party is not to be condemned on that account. You might as well condemn the family on the ground that it divides men's interests with the state. All good things are liable to abuse. The Romans thought rightly that men associated in public functions ought to be friends. They thought rightly that he who loved nobody would never love his country. It was justly said to the honour of Whigs of former days that they were trusted in public positions, because they had shown that they were to be trusted in private life. The struggle of an honest party for power is a joint effort made by a body of friends to obtain a position in which they can carry out a policy which they all consider beneficial to their country. A selfish man can generally find a plausible excuse for his conduct. A man who always contrives to be in favour with the party in power will say that he thinks it better to look to measures than to the individuals by whom they are proposed. But his conduct shows him to be a trimmer. A man need not, because he belongs to a party, yield up his conscience to it. As he joined it because he approved its general principles, he will naturally be in accord with it on the majority of questions. On minor points he will yield to his friends, who will not grudge him an occasional freedom for conscience sake. Public life in England tends naturally to combine men into parties, and men should be glad of the opportunity of turning private virtues to the account of the state. If men will not form parties to prevent illegal actions, they will find themselves reduced to the necessity of rebelling against a usurping power which owes its existence to their previous inactivity.

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
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